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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
For ease of reference, statutory offer back provisions and related repealed 
legislation discussed in this paper are recorded as follows:  
 
 
PUBLIC WORKS ACT 1981 (as at July 2017) 
 
40   Disposal to former owner of land not required for public work 
(1) Where any land held under this or any other Act or in any other manner for any public 
work— 
(a) is no longer required for that public work; and 
(b) is not required for any other public] work; and 
(c) is not required for any exchange under section 105 of this Act— 
The chief executive of the department within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey Act 1986 
or local authority, as the case may be, shall endeavour to sell the land in accordance with 
subsection (2) of this section, if that subsection is applicable to that land. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the chief executive of the department 
within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey Act 1986 or local authority, unless— 
(a) he or it considers that it would be impracticable, unreasonable, or unfair to do so; or 
(b) there has been a significant change in the character of the land for the purposes of, or in 
connection with, the public work for which it was acquired or is held— 
shall offer to sell the land by private contract to the person from whom it was acquired or to 
the successor of that person— 
(c) At the current market value of the land as determined by a valuation carried out by a 
registered valuer; or 
(d) If the chief executive of the department within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey Act 
1986 or local authority considers it reasonable to do so, at any lesser price. 
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(2A) If the chief executive of the department within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey 
Act 1986 or local authority and the offeree are unable to agree on a price following an offer 
made under subsection (2) of this section, the parties may agree that the price be determined 
by the Land Valuation Tribunal. 
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to land acquired after the 31st day of January 
1982 and before the date of commencement of the Public Works Amendment Act (No 2) 1987 
for a public work that was not an essential work. 
(4) Where the chief executive of the department within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey 
Act 1986 or local authority believes on reasonable grounds that, because of the size, shape, or 
situation of the land he or it could not expect to sell the land to any person who did not own 
land adjacent to the land to be sold, the land may be sold to an owner of adjacent land at a 
price negotiated between the parties. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, the term successor, in relation to any person, means the 
person who would have been entitled to the land under the will or intestacy of that person had 
he owned the land at the date of his death; and, in any case where part of a person's land was 
acquired or taken, includes the successor in title of that person. 
 
 
41   Disposal of former Maori land when no longer required 
Notwithstanding anything in sections 40 and 42 of this Act, where any land to which section 
40(2) of this Act applies was, immediately before its taking or acquisition,— 
(a) Maori freehold land or General land owned by Maori (as those terms are defined in section 
4 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993); and 
(b) beneficially owned by more than 4 persons; and 
(c) not vested in any trustee or trustees— 
The chief executive of the department within the meaning of section 2 of the Survey Act 1986 
or local authority, as the case may be, shall— 
(d) comply with the requirements of section 40 of this Act; or 
(e) apply to the Maori Land Court for the district in which the land is situated for an order 




PUBLIC WORKS ACT 1928 (repealed 1 February 1982)1 
 
35   Dealings with Taken Lands (Repealed)  
If it is found that any land held, taken, purchased or acquired at any time under this or any 
other Act or Provincial Ordinance, or otherwise howsoever, for any public work is not 
required for such public work, the Governor-General may, by an Order in Council publicly 
notified and gazetted, cause the same to be sold under the following conditions:-  
(a) A recommendation or memorial, as the case may be, as provided by section twenty-three 
hereof shall be laid before the Governor-General by the Minister or local authority at 
whose instance the land was taken describing so much of the said lands as are not required 
for such public work, accompanied by a map thereof certified by the Surveyor-General or 
an authorized surveyor appointed by him in that behalf, and setting forth the reasons for 
disposing the same: 
(b) The Minister or local authority, as the case may be, shall cause the land proposed to be 
sold to be valued by one or more competent valuers, and shall offer such land at the price 
fixed by such valuation – first, to the person then entitled to the land from which such 
land was originally taken; and, if he refuses it or cannot after due inquiry be found, then to 
the owner of the adjacent lands, or, if there is more than one such owner, then to each of 
such owners in such order as the Minister or local authority thinks fit; and, if no such 
owner accepts such offer, may cause the land to be sold by public auction:  
Provided that the Governor-General may without complying with any of the last foregoing 
provisions sell by private contract or grant to any Education Board any lands taken for 
Government works, and may execute such grants, conveyances, and assurances as may be 
necessary to give effect to such sale or grant:  
Provided also that in the case of any land so taken, purchased, or acquired for a Government 
work and not required for that purpose, the Governor-General may, on such recommendation 
as aforesaid and without complying with any other requirements of this section, by 
Proclamation declare such land to be Crown land, Subject to the Land Act, 1924, and 




                                                          
1
 Public Works Act 1928, s35 is a carry-over from the provisions of the Public Works Act 1894, s29 except for 
the final paragraph of the 1928 Act which is additional. 
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PUBLIC WORKS ACT 1876 (repealed) 
 
29   Land not wanted may be sold by Order in Council (Repealed)  
If it is found that any land taken under this Act is not required for public use, the Governor 
may, by an Order in Council, publically notified and gazetted, cause the same to be sold under 
the following conditions: -  
(1) A memorial shall be laid before the Governor by the Minister, County Council, or Road 
Board at whose instance, as provided by the twenty-fifth section, the land was taken, 
describing so much of the said lands as are not required for public use, accompanied by a 
map thereof, certified by a certified surveyor appointed by him in that behalf, and setting 
forth the reasons for disposing of the same.  
(2) The Minister, County Council, or Road Board, as the case may be, shall cause the land 
proposed to be sold to be valued by one or more competent valuers, and shall offer such 
land at the price fixed by such valuation, first to the person then entitled to the land from 
which it was originally severed; and if he refuse it, or cannot after due inquiry be found, 
then to the owner of the adjacent lands, or, if there be more than one such owner, then to 
each of such owners, in such order as the Minister, County Council, or Road Board thinks 




MAORI AFFAIRS ACT 1953 (repealed 1 July 1993) 
 
436    Land Acquired From Maoris For Public Work May Be Revested In Maoris 
(Repealed) 
(1)    Where any Maori land or any [General land] owned by Maoris has been at any time 
acquired by the Crown or by any local authority or public body for the purposes of a public 
work or other public purpose, and is no longer required for [the public work or other public 
purpose for which it was acquired or is held] [the [ ]]Minister or authority under whose control 
the land is held or administered may apply to the Court to vest the land in accordance with the 
provisions of this section. In any application made for the purposes of this section the Minister 
or other applicant may nominate the person or persons in whom the land shall be vested, and 
may stipulate the price to be paid for the land, the terms and conditions of payment, and any 
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other conditions subject to which a vesting order under this section may be made, or may leave 
all or any of such matters to be dealt with in the discretion of the Court. 
(2)    An application may be made to the Court and the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
under this section notwithstanding the provisions of any Act to which the land is subject and 
notwithstanding any terms and conditions imposed by any Act on the sale or other disposition 
of the land. 
(3)    On application being made under this section the Court may make one or more orders, 
subject to such terms and conditions as may have been specified in the application or subject 
to any other terms and conditions not inconsistent with any terms and conditions so specified 
as it may think fit to impose, vesting the land or any parts thereof, freed from any trusts and 
restrictions subject to which the land may previously have been held, in such person or 
persons as may be nominated by the applicant or, if no such nomination has been made, in 
such person or persons as may be found by the Court to be justly entitled thereto, for an estate 
of freehold in fee simple and, if more than one, as tenants in common in the relative shares or 
interests defined by the Court. 
(4)    Instead of making a vesting order under this section or in addition to any such order the 
Court if it thinks it necessary or convenient so to do, may amend any existing instrument of 
title so as to include therein the land or any part of the land to which the application relates, 
and the land so included shall thereupon become subject to all reservations, trusts, rights, 
titles, interests, and encumbrances affecting the other land comprised in that instrument of 
title. 
(5)    Any land vested in a Maori pursuant to this section shall thereupon be deemed to become 
Maori freehold land, unless the Court otherwise expressly orders. 
(6)    The District Land Registrar is hereby authorised to make all such alterations and 
amendments in the register and to issue such new certificates of title as may be necessary to 








SURPLUS PUBLIC WORKS LAND: THE 




During the 1970s there was increased public awareness concerning the 
disposal of land no longer required for public works. That awareness was 
largely due to the voice of Maori protest making known specific situations 
where the Crown sought to sell land it had taken without first considering the 
interests of former owners. At that time, the Crown did not have to consider 
how it had originally come to hold subject public works land nor was it 
required to consider the interests of those former owners adversely affected by 
such taking. Parliament changed that in 1981 by enacting enforceable offer 
back provisions under ss40 and 41 of the Public Works Act 1981. The Crown 
is now obliged to offer surplus public works land back to its former owners or 
their successors unless exceptions under the offer back scheme apply.
2
  
The offer back scheme is remedial in nature and purpose. It is not to be 
confused with Treaty of Waitangi settlement policy which addresses broader 
failures of the Crown regarding its obligations to an iwi or hapu. It is 
individual owners who lose or surrender their lands for public works. The 
Crown’s duty under s40 offer back provisions is directed specifically toward 
those former owners and their successors. Offer back rights may be held by 
former owners or their successors whether or not they identify as Maori. They 
are granted the first right to buy land back at market value when the subject 
land is no longer required for a public work or for exchange.
3
  
                                                          
2
 Public Works Act 1981, s40(2) 
3
 Ibid, s40(1) 
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The Crown and Maori hold a special relationship first recognised under terms 
recorded in the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840.
4
 That relationship endures to the 
present day and remains part of the constitutional arrangement for Aotearoa 
New Zealand as a sovereign state. Developing public infrastructure and 
services throughout Aotearoa New Zealand has benefitted the nation but has 
been achieved at the expense of individual land owners who have been 
required to sell or surrender their land for public works. The surrender of land 
for public works has often been carried out under compulsion or an element of 
compulsion. Such circumstances concerning Maori owned land taken for 




The Crown owes a special duty to Maori regarding the offer back of surplus 
public works land. This duty is constitutional and is in keeping with the special 
relationship between the parties since 1840. The enactment of offer back 
provisions under the Public Works Act 1981 further enhanced the Crown’s 
responsibility to Maori. Surplus public works land must be offered back to its 
former owners or their successors unless specified exemptions apply.  
Since 1981, offer back cases before the Courts have identified advantages and 
some shortfalls in the statutory offer back regime. The stories of people and 
land holding institutions are brought out in these cases. It is only possible to 
assess the appropriateness and relevance of the offer back scheme after it has 
been played out in real life situations. The implications for Maori is 
concerning. The scheme despite being a significant advancement in 1981, has 
failed to keep pace with developments since then. Since 1981 there have been 
significant developments in the relationship between the Crown and Maori 
particularly regarding land and Treaty of Waitangi matters. Other 
developments include decisions from the Courts in numerous offer back cases 
that have shaped how the Crown must deal with its responsibilities under the 
statutory scheme. There is now a need to revise and improve the offer back 
scheme to ensure its remedial purpose is properly served. One aspect of this is 
                                                          
4
 Treaty of Waitangi, United Kingdom – New Zealand (opened for signature and entered into force 6 February 
1840) 
5
 Ibid, art 2 
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to ensure Maori stand a reasonable chance of exercising their rights to offer 
back and be reunited with land previously taken from them. There is little 
point in having an offer back scheme if there is a high probability Maori will 











Public works legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand enabled the development of 
public facilities and infrastructure for the greater public interest. Schools, 
hospitals, roads, railways, telecommunication and electricity networks are but 
some of the public facilities and infrastructure essential to advance the 
wellbeing of the population. Public works are part Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
history of settlement and development and will continue to be an important 
part of national development into the future.  
Settlement and development comes at a cost. Private individuals must 
surrender their land, sometimes under protest, when statutory powers of 
compulsory acquisition are exercised. An offer back requirement regarding 
surplus public works land was introduced by Parliament in 1981 to address the 
perceived injustice arising from losing land compulsorily taken.
6
  
Part I of this paper summarizes laws relevant to the disposal of surplus public 
works land and resulting obligations of the Crown to former Maori owners.  
 
 
Constitutional Arrangement by Treaty 
 
A special constitutional relationship in Aotearoa New Zealand was established 
by treaty between the Crown and Maori at Waitangi in 1840. Due to this 
arrangement, legal principles from England regarding land ownership and 
tenure were deemed to take effect in Aotearoa New Zealand. The full 
                                                          
6
 Rowan v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 559 at 568 
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implication of this new constitutional arrangement would likely have been 
unknown to those Maori signatories of the Treaty, particularly the Crown’s 
ultimate dominance over estates in land. Notwithstanding Treaty provisions 
for protecting Maori interests in land, the Crown must at times rely upon its 
constitutional dominance. Acquisition of land for public works is enabled by 
powers conferred by Parliament which includes the power to compulsorily 
acquire land if need be. These powers may be exercised over all land held in 
private ownership, including land held by Maori. The Crown’s exclusive right 
of pre-emption over land, alluded to in the Second Article of the Treaty, is 
more than a first option to purchase in favour of the Crown.
7
 It is the ultimate 
right of the Crown to take back the fee simple estate it has conferred upon 
private land owners.  
The constitutional relationship established by way of the Treaty of Waitangi in 
1840 endures and has subsequently been affirmed by contemporary Treaty 
settlements. The relationship links Maori and the Crown in a partnership for all 
time.
8
 The nature of this arrangement is that Maori pursue their own goals but 
do not aspire to take over the role of central government in meeting its 
obligations to all New Zealanders.
9
  
There is an inherent conflict in the 1840 treaty provisions between the 
principle of ‘kawanatanga’, being the right of the Crown to govern and make 
laws,
10
 and the guarantee to protect Maori ‘tino rangatiratanga’, being the 
Maori right of self-governance. Both principles are the subject of much debate. 
This paper does not justify or explain the conflict. There has been much said 
about this subject at hearings before the Waitangi Tribunal and recorded 
settlements between the Crown and Maori which acknowledge and address 
failings of the Crown. However, it is worth noting a particular observation of 
the Waitangi Tribunal regarding Public Works legislation. The observation is 
recorded in its 1994 Te Maunga Railways Land Report:  
                                                          
7
 Treaty of Waitangi, United Kingdom – New Zealand (opened for signature and entered into force 6 February 
1840), art 2 
8
 Dr Nin Thomas “Coming Ready or Not! The emergence of Maori Hapu and Iwi as a Unique Order of 




 Waitangi Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation 
paragraph 2 (no page or paragraph references on report) 
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Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed protection of tino rangatiratanga. This 
was a promise made by the Crown that Maori would remain in possession of their 
lands and resources unless and until Maori themselves willingly decided to dispose of 
them at an agreed price. On the face of it, a Crown right to compulsory acquisition of 
land cuts right across this guarantee of Maori rangatiratanga.
11
  
The role of the Crown as protector of Maori interests in land can be at odds 
with the role of the Crown as government and lawmaker. The Crown’s 
responsibility for public works overrides the rights of private land owners and 





Overview of Public Works Legislation 
 
The history of consolidated public works legislation applicable to Aotearoa 
New Zealand dates from the industrial revolution in England. Holders of 
private interests in land had to give way to the demands of economic 
expansion for the national good. Privately owned land was required for various 
public purposes such as canals, roads and railways.
13
 The Lands Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845 (UK)
14
 was the first English statute to consolidate 
laws authorising the acquisition of land for public works.
15
In Aotearoa New 
Zealand, privately owned land was also required for public purposes to enable 
settlement and promote economic development throughout the country. 
Consolidated public works legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand follows 
through from the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1863, Immigration and 
                                                          
11
 Waitangi Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation: 
paragraph 2 (no page or paragraph references on report) 
12
 Treaty of Waitangi, United Kingdom – New Zealand (opened for signature and entered into force 6 February 
1840), art 2 
13
 Waitangi Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation: 
Kawanatanga: The Powers of the Crown to Take Land 
Peter Salmon The Compulsory Acquisition of Land in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington 1982) at 8 
14
 Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 8 Vict 18 (Repealed) 
15
 Frank A Sharman “The History of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845-2*” (1986) 7(2) Statute Law Rev 
78 at 78, Also see: Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 8 Vict 18 (Repealed) - Long title of Act 
16 
 




Compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes is today enabled by 
statute, principally Part 2 of the Public Works Act 1981. The rationale behind 
this statutory power is essentially for advancement of the public good 
generally. This is determined by the government of the day from its own view 
point. The Crown’s right of eminent domain, a generic term referring to the 
existence of inherent and dominant rights in favour of the State, is exercised 
by means of the statute. It is the basis upon which the State may pursue its 
public works policy agenda. The Crown, which for practical purposes is best 
described as the government of the day, has been authorised to exercise this 
privilege in Aotearoa New Zealand since 1840.
17
 It is the Crown’s 
constitutional right.  
The private citizens of Aotearoa New Zealand are Crown subjects. This order 
is also apparent with estates over land. The status of the Crown’s tenure in 
land is paramount. The parent estate, or radical Crown title, is dominant over 
the inferior fee simple estate held by private citizens. Since 1840, all land in 
Aotearoa New Zealand is subject to this doctrine of tenure, including Maori 
customary land and Maori freehold land.  
Historically in England and consequently relevant to constitutional 
arrangements in Aotearoa New Zealand, the Crown held absolute and 
unfettered rights over land. However, these rights were restrained in 1215 AD 
under the Magna Carta. Compulsory acquisition of land by the Crown from its 
subjects is now limited to that as authorised by the law of the land.
18
 
Parliament determines whether or not the Crown’s powers are acceptable. The 
judiciary keeps watch to remind the Crown of its powers and limitations that 
apply.  
                                                          
16
 Waitangi Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation: 
Kawanatanga: The Powers of the Crown to Take Land 
17
 GW Hinde, DW McMorland, NR Campbell and DP Grinlinton  Land Law in New Zealand (1
st
 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997) at 29 
18
 Waitangi Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation: 
Kawanatanga: The Powers of the Crown to Take Land 
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With the passing of time, the ultimate privilege of the Crown has been further 
refined by statute. Parliament responds, sometimes slowly and reluctantly, to 
pressures brought upon it by the public conscience of the day. One such 
example was the introduction in 1981 provisions to limit the Crown’s power to 
acquire land from its citizens. Broad public works land acquisition powers 
were restricted to only enable land acquisitions deemed to be essential. Soon 
after enactment of the Public Works Act 1981, Peter Salmon observed:  
The most significant departure from tradition contained in this legislation is a 
restriction on the circumstances under which land can be acquired compulsorily. 
Land may now be acquired compulsorily only if it is for an essential work. …[T]here 
is no doubt that in the process of balancing the public against the private interest the 




Although this new ‘essential work’ restriction was repealed several years 
later,
20
 the legislative refinement process was at work. Parliament arrested a 
culture rampant within government and local authorities which placed 
excessive reliance upon compulsory land acquisition powers. Advancement of 
public works for the greater good was balanced against the cost of 
compromising private interests in land.
21
 
Limiting compulsory acquisition powers to ‘essential works’ restrained both 
central and local governments. Acquiring authorities had to negotiate on a 
willing buyer willing seller basis if they wished to acquire land for a public 
purpose that fell outside the narrow ‘essential work’ category.  
The ‘essential work’ restriction was repealed by Parliament in 1987 in favour 
of broader compulsory acquisition powers. A message had been sent and it 
was time for Parliament to loosen the restraint. The practical interests of the 
public are sometimes a priority.  
                                                          
19
 Peter Salmon The Compulsory Acquisition of Land in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington 1982) at 8 
20
 “Essential Work” definition was repealed on 31 March 1987 by the Public Works Amendment Act 1987 (No 
2), s 2(1) 
21
 See (24 March 1987) 479 NZPD pp 8023-8024 - speech by the Minister of Works and Development, Hon 
Fraser Colman referring to opposition by local authorities to restrictive statutory powers - As cited in Waitangi 
Tribunal Te Maunga Railways Land Report (Wai 315, 1994) at chapter 6 – Public Works Legislation: 
Kawanatanga: The Powers of the Crown to Take Land 
18 
 
The Public Works Act of 1981 was passed at a time in New Zealand’s history 
when there were growing sentiments to restrain excessive use of government 
powers over private property rights. In 1975, a land march from the far north 
of New Zealand to Parliament was led by respected Maori leader, Whina 
Cooper, protesting the significant and ongoing loss of Maori land from its 
Maori owners. Protests were later held at Bastion Point in Auckland during 
1977 and 1978. The Bastion Point protests concerned the almost total loss of 
tribal land which had belonged to Auckland iwi, Ngati Whatua. The 
Government announced that 60 acres (24 hectares) of then uncommitted 
Crown owned land would be sold for upmarket housing rather than be offered 
back to its former Ngati Whatua owners from whom it had been acquired.
22
 
There was also protests at Te Kopua, Raglan, led by Maori activist, Eva 
Rickard. Land had been compulsorily taken during World War II as a 
temporary emergency airfield. Despite assurances at the time of acquisition, 
the land was not returned to its former owners after the war. When the land 
was no longer required for the purpose it had been taken, it was instead leased 
to a local golf club and converted into a golf course.  
The statutory offer back scheme illustrates a significant shift in policy. 
Parliament now formally recognises the Crown’s prevailing responsibility to 
former owners. The scheme is described by Harrison J in the Court of Appeal 
judgment of Williams v Auckland Council
23
 in a series of questions to ascertain 
whether or not an offer back duty will arise. The summary is edited here for 
general reference. It is necessary to consider:   
(a) Whether the [acquiring authority] acquired or held the land for a public 
work;  
(b) If so, whether the [acquiring authority or its successor to the land] still held 
and required the land for a public work on 1 February 1982 [being the date 
the Public Works Act 1981 with offer-back provisions came into force];  
(c) If so, whether the owners must prove the [acquiring authority] compulsorily 
acquired the land;  
(d) If not, or if the owners are required to prove compulsion and are able to do 
so, whether the [acquiring authority or its successor to the land] lawfully 
                                                          
22
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exercised a discretionary power [when the land was no longer required for a 
public work] in resolving not to offer …the land back to [its former] owners;  




The statutory offer back scheme does not guarantee the return of land to 
former owners or their successors. However, it is an improvement from the 
historic system of land disposal where surplus public works land could be sold 
without any regard to former owners or their successors who hold prevailing 
ties to subject land taken from them. 
 
 
Era of Land Disposal 
 
The era of extravagant land acquisition for public works is now history. The 
context today is set in an era of surplus public works land disposal. The 
Government’s attention is now predominantly focussed upon reducing its land 
holding rather than increasing it.
25
 To think of the Public Works Act 1981 
exclusively as a legislative instrument to take land for public works would be 
to miss an important function of the Act. The land disposal provisions of the 
Act are now just as important, if not more important, to Maori than the 
acquisition provisions. The statutory mechanism under which the Crown 
disposes of surplus public works land should now be the leading public works 
issue for Maori, if not all New Zealanders.   
Where land is no longer required for a public work or land exchange, the Chief 
Executive of Land Information New Zealand for and on behalf of the Crown is 
charged with the responsibility for its disposal.
26
 It was not until the Public 
Works Act 1981 that the Crown had to consider its responsibility to previous 
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owners. It now must consider whether or not surplus public works land should 
be first offered back to them or their successors prior to its sale on the open 
market to third party interests.
27
  
The Crown’s offer back obligations to former owners of surplus public works 
land, other than railway land, is prescribed under s40 of the Public Works Act 
1981. Surplus public works land that was previously owned by Maori may, if 
the land meets the specified criteria under s41, be returned to Maori without 
any need to comply with s40 offer back requirements. The Crown’s statutory 
offer back responsibilities are administered by the Chief Executive Officer of 
Land Information New Zealand, the leading government department in New 
Zealand for land matters.
28
 The scheme also confers responsibilities upon local 
authorities that hold surplus public works land. The disposal of surplus railway 
land is governed under ss23 and 26 of the New Zealand Railways Corporation 
Restructuring Act 1990. The disposal provisions for surplus railway land are 
similar to those under the Public Works Act, but the public works offer back 
scheme is more detailed. For economy, this paper considers the Public Works 
Act offer back scheme as applicable to the Crown.  
The statutory offer back scheme is remedial. It was enacted following a period 
of raised public awareness regarding the Crown’s relationship with Maori and 
public works land. The land-march protest of 1975 together with protests at 
Bastion Point and Raglan raised sufficient public concern for Parliament to 
take action. An offer back scheme was introduced under the 1981 Public 
Works Act. The rationale behind the offer back provisions is described by 
Smellie J at the High Court in Rowan v Attorney-General:  
On the face of it the plain meaning and intent of the section appears to be remedial, 
bringing to an end a perceived injustice where land could be compulsorily taken by 
the Crown for one purpose and arbitrarily used for another without giving the 
original owner the opportunity to buy it back.
29
  
The disposal regime for surplus public works land is particularly important for 
Maori and more relevant today than the public works land acquisition 
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 The offer back scheme presents an opportunity for former owners to 
be restored to their land. Public works land often is acquired under compulsion 
or an element of compulsion. This is where a perceived injustice arises, 
regardless of whether or not the surrender is for the greater good. The 
opportunity to buy the land back will vary in significance for each former land 
owner. For Maori, that opportunity is more than a chance to realise an 
economic opportunity. There is the prospect of being reunited with prevailing 
cultural ties to the land. Cultural ties in land are significant for people that hold 
them.  
The Courts observe that a former owner or their successor must hold a 
‘personal or familial connection’ with surplus public works land in order to 
qualify for an offer back. The Court of Appeal in Williams v Auckland 
Council, upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal, describes the offer back 
scheme as intended to restore land to a person that still holds a ‘personal or 
familial connection’ with it, such connection being more than mere economic 
interest.
31
 It was observed:  
In undertaking this balancing exercise we repeat that the purpose of s 40 is 
remedial, designed to confer a personal, not an economic, benefit on those 
with an attachment to the land.
32
  
If a former owner or their successor of surplus public works land has lost their 
attachment to the land they will then lose their statutory offer back entitlement. 
The remedial aspect of the scheme does not extend to an opportunity for 
former owners to exercise rights if they are motivated exclusively by the 
prospect of financial profit at the expense of the public. The economic interests 
of former owners are considered to be compensated when land is taken for a 
public work, not when land is offered back. The Courts in Williams v Auckland 
Council were prepared to balance the interests of former land owners against 
the adverse consequences for Auckland Council and its ratepayers where the 
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Maori cultural, social and spiritual ties to land are enduring. Such people are 
intrinsically connected to geographic locations through tribal affiliations. It 
would be difficult to assert that a Maori former land owner could ever lose 
their ‘personal or familial connection’ to land if they remain connected to their 
hapu or iwi. If a hapu or iwi is recognised as belonging to a particular area, 
their connection to the land is likely to be preserved by their status as tangata 
whenua which infers a special bond and connection to their traditional land. 




Mandatory Offer Back – s40(1) 
 
The Crown is obliged to offer surplus public works land back to its former 
owners or their successors in the event the land is no longer required for a 
public work and is not required for exchange. Such surplus public works land 
must be offered for sale to its former owner or their successor.
34
 This is a 
statutory duty imposed upon the Crown.
35
 There are exceptions to the 
otherwise mandatory offer back. Circumstances that will give rise to these 
exceptions are prescribed under s40(2) of the Act.
36
 Ascertaining whether such 
circumstances are enough to release the Crown from its duty to offer land back 




Ultimate responsibility for surplus public works land held by central 
government agencies rests with the Crown. The chief executive of Land 
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Information New Zealand is the responsible statutory officer. However, that 
officer will not always be the person involved in important administrative 
decisions that give rise to the triggering of s40 offer back obligations. There 
are many branches of government that administer public works land and many 
individual decision makers. The Crown’s ultimate responsibility is described 
by Randerson J in Hull v Attorney-General:  
Where the Crown has been found to be in breach of its obligations, it cannot hide 
behind a change in the relevant officer whose task it is to perform the statutory 
obligations at issue. The relevant statutory officer exercises its functions on behalf of 
the Crown and as its agent. Accordingly, it is for the Crown to ensure that by one 
means or another, it carries out its statutory obligations. The Crown clearly has the 
capacity to ensure that the land is offered back, as nearly as may be in accordance 
with its statutory obligations.
38
  
Cross agency roles and responsibilities can be complex, particularly as 
relevant events roll out over several years while government agencies are 
reorganised or restructured. The Courts look beyond all this. Offer back 
obligations rest with the Crown.  
A simple summary of the Crown’s duty under s40 is observed by Keith J in the 
Court of Appeal judgment of Attorney-General v Hull: 
The Chief Executive must give bona fide and fair consideration to whether the 
statutory course of offer back would be impracticable, unreasonable or unfair under 
subs (2) or whether in terms of subs (4) the land is instead to be sold to an adjacent 
owner. Unless one of those exceptions applies, the Chief Executive must offer the 
land back to the original owner. Individual cases may present particular difficulties 
but the foregoing approach should be of assistance in resolving the usual issues 
which arise [when dealing with central government land] under s 40.
39
  
If qualifying requirements are satisfied, public works land will be deemed 
surplus to the Crown’s requirements. Offer back obligations will be triggered 
at that time, unless the statutory exceptions apply.  
Randerson J at the High Court in Hull v Attorney-General describes s40 as 
imposing an obligation upon the Crown where the three factual circumstances 
in subsections (1)(a), (b) and (c) are established.
40
 Section 40(1) reads:  
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Where any land held under this or any other Act or in any other manner for any 
public work –  
(a) is no longer required for that public work; and 
(b) is not required for any other public work; and 
(c) is not required for any exchange under section 105 of this Act –  
The chief executive [of Land Information New Zealand] or local authority, as the 
case may be, shall endeavour to sell the land in accordance with subsection (2) of this 
section, if that subsection is applicable to that land.
41
  
Land may cease to be required for a public work either by express decision or 
because of contingent circumstances.
42
In either event, the Crown’s duty to 
offer the land back is triggered.  
The Courts have consistently maintained the ‘plain meaning and intent’ 
approach when interpreting s40.
43
 There is no bending of words to avoid 
inconvenience. What Parliament has passed are the words the Courts apply. 
The plain meaning is adopted by Smellie J in Rowan v Attorney-General.
44
 
The Court of Appeal also favoured this approach in Attorney-General v Hull:  
Our final comment relating to s 40 concerns the various descriptions or 
characterisations given by Courts of the former owner's right under that provision. 
We do not consider that it is useful to try to compare the position under s 40 with 
conventional property law concepts. It might be better simply to allow the provisions 
of s 40 to speak for themselves in their historical and legislative context.
45
 
The plain meaning of the Act has at times proved to be inconvenient. Where 
that inconvenience is at the expense of the Crown, there is no option but to 
grant entitled former owners their right to an offer back. Any failure by the 
Crown to offer surplus public works land back within reasonable after offer 
back obligations are triggered will amount to a breach of its statutory duty. 
The Crown has no choice.  
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When Land Becomes Surplus  
 
The point in time which public works land ‘is no longer required’ is not 
always obvious. It is at times an involved process to ascertain precisely when a 
property has ceased to be required for a public work. Such question is not 
answered by a single recorded decision. It is necessary to consider the actual 
use of the land and whether or not its use is in keeping with the public work 
purpose for which it had initially been acquired and is officially held.  
In qualifying circumstances, surplus public works land must be offered for sale 
to the person from whom it was acquired or to the successor of that person. 
The land is to be offered at either the current market value of the land or at any 
lesser price if the chief executive considers it reasonable to do so.
46
 The Court 
of Appeal in Horton & Anor v Attorney-General expressed this requirement of 
the statutory scheme in strict terms.
47
 Once the factual matters prescribed 
under subsection (1)(a) to (c) are satisfied, the land is at that point in time 
surplus to the Crown’s requirements. Responsibility under the offer back 
statute then passes from the land holding agency to the chief executive of Land 
Information New Zealand who “shall endeavour to sell the land” and “shall 
offer to sell the land” to the former owner or their successor.
48
 There is no 
going back. Once the offer back obligation is triggered, the land holding 
agency cannot change its mind and decide to keep the land even if it does 
genuinely require it for further public works.
49
 This principle proved to be a 
problem for Coal Corporation in Horton. The State Owned Enterprise was not 
entitled to reconsider its previous position that certain mining land it held was 
no longer required for a public work. Coal Corporation appears to have been 
coming to terms with its land portfolio and commercial priorities as a 
relatively recently formed State Owned Enterprise. The Court of Appeal and 
the Privy Council strictly applied the statutory scheme. There was no 
allowance for administrative dilemmas on Coal Corporation’s behalf.  
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There are no express time limits for the Crown under the offer back 
legislation. However, the Crown is obliged to attend to the offer within a 
reasonable time of the obligation arising and to do so with due expedition.
50
 
There have been occasions when the Crown has not realised that statutory 
offer back requirements have triggered and surplus public works land has been 
held longer than can be justified without being offered to former owners or 
their successors.
51
 In such cases the Crown will be in breach of its obligation 
to those former owners and their successors. A typical problem for the Crown 
in such situation is that the market value of land for the purpose of offer back 
will be fixed to the value as at the time the Crown should have made the offer. 
This can result in significant windfalls for former owners where property 
prices increase over time.  
 
 
Mandatory Offer Back: Grounds for Exemption – s40(2) 
 
The presumption regarding public works land is that the Crown will owe a 
duty to former owners or their successors to offer the land back to them when 
subject land is no longer required. However, there are occasions when the 
Crown will be exempt from this duty.  
The chief executive of Land Information New Zealand is entitled to exclude 
land from offer back if there are qualifying circumstances. Those 
circumstances are prescribed under s40(2) and (4). Under s40(2) the chief 
executive may determine that land will not be offered back where: 
(a)  he or it considers that it would be impracticable, unreasonable, or unfair to 
do so; or 
(b)  there has been a significant change in the character of the land for the 
purposes of, or in connection with, the public work for which it was 
acquired or is held—
52
 
                                                          
50
 Horton & Anor v Attorney-General CA43/97, 3 December 1997 at 17 
51
 Attorney-General v Morrison [2002] 3 NZLR 373 (CA) 
52
 Public Works Act 1981, s40(2) 
27 
 
Section 40(4) confers discretion upon the chief executive to exclude land from 
offer back to former owners of their successors and instead direct the offer to 
an owner of adjacent land:  
Where the chief executive …believes on reasonable grounds that, because of the size, 
shape, or situation of the land he or it could not expect to sell the land to any person 
who did not own land adjacent to the land to be sold, the land may be sold to an 
owner of adjacent land at a price negotiated between the parties.
53
  
These are practical provisions to exclude mandatory offer back of land that 
will not serve the remedial objective of the offer back scheme. The exceptions 
are available to avoid unnecessary burden upon the Crown. For example, it 
would be unreasonable to require the Crown to offer land back if the former 
owner had advertised the property for sale on the open market where the 
Crown merely won the property by way of the best offer. Circumstances that 
will give rise to land being offered to an owner of adjacent land will for 
example include severance areas of impractical size or location.  
 
 
Impracticable to Offer Land 
 
Land Information New Zealand guidelines prescribe examples of when it may 
be impracticable for the Crown to offer surplus public works land back to its 
former owners or successors. Scenarios prescribed are:  
1. Where the former owner is now a defunct company; 
2. The former owner and their successors have died;  
3. Where original land parcels cannot be offered back due to the 
later amalgamation of various land parcels from different 
owners into one, now surplus, computer register title. If 
substantial improvements have been built on the amalgamated 
land it may well be impractical to then subdivide the surplus 
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amalgamated parcel to reinstate the original parcel for offer 
back to its former owner,
54
 and 
4. Due to local authority planning restrictions, the Crown may 




In Rowan v Attorney-General, the High Court awarded damages to the 
plaintiff where an officer for the former Ministry of Works incorrectly decided 
that it would be impracticable to offer back a surplus public works property to 
its former owners because it was landlocked.
56
 The officer mistakenly thought 
it was not possible to obtain a certificate of title for the land unless it was 
amalgamated with an adjoining property that had road frontage. He also 
mistakenly thought that s40 gave the department a choice whether to offer the 
land to its former owner or their successor in title. The successor in title was 
the person who later owned the parent land from which the public works land 
had originally been taken.
57
 The Court held that the department was supposed 
to offer the land to its former owners, and by failing to do so it had breached 
its duty of care owed to those former owners.
58
   
 
 
Significant Change to Land 
 
The chief executive may determine that an exemption to offer back applies 
where there has been significant change in the character of the land because of 
the public work or works for which the land was held. Examples of significant 
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change recorded in Land Information New Zealand guidelines include 
significant change arising from:  
1. Change to the land itself, such as change caused by land 
reclamation or major landscaping work;  
2. Change in local authority district plan zoning or use;  
3. Significant building improvements on the land likely to remain 
in use in keeping with the ‘highest and best use’ of the subject 
property; and 
4. Demolition of improvements on the land following acquisition 
for a public work.
59
  
For a significant change in the character of the land to give rise to an 
exemption to offer land back, that change of character must have occurred 





Timing of the Exemption Decision 
 
The discretionary power under s40(2) to exempt land from offer back must be 
exercised within a reasonable period from the triggering of the offer back 
obligation. If the discretion is not exercised in a timely manner, the ability to 
exclude land from offer back on grounds it would be “impracticable, 
unreasonable or unfair to do so”
61
 will be lost.
62
 The Court of Appeal in 
Williams v Auckland Council refers a period of 18 months which was agreed in 
that case as a reasonable period of time.
63
  
Holders of surplus public works land have on occasions improperly sought to 
rely on their discretionary powers to avoid responsibility to former owners. 
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Miller J observed in Edmonds v Attorney-General, later cited by the Court of 
Appeal in Williams v Auckland Council:  
If the agency did not invoke the relevant subsection to justify a decision to retain the 
land at the time, it is difficult to see why the Court ought to reach a decision on its 




The discretionary power for exemption under s40(2) cannot be exercised 
retrospectively as a defence for failing to observe mandatory offer back 
provisions. Harrison J observes this construction both conforms to the plain 






Former Owner and Successor – To Whom is the Duty Owed?  
 
Section 40 offer back rights are conferred upon former owners of surplus 
public works land and their successors. An important step in the offer back 
process is the identification of those people to whom the Crown owes the 
statutory duty of offer back. Section 40(2) reads:  
“…[the Crown] shall offer to sell the land by private contract to the person from 
whom it was acquired or the successor of that person –“
66
 
The task of identifying former owners involves a search of public land records. 
The Registrar-General of Land holds a register of land interests.
67
 However, 
the Registrar of the Maori Land Court is responsible to record ownership of 
Maori freehold land.
68
 The two registers may duplicate ownership information 
for Maori freehold land, however, the Maori Land Court register is the primary 
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record for Maori freehold land.
69
 Former owner details are held under either, 
or both, registers. The more difficult identification task arises where a former 
owner has died. In such situations the successor of the former owner becomes 
the entitled person. Probate and intestacy records will be required to help 
identify successors of former owners.  
The meaning of the term ‘successor’ is recorded under s40(5) which reads:  
(5) For the purposes of this section, the term successor, in relation to any person, 
means the person who would have been entitled to the land under the will or 
intestacy of that person had he owned the land at the date of his death; and, in any 
case where part of a person’s land was acquired or taken, includes the successor in 
title of that person.
70
  
The first part of the definition refers to succession of the natural person by way 
of will or intestacy. The application of this part of the statute is aided by laws 
relating to wills and intestacy. In Williams v Auckland Council, Harrison J 
rejected any suggestion of broadening the definition to cater for successors 
beyond the immediate successor of the former owner: 
There is an assumption that ownership of the land has not changed between the dates 
of acquisition and the owner’s death, meaning …that Parliament intended only one 
level of succession.
71
   
Succession for the purposes of the offer back scheme is a one-step exercise, 
and no more. The person next in line from the former owner is their successor. 
Descendants beyond this first level of succession miss out. The narrow 
interpretation follows the obiter of Port Gisborne Limited v Smiler
72
 at the 
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Successors of Maori Land 
 
Public works land will often remain in the hands of its administrating public 
body for many decades. Public works activity is therefore likely to endure 
beyond the lifetime of former owners. Strong ties to such land will typically be 
retained by descendants of former Maori owners. Maori cultural ties to land 
endure for multiple generations, not just one level of succession. This gives 
rise to a problem where former owners and their immediate successors fail to 
live long enough to qualify for an opportunity to buy their land back. The 
remedial purpose of the offer back scheme falls short at this stage. Tikanga 
Maori is the basis upon which Maori recognise enduring connection and 
relationship with land. The meaning of the term ‘successor’ under s40(5) of 
the Public Works Act falls short of land succession norms under Tikanga 
Maori. It fails those descendants of former owners who retain their traditional 
connection with land once owned by their ancestors but fall beyond the one-
step succession limit from those people that happen to be named on the public 
land record.  
Maori freehold land succession is based upon a hybrid of Maori custom 
together with common succession laws of probate and intestacy. Part 4 of Te 
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 is dedicated to this customary and common 
succession of Maori land interests.
 73
 The statutory scheme for Maori land 
succession is broader than succession prescribed under the Public Works Act. 
To this extent, s40(5) is inconsistent with Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
Parliament recognises that Maori interests are not always adequately catered 
for under the general offer back provisions of s40. Section 41 of the Public 
Works Act caters for a limited class of former Maori owners. The chief 
executive of Land Information New Zealand has discretion to either comply 
with the requirements of s40 or alternatively apply to the Maori Land Court for 
the land to simply be vested as Maori freehold land in Maori ownership. This 
option is not available for all land previously owned by Maori. Surplus public 
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works land will only qualify if it was: Maori freehold land or General land 
owned by Maori immediately prior to acquisition for a public work; 




The disposal of former Maori land provision under the Public Works Act 
reads:  
41  Disposal of former Maori land when no longer required 
Notwithstanding anything in sections 40 and 42 of this Act, where any land to which 
section 40(2) of this Act applies was, immediately before its taking or 
acquisition,- 
(a) Maori freehold land or General land owned by Maori (as those terms are defined 
in section 4 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993); and 
(b) Beneficially owned by more than 4 persons; and 
(c) Not vested in any trustee or trustees- 
The chief executive … shall-  
(d) Comply with the requirements of section 40 of this Act; or 
(e) Apply to the Maori Land Court for the district in which the land is situated for 
an order under section 134 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.
75
  
The advantage of the s41 disposal provision is that it offers an alternative to 
the formalities under the s40 procedure that are unsuitable for Maori land 
dealings. One such unsuitable aspect is the discrepancy between the meaning 
of ‘successor’ under s40(5) and Maori land succession practise. This 
discrepancy can be avoided if the chief executive exercises discretion to 
dispose of subject land under s41(e) by applying to the Maori Land Court for a 
vesting order. 
It will be of particular concern for Maori that not all former Maori land is 
captured under the s41 Maori land disposal provision. Land that falls outside 
the relatively narrow class includes:  
1. Maori freehold land with between one and four beneficial owners;  
2. Maori freehold land that was vested in a responsible trustee or trustees, 
such as the Maori Trustee or a Maori land trust recognised by order of 
the Maori Land Court; and  
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3. General land owned by Maori. In keeping with Government policy 
during the 1960s, Maori freehold land was routinely converted to 
General land where such land was beneficially owned by no more than 
four people. Such conversion was typically a matter of procedure 
without beneficial owners being consulted.  
The problem of the s41 provision for Maori successors is twofold. First, such 
vesting is at the discretion of the statutory officer. It is not a right in favour of 
former land owners or their descendants to determine whether or not the s40 
provisions are unsuitable and they would be better served by s41. Second, the 
qualifying class of land that falls under s41 is narrow leaving non-qualifying 
land to the formal requirements of the potentially unsuitable s40 offer back 
scheme. Some former owners and their descendants will be lucky, while others 
will miss out. There is no obvious reason for there to be such a narrow 
approach under s41 which disqualifies some Maori land due to land ownership 
recording rather than taking into account the remedial purpose of the statutory 
offer back scheme as it applies to all land formerly owned by Maori.  
 
 
Return of Land by Maori Land Court Order 
 
The Maori Land Court has jurisdiction to grant an order vesting land into 
Maori ownership and to declare that such land shall become Maori freehold 
land.
76
 The chief executive may seek an order as an alternative to the standard 
offer back procedure under s40 of the Public Works Act.
77
 In such cases, the 
vesting procedure under s134 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 replaces the 
procedure under s40.  
The statutory vesting scheme under s134 of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 
prevails. The Maori Land Court by way of a s41(e) offer back is responsible to 
consider the chief executive’s application and the terms of any vesting order 
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sought. The Court is not constrained by the terms proposed by the chief 
executive, including terms proposing names of people whom the chief 
executive considers should take the land back.
78
 Offer back provisions under 
ss40 and 41 of the Public Works Act do not limit the powers of the Court to 
exercise its own discretion.
79
 
The relevant provisions of section 134 of the 1993 Act read:  
134  Change to Maori freehold land by vesting order on change of ownership 
(1) This section applies to— 
(a) Any land (other than Maori freehold land) that the beneficial owner wishes to 
have vested in or held in trust for any Maori or any group or class of Maori, or any 
Maori incorporation; and  
… 
(e) Any Crown land (other than Crown land reserved for Maori). 
(2) The Maori Land Court shall have jurisdiction in accordance with the succeeding 
provisions of this section to make a vesting order in respect of any land to which this 
section applies and to declare in that order that the land shall become Maori freehold 
land.  
… 
(3) An application to the Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction under this section 
shall be made,— 
… 
(e) In any case to which subsection (1)(e) of this section applies, any Minister of the 
Crown. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything in subsections (1) to (3) of this section, any Minister of 
the Crown having responsibility in regard to the matter may apply to the Court for 
the exercise of its jurisdiction, and on such an application the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction, under this section in respect of any Crown land that has not been 
formally set aside for the benefit of Maori. 
(5) An application may be made to the Court, and the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction, under this section notwithstanding the provisions of any Act to which 
the land is subject, and notwithstanding any terms and conditions imposed by the Act 
on the sale or other disposition of the land. 
(6) In any application under this section, the applicant may specify—(a)  
The person or persons in whom it is proposed the land shall be vested; and 
(b) The price to be paid for the land, and the terms and conditions of payment; and 
(c) Any other conditions to which it is proposed the order shall be subject. 
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(7) On an application under this section, the Court may make an order vesting the 
land in— 
(a) Such person or persons as the Court may find to be entitled to the land or 
otherwise in accordance with the terms of the application, in such shares as may be 
specified in the order; or 
(b) A Maori incorporation or a Maori Trust Board or trustees for or on behalf of such 
person or persons, and on such terms of trust, as the Court may specify in the order.
80
 
The s41(e) offer back option assigns jurisdiction over to the Maori Land Court 
to exercise its own discretion under s134. Several unsuitable aspects of the s40 
offer back scheme are addressed by a specialist Court which is expert in Maori 
land matters. The Court holds the final say as to ‘[s]uch person or persons as 
the Court may find to be entitled...’.
81
 The Court’s powers, unlike those powers 
of the Public Works Act 1981, are designed expressly to cater for the needs of 
Maori people in relation to land.
82
  
The s41(e) offer back option does not remove the influence of the chief 
executive who is responsible to propose terms of any vesting order sought 
from the Court.
83
 Negotiations between the chief executive and former owners 
or their successors will be concluded before a vesting application is lodged 
with the Court. Terms of the agreement reached between the parties will be 
conditional upon the Court’s approval. Such approval will ultimately be in the 
form of a vesting order on terms determined by the Court.  
If the parties are unable to reach agreement, for example upon the price to be 
paid or upon any restrictions the Crown may wish to impose over the land, the 
chief executive is entitled to withdraw from negotiations. Offer back 
obligations will be satisfied if subject land has been offered to former owners 
or the successors and those people have had a reasonable opportunity to 
consider the offer regardless of whether or not the offer is accepted. In such 
circumstances, there is no need for the chief executive to apply to the Court for 
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The strict offer back provisions of s40 are not entirely suitable for dealing with 
land interests held by Maori. ‘Tikanga Maori’ is the deeply embedded 
customary values and practices of Maori
85
 and is the foundation of Maori 
culture. The values and principles it embodies are essential to Maori 
understanding of what may be appropriate, particularly regarding rights and 
interests over land. Tikanga greatly influences, if not determines, what Maori 
consider to be right, correct or appropriate.
86
 
The succession of land interests is particularly important to Maori. Maori 
interests extend beyond the notion of ownership. Land is not simply an asset 
measurable in financial terms. Maori hold a special connection to land over 
many generations of association and activity. The land itself confers identity 
while ancestry is associated with occupation. These values extend well beyond 
monetary terms.
87
 When dealing with the succession of Maori interests in land 
for the purpose of offer back, the method of succession is critical. Eligibility 
for succession of offer back rights is more appropriately addressed under the 
jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court by s134 Te Ture Whenua Act 1993 than 
by the chief executive under terms prescribed under s40(5) of the Public 
Works Act 1981. Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 caters for tikanga Maori 
while the Public Works Act does not.  
The suitability of various methods for determining succession is measureable 
by the end result. Succession by way of laws aligned to Maori custom may 
deliver a different end result compared to succession determined exclusively 
under standard laws for probate and intestacy.  
An illustration of differing end results is recorded in a 1958 High Court case 
involving a Maori land owner who died intestate without children. In Re 
Wiremu Ngawhare (Deceased), Hopkins v Raupatu Te Kaponga,
88
the Court 
was asked to determine whether the persons entitled to succeed an interest in 
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land would do so by Maori custom under s116 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953, 
or by succession determined exclusively by standard laws of intestacy. There 
were two distinct classes of entitled persons. On one side was the non-Maori 
half-brother of the deceased. On the other side were the nearest blood relations 
to the deceased who were Maori. The Court held that the persons entitled to 
succeed should do so as if the land was ‘European land’. Maori custom did not 
apply. The land went to the deceased’s non-Maori half-brother.  
The municipal law of New Zealand recognises succession both under Maori 
custom
89
 and under the laws or probate or intestacy.
90
 Succession by Maori 
custom has no less legal standing if qualifying criteria are met. For the purpose 
of s41 offer back of surplus public works land, it is the chief executive of Land 
Information New Zealand, for and on behalf of the Crown, who gets to decide 
the method of succession. As Re Wiremu Ngawhare (Deceased), Hopkins v 
Raupatu Te Kaponga illustrates, it is possible that eligible successors under 
Maori custom will not necessarily be eligible under an alternative method of 
succession.  
The return of surplus public works land by Maori Land Court order faces 
difficulties due to four significant barriers that limit the operation of s41 offer 
back. First, prerequisites determine that not all Maori land qualifies under the 
s41 offer back criteria. The prerequisites are based upon formal historic 
ownership records which have no bearing to the remedial objective of the offer 
back scheme. Second, if land does meet the prerequisites of s41, the 
opportunity under s41(e) for land to be returned by Maori land Court order is 
entirely at the discretion of the chief executive of Land Information New 
Zealand.
91
 Maori who hold strong connections to subject land as either former 
owners or the descendants of former owners have no say in determining the 
suitability or appropriateness of options conferred under s41 to either follow 
the scheme of the Maori Land Court or the scheme under s40 of the public 
Works Act. Third, the parties to offer back must reach agreement as to terms 
of any proposed vesting. Maori’s disadvantage is that if agreement is not 
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reached within a reasonable time, the Crown’s offer back responsibilities may 
be satisfied regardless. Fourth, the ‘one-level succession from the former 
owner’ principle of s40(5) and Port Gisborne Limited v Smiler
92
 cannot 
necessarily be avoided given such approach is still available to the chief 
executive under s41(d). Whether or not the Maori Land Court would follow 
this reasoning is another question given it has its own jurisdiction to determine 
such matters.
93
 However, an offer back will not even get before the Court if 
the chief executive has already decided to comply with the requirements of 
s40
94
 and adopt the Public Works Act meaning of successor where there is no 
eligible successor under those criteria.  
 
 
Unsuitable Statutory Approach 
 
It is a near impossible task to create a statutory scheme that will work well in 
all situations. Circumstances leading up to the disposal of surplus public works 
land will vary greatly. However, a good scheme should seek to meet the 
reasonable requirements of the people for whom the scheme is intended to 
serve. The statutory offer back scheme is not designed to serve the Crown.
 95
 It 
is designed to serve former owners of surplus public works land and the 
successors of those former owners. The offer back scheme is for those people 
and it is intended to be remedial.
 96
  
The Crown, in its Treaty settlement with Ngati Turangitukua, acknowledges 
that the ss40 and 41 land disposal mechanisms “…do not always work 
well.”
97
The acknowledgement itself refers to matters of timeliness. A protocol 
agreement was reached between the Crown and Ngati Turangitukua under 
their settlement to better support the offer back process. It addresses the need 
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for the Crown to improve its consultation with former Maori owners. It also 
enables Ngati Turangitukua to notify the Crown if there are any other persons 
that may be entitled former owners or successors other than those persons 
identified by the Crown from formal land records.
98
   
The offer back protocol addresses some shortfalls of ss40 and 41 regarding 
consultation and identification of entitled persons. However, it has limited 
legal reach. The Treaty settlement with Ngati Turangitukua is recorded by 
deed between the parties. The full provisions of the Deed and offer back policy 
have not been elevated to legislation, other than a relatively brief apology and 
several essential operative provisions.
99
 The offer back protocol is an 
arrangement between parties, the Crown and Ngati Turangitukua, which has 
no broader application to the statutory offer back scheme as a whole. 
Advantages for Ngati Turangitukua are not enjoyed by all Maori former 
owners or their successors.  
The offer back protocol endorsed by the Crown for Ngati Turangitukua has 
merit in a wider sense. The offer back scheme is designed for former owners 
and their successors, but the scheme tends to fail those people if they are 
Maori. There is particular difficulty with the link between recognising eligible 
persons under the scheme and those people who genuinely have a cultural 
connection to subject land by way of their cultural and ancestral ties. The 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler
100
 is an example. An 
unusual outcome followed the Court’s reasoning as to how the term 
‘successor’ under s40(5) should be applied. The background to the Smiler case 
is that 40,000 acres of ancestral land belonging to the hapu of Tauwhareparae 
was sold to the Crown in 1879 following several years of negotiation and 
formal steps by the Crown to secure an exclusive negotiating position. The 
purchase was given effect under the consolidated public works legislation of 
the day, s34 of the Immigration and Public Works Act 1870.
101
 The Court of 
Appeal observed a difference between land ‘acquired and held for public or 
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government works’ and land merely acquired and held “…by the Crown for 
the general purposes of settlement.”
102
It was found that the Tauwhareparae 
land was not initially brought into public ownership for a public work, 
notwithstanding its use and designation in later years.
103
 The public works 
status occurred four years after the land was acquired from its former owners. 
In 1884 the land was endowed on the Gisborne Harbour Board and the public 
works purpose was triggered.
104
 The Court of Appeal found that the former 
owner for the purpose of the offer back scheme was the Crown, not the hapu 
of Tauwhareparae. The Gisborne Harbour Board was deemed to have acquired 
the land from the Crown because the land was owned by the Gisborne Harbour 
Board when it was first held for a public work.
 105
 The hapu of Tauwhareparae 
with genuine cultural and ancestral ties to the subject land they had 
surrendered to the Crown were not recognised under the statutory offer back 
scheme.  
Laws in Aotearoa New Zealand recognise a system of land unique to Maori. 
The system is administered under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 and 
overseen by the Maori Land Court. The preamble of the Act refers to the 
special relationship between Maori and the Crown by way of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. It also proclaims how land is deeply significant to Maori. 
Mechanisms are in place under the land system to promote the retention and 
protection of such land in the hands of its owners for their benefit. The 
protection also extends to whanau and hapu in recognition of wider cultural 
ties between people and land.
106
  
The Maori land system has unique arrangements for land ownership, 
succession, governance, administration and judicial oversight. The Public 
Works Act offer back provisions are not designed to cope with this unique 
system of land. Offer back of surplus public works land in Aotearoa New 
Zealand functions on a ‘one scheme fits all’ basis. Maori interests in land are 
treated the same as all other interests in land generally. Some former Maori 
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land will at the discretion of the chief executive of Land Information New 
Zealand be passed to the Maori Land Court under s 41(e) if offer back terms 
are first accepted by former owners. However, strict qualifying criteria means 
that unique treatment in terms of s41(e) is not guaranteed.  
 
 
Successor in Probate and Successor in Title 
 
There are two aspects to the term ‘successor’ as it is defined under s40(5) of 
the Public Works Act. The first relates to the person entitled to the subject land 
under the will or intestacy of the former owner. This person is the successor in 
probate.
107
 The second relates to the subsequent owner of land from which the 
surplus public works land was originally taken. This person is the successor in 
title to the original owner.  
The purpose of recognising the successor in title is to restore a land parcel to 
its original position rather than restoring the original owner’s connection to the 
land. The successor in title provision is included for practical reasons to give 
land administrators options in relevant circumstances.  
Schemes for disposal of surplus public works land before the 1981 Public 
Works Act came into force ignored any remedial notion toward former owners 
or their successors in probate. The attitude of the day appears to be that former 
owners received compensation for the loss of their interest in subject land, and 
that compensation supposedly reflected both the land value and full settlement 
for any perceived injustice.  
The objective of disposal schemes which pre-date ss40 and 41 offer back 
provisions is utilitarian. Surplus public works land could be consolidated with 
adjacent land for best utilisation. Section 29 of the Public Works Act 1876 
(repealed)
108
 and s35 of the Public Works Act 1928 (repealed)
109
 provided that 
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surplus public works land originally taken under those Acts could be sold by 
offering it first to the owner of the balance land from which it had been 
severed, being the successor in title. If that person did not accept the offer, the 
land could then be sold to the adjoining owner of the surplus land.
110
 This 
mechanism is perhaps better described as a ‘utilitarian offer’ rather than a 
‘remedial offer back’.  
The composition of s40(5) is such that both ‘successor in probate’ and 
‘successor in title’ are qualifying persons where only part of a person’s 
property was originally taken. In such circumstances the ‘successor in title’ is 
included. There is nothing under the statutory definition to suggest that a 
‘successor in probate’ should be excluded where circumstances give rise for a 
‘successor in title’ to be included. If Parliament intended the successor in 
probate to be excluded, subsection (5) would have been worded differently, for 
example: “…in any case where part of a person’s land was acquired or taken, 
[shall instead be] the successor in title of that person.”
111
 
The Court of Appeal in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler & Ors expressed an obiter 
view which implies a successor in title should be entitled over a successor in 
probate.
 112
 This view is not supported from a plain reading of the words in 
s40(5) so it would be difficult to argue that such view was ever the intention of 
Parliament for the remedial offer back scheme. It seems as if the Court in 
Smiler missed the significance of Parliament’s new objective under the 1981 
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Offer Back and the Treaty of Waitangi 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi stands as a foundational document in the constitution 
of Aotearoa New Zealand. The system of land tenure operative in the nation 
since 1840 is underpinned by the Crown’s right of eminent domain. The 
Crown holds ultimate title in land. The Crown’s subjects can only hold 
privileges in land under the ultimate title and authority of the Crown. These 
privileges are conferred by way of estates in land which are inferior to the 
Crown’s title.  
The Treaty of Waitangi has no direct application to the Public Works Act 1981 
other than by way of its constitutional significance. There is no specific Treaty 
provision within the Act, unlike Treaty of Waitangi provisions in other statutes 
such as s9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986.
114
 The Treaty provision 
under the State Owned Enterprises Act gave rise to the 1987 landmark Court 
of Appeal decision of New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General 
concerning the disposal of land from the Crown to State owned enterprises and 
ensured protection of Maori interests.
115
  
The Waitangi Tribunal has called for the Public Works Act 1981 and other 
relevant legislation to be amended to require:  
“That all persons exercising functions and powers under the Public Works Act should 
act in a manner that is consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi.” 
116
 
The Tribunal’s fourteen recommendations concerning Public Works 
legislation from its Ngai Tahu, Te Maunga and Turangi reports were tabled in 
December 2000 under a review of the Public Works Act. Amendments to the 
1981 Act were recommended to avoid situations, either in the Act itself or 
derived by powers conferred under the Act, which breach or potentially breach 
the principles of the Treaty.
117
 There was a strong preference among Maori 
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In absence of statutory recognition or adoption, the Crown’s obligations under 
the Treaty of Waitangi are not directly enforceable in the Courts.
119
 With no 
express Treaty provision in the Public Works Act 1981, the exercise of Treaty 
principles by the Crown is limited to good faith and best intentions of 
responsible Ministers and officials. Obligations arising from the relationship 
between the Crown and Maori are prescribed by analogy rather than direct 
application, as is the relationship itself.
120
 O’Regan J delivered the Court of 
Appeal judgment in the 2008 forestry case New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General. He observes:  
The decisions of this Court contain clear statements to the effect that the Crown’s 
duty to Maori is analogous with a fiduciary duty and we see no proper basis for us to 
revisit them. The law of fiduciaries informs the analysis of the key characteristics of 
the duty arising from the relationship between Maori and the Crown under the 
Treaty: good faith, reasonableness, trust, openness and consultation. But it does so by 
analogy, not by direct application. In particular, we see difficulties in applying the 
duty of a fiduciary not to place itself in a position of conflict of interest to the Crown, 
which, in addition to its duty to Maori under the Treaty, has a duty to the population 
as a whole. …[T]he Crown may find itself in a position where its duty to one Maori 
claimant group conflicts with its duty to another.
121
  
A Treaty of Waitangi provision in the Public Works Act will serve to secure 
the principles of good faith, reasonableness, trust openness and consultation as 
derived from the Treaty. Powers to facilitate public works activities for the 
good of the general population would be maintained and continue. However, 
the manner by which these powers are exercised would be open to the scrutiny 
of the Courts if the exercise of power is contrary to principles of good faith, 
reasonableness, trust, openness and consultation.  
The Crown’s right of eminent domain and powers of the Crown to 
compulsorily take land for public works is at odds with perceived rights of 
Maori land owners under the Treaty of Waitangi. The Second Article of the 
Treaty of Waitangi guarantees Maori a right to retain possession of their 
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 The Second Part of the Public Works Act 1981 authorises the Crown 
to take land, if need be by compulsion.
123
 A Treaty of Waitangi clause in 
public works legislation will not resolve this contradiction. A carefully worded 
clause will, however, enable those difficult provisions which are necessary for 
the public good as a whole to continue but with requisite transparency. Such 
transparency will be promoted when the Courts are able to review the actions 
of the executive in light of their responsibilities arising under the Treaty of 
Waitangi.  
A Treaty of Waitangi provision in the Public Works Act will inevitably be 
subservient to the right of the Crown to take private land in the interests of the 
greater public. A Treaty clause could be as simple as modifying the Treaty 
provisions from existing legislation such as s9 of the State Owned Enterprises 
Act 1986.
124
 Modification must ensure that powers conferred by the Public 
Works Act can still be exercised without undue limitation. A Public Works 
Act Treaty of Waitangi provision could read:  
[Without limiting the powers conferred by this Act,] [n]othing in this Act shall permit 
the Crown or a Local Authority to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.
125
  
There is natural tension between the Crown’s Treaty obligations and the 
Crown’s right to govern in the interests of the greater public. However, an 
express Treaty of Waitangi provision in the Public Works Act would serve as a 
protector of the good faith relationship between the Crown and Maori. If 
carefully worded, the provision would not unreasonably limit those powers 
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Practical Considerations for Offer Back to Maori 
 
The offer back scheme under ss40 and 41 of the Public Works Act 1981 
requires the Crown to identify those people eligible to have surplus public 
works land offered to them. The Crown’s offer back obligations will only be 
satisfied where those eligible people have had a reasonable opportunity to 
consider an offer put before them.  
Accuracy of former owner information is important for the proper discharge of 
offer back responsibilities. Details of former owners are sourced from historic 
land records. The record of legal and beneficial owners of all Maori freehold 
land is the responsibility of the Registrar of the Maori Land Court.
126
 The 
Registrar-General of Land holds a register of land interests which includes 
General land, Maori freehold land and some land of public bodies.
127
 
However, the record of the Maori Land Court Registrar is the primary source 
for information about ownership of Maori freehold land, whether that be 
current or historic.  
Land ownership information for a specific parcel can vary from one source to 
another. Where Maori freehold land is registered under the General land 
system of the Registrar-General of Land, it is relatively common for 
ownership details on computer freehold register titles to differ from those 
ownership records at the Maori Land Court. An example of this is where 
trustees have been appointed to manage land interests for and on behalf of 
beneficial Maori owners. Maori Land Court ownership lists record the names 
of all beneficial owners as well as the appointment of trustees. The Registrar-
General of Land in this situation will only recognise the trustees as legal 
owners of the land. The statutory offer back scheme requires that surplus 
public works land be offered to the former owners or their successors, not to 
the former trustee or trustees.  
Public works land has on many occasions been acquired from District Maori 
Land Boards, the Maori Trustee and other trustees or agents who at the time of 
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acquisition were named as registered proprietor on the Registrar-General of 
Land’s register. However, in each of these situations Maori Land Court 
records will evidence details of all beneficial owners represented by those 
trustees or agents. Maori freehold land belongs to its beneficial owners, not 
trustees or agents. Care must be taken to properly identify former owners. The 
Crown’s statutory duty to offer surplus public works land back will only be 
discharged if the former owners ‘from whom the land was acquired’
128
 or their 
successors are properly identified and have had reasonable opportunity to 
consider the offer.  
 
 
Barriers for Maori to Accept Offer Back  
 
The offer back scheme under ss40 and 41 of the Public Works Act is an 
opportunity for Maori to return to land previously taken from them. The 
opportunity is not an easy one for them to realise. There are barriers specific to 
Maori under the offer back scheme.  
The offer back scheme does not recognise any intrinsic value of land other 
than its current market value determined by a suitably qualified valuer.
129
 
Value from a Maori perspective concerns identity, many generations of 
occupation, and the link to ancestry which cannot be translated into monetary 
terms.
130
The offer back of surplus public works land is conducted strictly on 
financial terms. Payment of money will get land returned. Any inability to pay 
will result in land being sold to somebody else.
131
 
Maori freehold land is commonly held by multiple owners, to such an extent 
that governing structures must be implemented to cope with large numbers of 
beneficial owners. When such land has been taken for a public work, the 
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cohesion of the land owning group is detrimentally affected, if not lost 
altogether. The statutory offer back of land, many years after it has been taken 
from its former owners, is to a weakened group of people. Their ability to 
regroup and reach consensus over formalities associated with the buying back 
of surplus public works land will be put to the test. To make matters worse, if 
an offer is not accepted within 40 working days it may then be withdrawn by 
the Crown and the subject property sold on the open market.
132
 Time is 
essential.  
Offer back contemplates the possibility of land being sold to former owners or 
their successors on financial terms. The ability to take up such opportunity is 
dependent upon purchasers either having sufficient cash reserves to pay an 
agreed purchase price or having access to credit on reasonable terms. These 
two requirements are problematic for Maori.  
The purchase price of surplus public works land is the current market value or 
a lesser price if the chief executive of Land Information New Zealand 
considers it reasonable to do so.
133
 Discretion to accept a lesser price is an 
allowance for genuine negotiation between parties. Depending upon 
circumstances, it may be reasonable to accept a lesser price. However, the 
discretion is not about extending generosity to Maori merely because they may 
struggle to raise the purchase price.  
Maori have 40 working days from receiving an offer to secure funding for any 
contemplated purchase.
134
 This time limit may be extended at the discretion of 
the chief executive officer, but even so the prospective purchasers will be 
required to move quickly to have any chance of accepting the terms of an offer 
before it is withdrawn. The amount of money required to satisfy the purchase 
of land will be a relatively significant sum. If entitled purchasers do not have 
sufficient funds themselves, their only option will be to raise finance from a 
willing lender. The task of coordinating and mobilising multiple former 
owners and successors will be difficult enough when it is time to receive and 
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consider an offer back proposal. The logistics involved with raising finance 
amongst a large group of people will pose even more difficulty.  
Lenders typically require security as a condition before finance will be 
advanced to a borrower. The terms of that security will be determined by the 
lender. The form of security in such circumstances is likely at the very least to 
be a registered mortgage over the subject land.  
Mortgage security over Maori freehold land does not offer the same level of 
security as a mortgage over General land. Mortgage security is intended to 
enable the mortgagee to realise its interest in subject land if a borrower is in 
default. The alienation provisions under Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 
impose restrictions upon mortgagees, indeed every person, wishing to sell 
Maori freehold land.
135
 If Maori require mortgage finance to satisfy purchase 
conditions, the lender is likely to prefer or require that the surplus public 
works land be returned to Maori as General land rather than Maori freehold 
land. This may pose a problem for the purchasers if the Maori land system is 
more suitable for their needs as land owners having regard to tikanga Maori. It 
may be a bigger problem for Maori in these circumstances if the chief 
executive imposes offer back terms which include the surplus public works 
land being vested as Maori freehold land. 
136
 
If Maori are willing to purchase surplus public works land under an offer back 
arrangement but they are simply unable to raise funds to satisfy the sale terms, 
the entire offer back exercise at that point is reduced to a futile exercise. The 
reality of the offer back scheme is that property is offered strictly on financial 
terms. There are very real barriers for Maori to raise sufficient funds to enable 
land to be returned to them as Maori freehold land. If the original acquisition 
of land from Maori was a breach of the special relationship between the Crown 
and Maori, the offer back of land without any reasonable chance of acceptance 
is likely to give rise to another breach. 
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The offer back provisions of the Public Works Act require the Crown to offer 
surplus public works land back to former owners or their successors unless 
statutory exemptions apply. The enactment of offer back provisions in 1981 
was a significant advancement to address perceived injustice arising from 
losing land compulsorily taken. It is now time to improve the Act to better 
align the offer back scheme with well-established Maori land laws and to 
better reflect the constitutional relationship between the Crown and Maori. 
The special constitutional relationship between the Crown and Maori, together 
with laws and a land system unique to Maori interests in land, call for an offer 
back scheme that recognises the Crown’s special duty to Maori being different 
than obligations owed to others. The relationship between Maori and the 
Crown is a constitutional arrangement in place since 1840 and more recently 
affirmed under Treaty of Waitangi settlements. Laws of Aotearoa New 
Zealand recognise a land system unique to Maori land. Those laws take into 
account tikanga Maori in matters including customary succession of Maori 
land interests. The offer back scheme should be better aligned to this system 
and the unique needs of Maori.  
The statutory offer back scheme can only be revised by Parliament. It is not 
possible to read more into the offer back provisions in their existing form. 
Government officials responsible to administer the Crown’s obligations and 
the judiciary in its role of applying the law are bound to a statute which has 
remained without significant change or reform for well over three decades. A 
lot has happened in Aotearoa New Zealand regarding advancement of Maori 
issues since the early 1980s. Much needed improvement can only be brought 
about by revising the legislation to a modern form. Parliament already 
acknowledges the nature of the Crown’s relationship with Maori in other 
legislation. The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi have long since existed 
under other legislation. It is now time to import those principles into a revised 




THE JUDICIAL NARRIATIVE 
 
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDICIAL NARRIATIVE 
 
The Crown’s special duty to Maori regarding the offer back of surplus public 
works land is broader than the strict confines prescribed by statute. However, 
unless obligations are imposed by a statutory scheme, there will be no legal 
justification to prioritise the interests of former owners over competing 
concerns held by the government of the day. Such competing concerns are 
typically driven by economic factors rather than a desire to address past 
injustices over historic public work land acquisition methods. Bastion Point 
and Te Kopua controversies of the 1970s are but two prominent examples. The 
unfettered opportunity to realise economic potential of surplus public works 
land will naturally take priority over legally unrecognised, but principally 
justified, interests of former Maori owners. In both Bastion Point and Te 
Kopua, the Crown had an opportunity under legislation of the day to offer the 
surplus lands back to former owners if it wished to do so. Such provision 
existed under s436 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953, the non-binding predecessor 
to the binding offer back provisions of ss40 and 41 of the Public Works Act 
1981. However, a golf course and the prospect of financial return from 
upmarket housing took priority over redress to former land owners from whom 
the lands were compulsorily taken.  
The offer back of surplus public works land involves all three constitutional 
powers, Parliament, the Judiciary and the Executive. Parliament has imposed 
obligations upon the executive to consider former owners before disposing of 
surplus public works land. The judiciary is tasked with the responsibility of 
upholding Parliament’s intention where offer back cases are brought before the 
Courts. A judicial narrative has now woven around the words of the statutory 
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offer back scheme. Parliament set the overall purpose of the scheme, but the 
judiciary has revealed the implications of the scheme for the Crown and 
former owners as real life situations have been decided one way or another.  
It is commonplace and proper for the judiciary to enquire on the intent of 
Parliament before arriving at a decision concerning the interpretation of 
statute. However, Parliament in 1981 could never have foreseen just how the 
offer back scheme would play out. It even took time for the Executive to come 
to terms with its obligations. Some Government agencies thought they were 
exempt from the requirement to offer surplus public works land to former 
owners.
137
 In the words of Fogerty J:  




A common theme throughout offer back cases is the complexity of facts. 
Applying the plain meaning of statute is not a simple task when complex 
background facts are introduced. Appeal Courts overturning decisions by 
learned judges of lower Courts speaks of the difficulty in understanding the 
statutory offer back scheme. It may in some respects be understandable that 
Government officials have taken time to come to terms with their offer back 
obligations. The judicial narrative is the application of black letter statute to 
background facts. 
By enacting the offer back provisions under Public Works Act 1981, 
Parliament has forced the hand of the Executive branch of government to 
consider former owners before disposing surplus public works land. 
Discretionary offer back powers, such as those under s436 of the Maori Affairs 
Act 1953, were not enough to avoid controversies with former owners at 
Bastion Point and Te Kopua, Raglan. The interests of former owners were not 
at the top of Government’s agenda. Obligations must be enshrined in statute if 
they are to take priority over competing interests. In absence of a statutory 
scheme for protection, the judiciary has limited powers to intervene and hold 
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 The statutory offer back scheme enables the 
Executive to understand and manage its priorities against the interests of 
former owners.  
Parliament is the supreme lawmaker of New Zealand.
140
 The judiciary’s role in 
the relationship is well explained by McGrath J at the Supreme Court in Paki v 
Attorney-General:  
“It is Parliament …that has full power to make laws under our constitutional 
arrangements. The Supreme Court itself recognises New Zealand’s commitment to 
the sovereignty of Parliament, as well as to the rule of law. An act of Parliament is 
the superior law that prevails over any inconsistent laws made by the executive or 
judicial branches of government. … 
It follows that the courts should not develop the common law in a manner 
inconsistent with legislation [or] that frustrates applicable statutory schemes.”
141
 
It is not the role of the judiciary to reform statute law. Acts of Parliament are 
the means by which modern law reform is carried out in New Zealand.
142
   
Understanding the purpose of Parliament is fundamental to proper statutory 
interpretation. The meaning of statute law is derived “…from its text and in 
light of its purpose.”
143
 The ‘intention of Parliament’ is perhaps better 
described as the ‘purpose of Parliament’. It would be absurd to analyse the 
collective mind of Parliamentarians to ascertain their intention at the passing 
of each statute. Furthermore, it was impossible for Parliament in 1981 to 
contemplate the full implications of the law it passed. Public sector reforms, 
corporatisation of government agencies reorganisation of port authorities are 
but some examples of events which unfolded years later to face both 
Parliament and the statutory offer back regime. 
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The purpose of offer back legislation is remedial. It is that surplus public 
works land must be offered to those people from whom it was taken, subject to 
several express exceptions.
144
 The Privy Council in Horton observes:  
“[The offer back scheme] has been said in a number of cases to be the expression of 
a strong legislative policy to preserve the rights of an owner subject only to the 
continuing needs of the state.”
145
  
The statute means what it says. A common theme from offer back cases has 
the judiciary applying the law as it is written. The policy of the scheme is clear 
from the words of the statute.  
The policy underpinning statutory offer back scheme has not always proven 
convenient. Despite inconvenience, offer back cases are typically determined 
in terms of the literal rule of statutory interpretation.
146
 The words in s40 of the 
Act are given their ordinary meaning when applied to relevant facts. 
Government agencies and enterprises coming to terms with their offer back 
obligations through the 1980s and 1990s occasionally found themselves in 





 Other canons of interpretation are not relevant 
given the plain drafting of offer back legislation.  The ‘golden rule’ of 
interpretation, where extraordinary meanings are applied to words to avoid 
contradiction or absurdity, is not an issue.
149
 Likewise, the ‘mischief rule’, 
where statutes are interpreted to remedy a mischief for which they were 
enacted is not applicable to the offer back legislation.
150
 
It would not be possible to properly consider implications of the offer back 
regime for Maori without reviewing some important cases. The only reliable 
way to ascertain the meaning of offer back legislation is to apply the ordinary 
                                                          
144
 Public Works Act 1981, s40 
145
 Attorney-General v Horton [1999] 2 NZLR 257 at 261 (PC) 
146
 An exception being the Supreme Court decision in Williams v Auckland Council [2016] NZSC 20 (SC) where 
plaintiffs proved the technical requirements of the offer back scheme had been satisfied in their favour but the 
Supreme Court found they did not meet the remedial purpose of the offer back legislation.  
147
 Attorney-General v Hull [2000] 3 NZLR 63 (CA) 
148
 Attorney-General v Horton [1999] 2 NZLR 257 (PC) 
149
 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (5
th





words to a set of facts.
151
 Statute law is paramount. The role of the judiciary is 
to apply the ordinary meaning of black letter law to the facts as presented by 
litigants. Those facts are often complex and, often, better understood with the 
benefit of hindsight. 
Offer back legislation passed by Parliament in 1981 is a significant recognition 
of the rights of former owners of surplus public works land. Maori are placed 
in a position stronger than they were before the offer back scheme came into 
force. However, any improvement in the offer back regime to better address 
the Crown’s special duty to Maori, where this is not adequately provided under 
existing legislation, must now be driven by Parliament.  
The judicial narrative highlights advantages and shortfalls of the statutory 
offer back scheme. The real life stories of people affected by the legislation are 
brought out in cases before the Courts. It is only from these real life stories 
that it is possible to judge the appropriateness and relevance of the statute law. 
The following analysis and commentary regarding a selection of offer back 
cases seeks to highlight implications of the offer back scheme upon Maori.  
 
 




Attorney-General v Hull [2000] 3 NZLR 63 (CA) 
Hull v Attorney-General HC Auckland M 1900-SD00, 25 October 2001 
Hull v Attorney-General (1998) 12 PRNZ 523 (HC) 
Hull v Attorney-General HC Auckland M 1181-89, 27 November 1998 
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As cities expand, demand increases for surrounding rural land to be converted 
from traditional use. Farmland, natural beauty areas, traditional food gathering 
sites and sacred areas are consumed into expanding cityscapes. More often 
than not, urban expansion takes place well beyond the control of landowners. 
Mass transition of land use will also result in economic, social and cultural 
change for people, particularly so for multi-generational land owning families 
whom are likely to have a strong connection to their property and its 
surrounds. For Maori, an extreme example of this phenomenon is illustrated by 
the urban expansion of Auckland city at the expense of Ngati Whatua whom 
by 1978 had lost ownership of practically all of their traditional lands. For 
individual landowners, whether Maori or non-Maori, the power behind an 
overwhelming push for urbanisation of land is much the same. The urban 
expansion phenomenon places landowners in a position whereby they have no 
option other than to have their lands consumed.  
The offer-back scheme of s40 does not discriminate between the preferences 
of the land holding agency or the former land owner. The policy of the 
legislation is that surplus public works land should be offered to former 
owners or their successors unless exemptions apply. The wording of the 
legislation can at times be inconvenient to the interests of either party. If 
public works land is surplus to requirements, is not required for another public 
work or exchange, then it must be offered back to its former owners unless the 
exemptions to offer-back apply.
152
 The offer is to be at current market value, 
unless the chief executive of Land Information New Zealand considers it 
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The Hull cases are important to the understanding of offer back obligations. 
Land originally taken for housing purposes was no longer required for a public 
work. The responsible agency had offered the surplus land back to the Hulls 
following requests from the Hulls’ solicitor to do so. The question before the 
Courts was ultimately to determine the date that the surplus land should have 
been offered back to the former owners.
154
If the responsible agency was 
statute bound to offer the land back at an earlier date, the sale price would be 
significantly less.
 155
 The ensuring litigation proves that the increase in land 
value over the years was worth the effort for each of the parties to pursue their 
preferred position.  
The background facts are complex and they unfolded over several years. The 
Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision that was in favour of the 
Hulls.
156
 The reason for the Court of Appeal reaching a different end result to 
the High Court ultimately rests in its approach to interpreting s40 provisions. 
Given the series of detailed and complicated facts, the final decision could 
otherwise have gone either way. But the prevailing approach adopted by the 
Court of Appeal was to resist comparing conventional property law concepts 
with the offer back regime. The provisions of s40 are, in the words of Keith J 
who delivered the judgment
157
, ‘to speak for themselves in their historical and 
legislative context’.
158
 The legislative context is that the statute means what it 
says. The words of s40 are not to have meaning imported from other arenas, 
such as conventional property law. The Court’s reference to the ‘historical 
context’ of s40 is a subtle reminder that the purpose of s40 is in its origin. 
Bastion Point, Te Kopua Raglan and the 1975 land march although not 
mentioned in the judgment are very much part of the historical context behind 
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Parliament enacting the offer back regime. Keith J reminds us that this context 
is relevant. 
Perhaps the most important observation of the Court of Appeal in Hull is that 
offer back obligations under s40 may be triggered by events.
159
 A ‘formal 
recorded decision’ may not be required.
160
 The Court of Appeal determined 
that the date the land was no longer required for a public work and should have 
been offered to the Hulls was later than the date determined by Randerson J at 
the High Court.
161
 The practical result was that the Hulls had to pay more to 
buy the land back given the increase in value between the two dates. The 
approach adopted by Keith J at the Court of Appeal reads:  
“[I]f any reasonable person would undoubtedly have concluded that in all the 
circumstances the land was no longer required for the relevant public work, the 
agency may well have difficulty asserting that it had not so concluded, and therefore 
had not come under any obligation to proceed in terms of the section.”
162
 
The abandonment of a public work is one such example of circumstances 
likely to trigger offer back obligations under s40. A formal written decision to 
this effect is not a pre-requisite.
163
 Section 40(1) refers to land ‘no longer 
required’ for a public work.
164
 Circumstances are enough. The legislation does 
not stipulate a requirement for a formal recorded decision.  
Whether or not public works land is no longer required for a public work will 
not always be an easy question to answer. The Hull case is testimony to that. 
However, Keith J at least presents a test that can be applied to background 
facts. The test is the easy part. It is the application of the test to facts, often 
complex, where matters become difficult.  
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Following construction of Auckland’s harbour bridge in 1959, urban growth 
accelerated north of the city toward Albany where the Hull family owned rural 
property. As part of the urban planning development for Albany, the Crown in 
1976 acquired from the Hull family two parcels of land for State housing 




The Hulls owned their land for a relatively short while. It was purchased by 
them in 1963 and utilised as a dairy farm. Even after the Crown acquired 
ownership, the Hulls continued to farm the property under a lease from the 




In the same year that the Hulls purchased their land, the Crown began 
purchasing land in the Albany Basin for its future urban development. The 
basin comprised the small village of Albany with the balance being 
substantially a rural landscape. In total there was approximately 5,500 acres or 
2,200 hectares of land within the basin. It was intended that the basin be 
developed into a new urban community with reserves, schools, commerce and 
light industry, but the initial intention was predominantly for a State Housing 
area similar to Otara and Mangere.
167
   
A steering committee was established by the Government to promote planning 
for a new university at Albany and to steer development of the whole urban 
community. In 1973, the steering committee prepared a technical report for the 
Minister of Works and Development and the Minister of Housing which 
included a long term outline development plan for the direction of 
development and urban growth within the entire Albany Basin. The report 
recommended that 200 acres of land, within the vicinity of the Hull’s property, 
be set aside for a sub-regional centre. The steering committee noted that initial 
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steps had been taken by the Housing Division of the Ministry of Works to 
exercise its powers under the Public Works Act 1928 to acquire all privately 
owned land within this zone.
168
  
The Hull’s property largely fell under a proposal in the technical report for 
land to be set aside for industrial purposes such as general manufacturing, 
assembly plants, distribution warehouses and extensive yard type industries.
169
 
The Waitemata County district scheme which came into effect during 1973 
zoned the Hull property as ‘rural residential deferred’, a designation for lands 
likely to be developed in future as part of urban expansion. The designation 
did not allow for urban development. Industrial activities were excluded and 
so were other uses incompatible with residential use.
170
 The proposal 
anticipated that Waitemata County Council would introduce changes to its 




The technical report recommended that the bulk of the land area, 
approximately 3,200 acres of the Albany Basin from an approximate total area 
of 5,500 acres, be utilised for housing purposes. The Hull’s property was 
largely designated for future industrial purposes. Except for two small areas, 




The reason the Crown assumed responsibility for orchestrating development of 
the Albany Basin was to ensure comprehensive development of the whole 
community. The steering committee expressed that public ownership of the 
industrial land would enable more effective land use controls to deliver 
broader economic and employment benefits.
173
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On 31 July 1974, the Associate Minister of Works and Development wrote to 
the Hulls notifying them of the Crown’s intention to take their land. Extracts 
from the letter read:  
You may be aware that Government, with the active cooperation of the Waitemata 
County Council and Auckland Regional Authority, has been engaged on the planning 
of the Albany Basin as a major extension to the Auckland metropolitan area. … 
To ensure the orderly development of the Basin as a new urban community with 
shopping, commercial and recreational facilities as well as places of work for future 
residents, in step with population and growth, Government now intends to acquire a 
further 423 acres of land which includes property owned by you ... 
In order to implement this decision I have signed a Notice of Intention to take, under 
the provisions of the Public Works Act 1928, this additional land and you will 
receive formal notification of this as soon as practicable … 
You will be approached by a Property Officer of the Ministry of Works and 
Development in the near future and I am hopeful that in due course it will be possible 
to purchase from you, by negotiation, the land required on terms which will be 
mutually satisfactory. I would add that only if agreement cannot be reached by 
negotiation will consideration be given to the use of the compulsory powers of 
acquisition under the Public Works Act.
174
  
The overwhelming inevitability of land ownership depravation is apparent 
from correspondence to the Hulls. Whether the landowners agree or not, the 
Crown’s intention to take was signed off by the Associate Minister. The 
invitation to negotiate was on terms with a predetermined outcome. The Hulls 
were going to lose their land and no amount of negotiation would change that. 
This illustrates the power imbalance in favour of the Crown. This is the 
imbalance deemed necessary to carry out public works for the greater public 
good.  
The Hulls and the Ministry of Works and Development did not agree within 
the prescribed 12 month statutory period so legalisation action was carried out 
regardless. On 12 February 1976 the Hull land was taken for State Housing 
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Purposes under s32 of the Public Works Act 1928.
175
 The designation of land 
for State Housing Purposes, although it was intended for industrial use, 
became a material point in litigation that followed.
176
  
Following the taking, the land was administered by Housing Corporation for 
and on behalf of the Crown. A lease was granted to the Hulls who continued to 
utilise the property as a dairy farm. Development of the Albany Basin 
continued but there were changes from the original plan. Various factors came 
into play such as a decline in the national economy and a change of local 
authority planning designation from rural residential deferred to rural 
industrial deferred. This affected the timing of the development and the 




The Public Works Act 1981 came into force on 1 February 1982 and with it 
the offer-back provisions of s40. Housing Corporation took time to appreciate 
the implications of s40. It initially questioned whether the offer back 
provisions even applied to the land it held.
178
 A significant reason for this 
position appears to rest in the sheer inconvenience of offer-back obligations to 
Housing Corporation. The State housing provider had assumed the role of a 
commercial property developer endeavouring to achieve a return from its 
investment by way of property sales. Offer-back obligations are an 
impediment to the freedom required by a property developer wishing to take 
advantage of market opportunity to maximise financial return on investment. 
A report of October 1985 by the Assistant Director-General of Housing 
evidences the Housing Corporation’s concern:  
“5.2  The Housing Corporation purchased the land and has held it since the mid-
60s for purposes now proposed. This, together with an outlay of approximately 
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$1,000,000 on engineering preparatory work suggests that we have a commitment to 
proceed to ensure a return of our investment to date.”
179
 
Development of housing within the Albany Basin depended upon market 
demand for developed land and Housing Corporation’s ability to meet the 
costs of infrastructure services for its new urban area.
180
  
Decisions dating to 1972 or 1973 indicated that earlier intentions of building a 
vast State housing complex had been set aside in favour of a mixed housing 
development with industrial areas. By the mid-1980s, the land acquired from 
the Hulls was under a cloud of uncertainty. Urban development of the Albany 
Basin progressively unfolded and Housing Corporation considered the former 
Hull property was still required for urban development likely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. There was no formal decision by Housing Corporation on 
the land being declared surplus to public works requirements.
 181
 The 
Corporation thought it could hold onto the land on its belief that the meaning 
of ‘State housing purposes’ was sufficiently broad to include general urban 
purposes, such as the industrial development it intended. The Corporation 
thought that its offer-back obligations under s40 would not apply provided that 
it still intended to develop the Hull land for industrial purposes.
182
 
The Hulls decided in late 1986 they would try to recover their land. Their 
solicitor met with a senior planning officer of the Housing Corporation and 
was informed that State housing was no longer the intended purpose for the 
land, and that had been the case since at least 1979. A letter from the Hulls’ 
solicitor was sent to Housing Corporation on 17 December 1986 informing 
that the Hulls wished to purchase their former land in keeping with the 
provisions of s40 of the Public Works Act.
183
 There still remained a significant 
level of uncertainty within Housing Corporation whether it could hold land for 
State Housing Purposes if the land was in fact intended for industrial and 
commercial development. It was not until 15 May 1989 that the Department of 
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Lands finally presented formal offers to the Hulls. The offers were based upon 
a market value assessment of the land at that time. $6.7 million plus GST was 
sought for the larger block and $3.5 million plus GST for the smaller. The 
Hulls were given 40 working days to respond.
184
  
The Hulls’ response to the Crown’s offer confirmed their intention to purchase 
the properties, but at prices prescribed by s40. The Hulls then lodged legal 
proceedings with the Courts seeking a determination that the land had become 
surplus to requirements much earlier, as far back as 1981. As such they 
considered the Crown’s offer to them should have been based upon the value 





What the Courts said 
 
The High Court ruled that by 1979 the fact scenario evidenced that the former 
Hull land was no longer required for State Housing Purposes, the public work 
for which it had been acquired.
186
 The High Court reasoned that Housing 
Corporation was not entitled to hold land for industrial development; therefore, 
statutory obligations under s40 could not be avoided when the offer back 
provisions of the Act came into force.
187
 On any uncertainty over the new offer 
back regime that conferred obligations upon Housing Corporation, Randerson 
J was unsympathetic:  
“In my view, it is irrelevant that the Corporation may have mistaken the extent and 
nature of its legal powers and obligations. Plainly, it had access to legal advice and, if 
it acted under mistake as to its legal position, this is not something which it may 
reasonably pray in aid to avoid its statutory obligations.”
188
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The onus rests upon responsible agencies to properly observe and carry out 
their statutory duties.  
The Court of Appeal preferred a far broader approach to the legitimacy of 
public work activity. It rejected the significance Randerson J had placed upon 
the distinction between ‘industrial purposes’ versus ‘state housing purposes’ 
Instead, it was the overall objective of the public work that was relevant, the 
urban development of the Albany Basin. Keith J at the Court of Appeal 
reasoned that ‘state housing purposes’ included industrial and commercial 
components which would comprise part of the intended new urban 
community. It was proper for land intended for industrial and commercial 
development to be held for state housing purposes. The broader purpose of 
urban development was legitimately contemplated under the ‘state housing 
purposes’ designation of the subject land.
189
 The appeal was allowed.  
 
The Hull litigation provides useful insight into operation of the surplus public 
works land offer back regime. Stepping back from the unique and complex 
facts, several themes appear in the narrative which relate to the offer back 
scheme as a whole. Rather than getting lost in detail, such as in the 
significance of district plan changes to the final outcome or in the relevance of 
‘state housing purposes’ versus ‘industrial purposes’, there are some more 
broader lessons to be learned.  
The Hulls faced the overwhelming inevitability that their farm land would be 
lost to urbanisation. The public works purpose for which their land was taken 
was driven by economic factors supported by the government of the day. The 
tone of correspondence from the Associate Minister of Works notifying the 
Hulls of the Crown’s intention to take their land will be familiar to Maori who 
have lost traditional lands to public works. An invitation to enter negotiations 
to sell is underscored with notice that land will be compulsorily taken if 
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 If land is required for a public work, it is not 
the ‘taking’ which is negotiable. Negotiation is only relevant to the terms upon 
which the land owner releases its property to the acquiring authority. Even 
then, the balance of power whether or not such terms are acceptable rests with 
an acquiring authority fully equipped to exercise compulsory powers of 
acquisition should negotiations fail.  
Public works are not always perfectly planned and executed. They are subject 
to factors unforeseen and at times beyond the control of acquiring authorities. 
It can take years, if not decades, for public works to unfold and reach an end. 
The selection of the Hulls’ land for a public work was carried out when the 
Albany urban development was only a concept. Detail of the development was 
to follow, contingent upon town planning approvals and unforeseen economic 
and political factors. The end result of the public work over the Hull property 
was that Housing Corporation’s participation in the urban development was 
abandoned. The land was no longer required for a public work and it was 
offered back to the former owners following their persistent petitioning.  
It is more than likely that the Hulls could not afford to buy their land back. It 
had been taken from them as farmland, but offered back as a prospective 
industrial development. The market value of the land had significantly 
increased in value since the land was taken for State housing purposes. There 
was a significant gap between the original compensation sum paid to the 
former owners when the land was taken and the market value purchase price in 
the Crown’s offer back some 14 years later. Compensation awarded to the 
Hulls in 1975 was ‘in the vicinity of $1 million’.
 191
 In 1989 two parcels of 




Housing Corporation was ill prepared and wrongly advised following the 
enactment of offer back legislation. It took years before it came to grips with 
its statutory offer back obligations. The Hulls were placed in a position 
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whereby they, through their solicitor, had to demand the land holding agency 





Perhaps the most dominant message to Maori from the Hull litigation is that 
the offer back provisions of the Public Works Act mean what they say. Keith 
J’s ‘plain meaning’ approach to the application of s40 provisions cannot be 
faulted. The Court of Appeal decision merely applies the ordinary words of 
s40, ‘in their legislative and historical context’, to the facts as presented before 
the Court.
193
 Parliament is the supreme lawmaker in New Zealand.
194
 It is not 
for the judiciary to import meaning into a statute beyond that which can 
reasonably be sustained by those words passed by Parliament.  
If the judicial narrative deviates from the values or interests of former Maori 
owners, fault does not rest with the judiciary. Instead, the problem rests with 
the statutory provisions and their suitability for purpose. Any required change, 
adaptation or amendment to the statutory offer back regime cannot be 
promulgated by the judiciary. That responsibility rests solely with Parliament.  
The Crown’s special duty to Maori regarding surplus public works land must 
be more than a well-established principle. If the duty is to hold any true 
significance it must be recorded in statute. Only Parliament can confer proper 
measures of accountability which can be recognised and upheld under the 
judicial process. The Courts will not import meaning and purpose into the 
statutory offer back scheme beyond that which is already there.  
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THE OHINEWAI COAL LANDS CASES (HORTON): Statutory 




Attorney-General v Horton [1999] 2 NZLR 257 (PC) 
Horton & Anor v Attorney-General CA43/97, 3 December 1997 




The Ohinewai Coal Lands Cases relate to the offer-back of land at Ohinewai 
compulsorily acquired by the Crown for a proposed large scale coal mine. The 
acquisition was part of government ‘think big’ policy of national public works 
to stimulate economic growth. The policy was abandoned not long after the 
land was taken.  
The High Court heard two cases together which had been filed by Mr Deane 
on one hand and trustees of E.G. Levin Farm Settlement Trust on the other. 
The commentary as follows begins with the High Court decision of Deane v 
Attorney-General
195
 then continues with the Levin Trust cases, the trustees 
being Mr Horton and Mr Campbell. The Levin Trust or Horton case was 
appealed to the Court of Appeal
196
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Statutory schemes are enforceable. With Horton
198
, offer back obligations 
were an inconvenience to the government’s privatisation agenda of the day. If 




The land requirements of newly incorporated state owned enterprises were not 
entirely known from day one. It took time for officials to understand and come 
to terms with the practical needs of these new business organisations and their 
statutory obligations. They learned from the Courts that as soon as conditions 
are satisfied under s40, statutory rights are conferred upon former owners and 
their successors. There is no going back once an offer back obligation is 
triggered. Surplus land must be offered back even if it is realised at a later 





Mr Deane’s farm at Ohinewai was compulsorily taken by the Crown in 1986. 
It was intended that the property would in future be developed into an opencast 
coal mine. Mr Deane was granted a lease and he continued to occupy the 
property after it was acquired by the Crown.
200
 The Levin Trust property was 
also taken in 1986 for the same purpose.
201
  
Not long after the Deane and Levin Trust properties were taken, a significant 
change in government policy was introduced. The ‘think big’ policy was 
abandoned and Government no longer wished to be directly involved in coal 
mining. Its coal mining function was corporatised and in 1988 state coal assets 
were transferred to the State Owned Enterprise, Coal Corporation of New 
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Zealand Limited. In keeping with the policy change, plans for a large open cast 
coal mine over the Ohinewai properties were cancelled.  
Corporatisation of state owned assets required the allocation of corporatised 
assets to newly formed enterprises. Government agencies and newly created 
state owned enterprises were not always certain about whether some land 
assets were still required for a public work. This uncertainty was not helped by 
apparent confusion over how the offer-back provisions of s40 should, or 
should not, be observed by responsible land holding agencies. The confusion 




On 1 April 1987 the business of State Coal Mines passed to Coal 
Corporation.
203
The newly established State Owned Enterprise and its 
shareholding Ministers on behalf of the Crown entered into an agreement on 
31 March 1988 setting out the detail of arrangements between them. There 
were three significant aspects of this agreement particularly relevant to the 
Ohinewai properties. First, the Ohinewai properties were expressly excluded 
from those State Coal Mines assets deemed to have transferred to Coal 
Corporation. The properties appeared on a schedule described as ‘Surplus 
Properties’ and referred to under the agreement as “…owned by the Crown, 
surplus to the requirements of [Coal Corporation].”
204
Second, Coal 
Corporation was appointed as the Crown’s exclusive selling agent to dispose 
of the Surplus Properties. Coal Corporation was entitled to a commission 
amounting to 10% of the net sale price and commission on rents and income 
pending any sale. The agreement further provided that:  
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“…the company shall have a discretion is determining how, when, and on what terms 
and conditions the properties should be sold or otherwise disposed of.”
205
 
Third, Coal Corporation was granted a first option to purchase at market value 
any of the Surplus Properties which according to the agreement could be 
exercised by the company giving notice to the Crown.
206
  
The arrangement between Coal Corporation and its shareholding Ministers 
regarding Surplus Properties was a misguided attempt at pragmatism. 
Properties transferred to State Owned Enterprises would be subject to 
clawback provisions if such land sold to a third party was later subject to a 
recommendation of the Waitangi Tribunal for it be returned to Maori 
ownership.
207
 The arrangement sought to avoid the clawback mechanism 
altogether, and instead authorise a State Owned Enterprise to administer the 
lands. Also, the first option to purchase in favour of Coal Corporation was at 
odds with the statutory rights of former owners to purchase surplus public 
works land under s40 of the Public Works Act 1981. 
Not long after the agreement between the shareholding Ministers and Coal 
Corporation, on 28 April 1988 Coal Corporation notified Mr Deane that he 
would soon be presented with an offer to purchase the land he previously 
owned.
208
 A formal offer was presented to Mr Deane in 1989. A proposed 
purchase price of $550,000 was derived by a valuer for Coal Corporation as 
the market value.
209
 Mr Deane’s solicitor confirmed his client’s willingness to 
purchase the property but at a price to be determined after Mr Deane obtained 
his own valuation. A counter proposal of $430,000 in keeping with his 
valuation was later put to Coal Corporation. This figure was subsequently 
increased by Mr Deane to $460,000 to reflect a Coal Corporation valuation as 
at 1 June 1988, one month after its initial notification to Mr Deane.
210
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The Coal Corporation administered Ohinewai land disposals were immediately 
suspended following a decision of the Court of Appeal which concerned the 
land disposal scheme.
211
 The decision was in favour of the Tainui Maori Trust 
Board. Following corporatisation of State coal assets, Tainui Maori Trust 
Board became concerned that the Crown’s intention to dispose of the 
Ohinewai lands would be carried out in a manner likely to defeat the Trust 
Board’s claim over them. Waikato-Tainui Maori had lost the majority of their 
tribal land, including the subject district of Ohinewai, when it was confiscated 
by the Crown during land wars of 1865. 
212
In 1989 the Court of Appeal upheld 
an application by the Trust Board regarding the Ohinewai public works lands 
and its then unsettled claim before the Waitangi Tribunal.  
The Tainui Maori Trust Board was concerned that the agreement between the 
Crown and Coal Corporation jeopardised its position to negotiate with the 
Crown a treaty settlement which may include Ohinewai land sold by Coal 
Corporation as an agent for the Crown. Proceedings were heard by the Court 
of Appeal. The Court determined that the Crown must not act in a manner 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi given that the Crown 
had authorised a State Owned Enterprise to manage disposal of the Ohinewai 
assets or liabilities on its behalf.
213
 The Treaty obligation was conferred upon 
the Crown under s9 of the Sate Owned Enterprises Act 1986. The mechanism 
for disposal of surplus Ohinewai lands designed by agreement between the 
Crown and Coal Corporation technically avoided triggering the treaty 
settlement clawback provision of the State Owned Enterprises Act.
214
 The 
clawback provision was to safeguard Maori claims to the Waitangi Tribunal
215
 
and would enable subject land to be utilised if called upon in future for 
settlement of any successful Treaty claim. The Court did not accept that the 
Crown’s intention to sidestep the statutory clawback provision was in keeping 
with its statutory Treaty of Waitangi obligations to Waikato-Tainui. The 
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Crown and Coal Corporation were prevented from “selling, disposing or 
otherwise alienating” the Ohinewai lands until a suitable “scheme of 
protection” was in place to protect the Tainui Maori Trust Board including the 




Mr Deane and the trustees of Levin Trust took exception to not being given the 
opportunity to purchase their respective farms back from the Crown 
compulsorily taken from them some years earlier. They considered the 
properties were no longer required for coal mining purposes and that the 
Crown had to offer the lands back to them. Mr Deane on one hand and trustees 
of the E.G. Levin Farm Settlement Trust on the other filed separate 
proceedings seeking, amongst other things, determinations they shall each 
have their former lands offered back to them. The High Court heard the two 
cases together.  
Coal Corporation had engaged with Mr Deane regarding the offer-back of the 
former Deane property. The offer-back was withdrawn by Coal Corporation 
following the Court of Appeal’s decision in favour of the Tainui Trust 
Board.
217
 However, trustees of the Levin Trust had no contact from Coal 
Corporation about the possible buy-back of the farm previously owned by the 
Trust. Instead, the Trustees were informed from a Coal Corporation 
representative that the former Levin Trust land may be used as part of a Treaty 
of Waitangi settlement with Waikato-Tainui. This information motivated the 
Trustees to assert a claim to take priority over Waikato-Tainui.
218
  
Although Coal Corporation had abandoned its plans for a large scale open cast 
coal mine at Ohinewai, there was a possibility that the former Levin Trust 
property could be required to support a smaller scale mine. Other former 
owners of Ohinewai lands, including Mr Deane, had been approached by Coal 
Corporation regarding the offer-back of surplus land. The Levin Trustees were 
never approached notwithstanding their former property appearing on the 
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What the Courts said 
 
The first aspect of the Horton litigation deals with the timing of when land is 
no longer required for a public work. Public sector reforms were brought about 
by a shift in government policy toward corporatisation and privatisation of 
commercial state assets. Whether or not coal mining land was surplus to 
requirements was not a simple question to answer at that time. To compound 




The litigation ultimately did not go well for Coal Corporation despite 
Hammond J at the High Court finding in favour of the Attorney-General. 
Hammond J accepted that uncertainty resulting from the Government’s exit 
from the coal business and passing the role to a state owned enterprise would 
understandably result in some confusion. He resisted a strict approach to s40. 
The difficulty for Coal Corporation was that it appeared for a short period it 
had resolved that it no longer required the land. The state owned enterprise 
some months later changed its position and decided it required the land. 
Hammond J considered that it would be “unduly legalistic to overlook the 
reality of what was unfolding.”
221
 He ruled that the land was still required for a 
public work notwithstanding the position briefly held by Coal Corporation that 
it was not. Hammond J concluded that the public work prevailed and the offer 
back provisions of s40 therefore did not apply.
222
 The Court of Appeal did not 
agree. It held that as soon as public works land is surplus to requirements, the 
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statutory scheme under s40 is triggered giving rise to obligations which cannot 
be reversed with a change of mind.
223
 The Privy Council agreed with the Court 




The test to determine whether land is ‘no longer required’ for a public work is 
found in the Privy Council judgment. It is described as an “objective 
assessment in accordance with expert evidence.”
225
 This approach led their 
Lordships to a relatively simple conclusion. The answer rested in Coal 
Corporation’s intentions. If Coal Corporation intended to mine in the area, 
then it could require the land for that purpose or ancillary works. If Coal 
Corporation did not intend to mine the area, the land ‘would not be 
required’.
226
 The end result, an objective assessment supported by relevant 
evidence, was delivered by Lord Hoffman:  




The subject land was no longer required for a public work at that described 
point in time. The Privy Council’s reasoning supports the broader approach 
taken by the Court of Appeal when it refused to accept that inclusion of the 
former Levin Trust land in a schedule of ‘surplus properties’ was enough in 
itself to establish that the land was no longer required.
228
 It is necessary to 
consider the broader context and circumstances of the matter to draw the 
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The Privy Council’s decision in Attorney-General v Horton
229
 is significant. 
There is no avoiding of statutory obligations when public works land is no 
longer required. There is now a clearer understanding what will constitute land 
being deemed surplus to public work requirements. Once obligations are 
triggered, there is no going back. 
Government objectives of the day can give rise to temptation to avoid proper 
process and responsibility. The statutory offer back scheme was at odds with 
Government pragmatism and convenience when it sought to exit the coal 
business and transfer assets to Coal Corporation. Judicial intervention was 
only made possible for three reasons. First, the former owners knew of the 
situation. Second, the former owners took action to ensure their rights were 
upheld. Third, the former owners could exercise rights conferred by statute. 
Parliament is the supreme lawmaker and the offer back scheme it prescribes 
must be observed, whether or not to do so is inconvenient and against other 
policy objectives.  
A parallel statutory protection was observed leading up to the Horton 
litigation. Proceedings by Tainui Maori Trust Board succeeded based upon s9 
of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986.
230
 In keeping with the Crown’s 
Treaty of Waitangi obligations enshrined in statute, the Crown and Coal 
Corporation could not avoid the scheme under the State Owned Enterprises 
Act 1986 to safeguard Maori claims to the Waitangi Tribunal.
231
  
Maori are often not far from their former lands. Being dispossessed from 
public works land does not remove tangata whenua status from former Maori 
owners. Maori remain connected to land, even when it has been taken from 
them. It is in the interests of former owners to keep informed about land lost to 
public works if they seek an opportunity to buy it back when it is no longer 
required.  
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The purpose of s40 offer back is remedial. It is to address perceived injustice 
where land is compulsorily taken from its owners.
 232
  Those people have an 
opportunity to buy it back when it is no longer required. Once a statutory 
scheme is in place, its purpose cannot be swayed by Government’s desire for 
pragmatism and convenience. The offer back scheme is purpose driven, arising 
from a historical context where perceived injustice of compulsory land 
acquisition justified a remedy. Bastion Point and Te Kopua, Raglan, are 
leading historical examples. In the words of Richardson J at the Court of 
Appeal in Horton:  
“While [s40] does not impose express time limits, it requires the chief executive to 




Statutory schemes are enforceable. This is an important message for Maori 
who may well benefit from an improved offer back regime. A revised Act 
could consider Maori succession practices, and ensure that successors of 
former owners are not limited to one generation for entitlement under offer 
back provisions. Perhaps the decades long call of the Waitangi Tribunal for a 
Treaty provision to be included in the Public Works Act could finally be 
realised.
234
 Well intended Government policy statements and schemes do not 
carry the same weight.
235
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Attorney-General v Morrison [2002] 3 NZLR 373 (CA) 
Morrison v Anor v Attorney-General & Anor HC Auckland CP 297-SD00, 31 





The Morrison case gives useful insight into how internal and external factors 
can adversely influence administration of the statutory offer back scheme. The 
full bureaucratic chain of control and decision making, from Corporation 
officials through to the responsible Minister, can become involved in the 
administration and disposal of surplus public works land.
236
 Public interest 
groups, political influence and the priorities of third party local body 
institutions can distract officials from the core purpose of s40.  
Whether or not land is no longer required for a public work is not always easy 
to determine. The complexity of unfolding events such as public policy 
changes, Treaty of Waitangi issues and town planning scheme changes, are but 
some examples of factors which add to the context within which the statutory 





illustrate how over time numerous factors can unfold to complicate what at 
first may seem to be a relatively straight forward offer back scheme. Both Hull 
and Horton are leading case authorities in this area of law.  
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 is yet another example of the complex nature of events 
which can shroud the core purpose of s40 offer back. Similar to Hull and 
Horton, there were various notable events leading up to the matter being 
brought before the Courts. Fisher J presides over Morrison at the High Court. 
He has difficulty with the legal reasoning between the Privy Council in Hull 
and the Court of Appeal in Horton:  
“There are real difficulties in reconciling some of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in 
Attorney-General v Hull [2000] 3 NZLR 63 at 77 with the Privy Council decision in 
Attorney-General v Horton [1999] 2 NZLR 257. In this decision I have attempted to 
identify the principles intended to govern a case like this one.” 
240 
What Fisher J means by the term ‘a case like this one’ is a case where the date 
the land should have been offered to its former owner must be determined by 
the Court, the fundamental issues of both Hull and Horton. However, the 
Court of Appeal did not agree with Fisher J.
241
 It reasoned that observing the 
offer back scheme is a simple matter of following the procedure prescribed 
under the statute, notwithstanding the complexity of surrounding events. The 
first step is to ascertain whether s40(1)(a) is satisfied, that is to determine if the 
land is no longer required for the public work. When s40(1)(a) is satisfied, the 
Chief Executive must in a timely manner establish whether under s40(1)(b) 
and (c) the land is required for either another public work or for the purpose of 
exchange. If the land is required under s40(1)(b) or (c), then the offer back 
provisions are not triggered.
242
 The Court of Appeal reasoning brings the offer 
back process back to its fundamental purpose by following the prescribed 
statutory procedure without getting distracted by the complexity of 
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An unusual aspect of Morrison is that the plaintiffs, Morrison and Blampied, 
and the vendor of the surplus land, Housing Corporation, had already reached 
substantial agreement regarding the offer-back to the plaintiffs. The substantial 
agreement was only reached following years of exchange between the parties 
as to whether or not an obligation to offer the land back even existed. 
However, once it was accepted that the statutory offer back scheme applied, 
the parties then could not agree on the price that should be paid. Their inability 
to agree was based upon a difference of opinion as to the date that offer back 
obligations were triggered. The parties agreed that the price should be market 
value as prescribed under s40, such value determined as at the date it should 
have been offered to the former owner or his successors. The plaintiffs 
therefore contracted with Housing Corporation to purchase the surplus land for 
the price being:  
“…the market value of the land as at the date when the land should have been offered 




The purpose of the Morrison proceedings was for the Court to determine the 
purchase price. With appreciating land values, the date when s40 offer back 
obligations are triggered had a financial consequence for both vendor and 
purchaser. That financial consequence was significant enough for Morrison to 





The Morrison case concerns surplus housing land initially taken under the 
Public Works Act 1928 from Mr A Morrison. Acquisition of the greater 
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Morrison landholding was concluded in two parts, the first by proclamation of 
1934 and the second by proclamation of 1941. The land was set apart for 
defence purposes. The land was strategically located adjacent to the beach at 
Castor Bay in Auckland and therefore suitable for the defence of Auckland.
 
Gun battery emplacements were constructed over part of the former Morrison 
holding, with another part being divided into 13 sections and used for housing 
military personnel during World War II. After the war these sections were set 
apart for housing purposes and used for general state housing.
 244
 It was these 
housing areas that would later become the subject of proceedings.  
In 1987 the housing land was administered by the Government owned and 
controlled housing provider, Housing Corporation. Decision making authority 
regarding the future of Corporation held land was conferred upon numerous 
people.
245
 A decision that property was surplus to Corporation requirements 
could come from many levels within the bureaucratic chain of control. In 
addition, the responsible Minister could direct the Corporation to follow 
specific Government policy involving land disposal.
246
 Members of the 
Corporation’s governance could pass resolutions which would bind the 
Corporation.
247
 The Chief Executive and designated Corporation staff held 
delegated authority to determine the future of Corporation properties, such as 
whether or not a property was required for housing purposes. The Corporation 
could even appoint committees comprising Corporation people, or other 




Housing on the former Morrison land was in disrepair. The dwellings were 
originally constructed for temporary accommodation from materials below 
standard. From an economic standpoint, repairs were not worthwhile. Coastal 
bare sections at this location were valuable, so Corporation staff considered 
selling the land so money could be better spent elsewhere.
249
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In 1988 a Branch Manager at Housing Corporation followed through on a 
recommendation that the former Morrison land should be sold with the 
proceeds of sale reinvested into other housing. An opinion had been obtained 
from the Ministry of Works which incorrectly stated the offer back provisions 
of s40 were not relevant in this situation.
250
 The Corporation’s initial 
understanding was that it would have a clear run to sell the properties and 
achieve its desired objective. The reality of the situation was quite different. It 




Various influences contributed to the surplus land disposal losing momentum. 
Auckland City Council had expressed an interest in the land for it to be added 
to an adjoining beach reserve.
252
 Maori claimants notified the Corporation that 
the property may be subject to its claim lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal.
253
 
Although the Corporation tried to explore the interests of both Council and the 
claimants, there were no material developments. These unresolved issues did 
nothing to quiet public interest in the land.  
In 1990 the Corporation adopted a policy to demolish each house on the site as 
they became vacant. A memorandum recording the Corporation’s approach is 
an example of how the disposal became clouded in wider considerations, well 
beyond the statutory considerations prescribed under the surplus land 
provisions of s40. The memorandum reads:  
The project team, considering a PR strategy to implement this recommendation, 
suggests the following:  
1. None of the dwellings should be demolished prior to the election – October 27. 
2. No publicity at all concerning the demolition of the dwellings.  
3. In the meantime any enquirers should be advised we are currently completing a 
cost analysis exercise in terms of reviewing the condition and use of the 
dwellings.  
4. A copy of Mr Williams’ report and Harrison Grierson Consultants’ report 
should be forwarded to Merrill Coke Communications Manager so that Head 
Office is briefed should this issue blow up. 
254 
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Public relations strategy took priority over the Corporations core offer back 
obligations to former owners of the land. By the end of 1992, and following 
judicial review proceedings brought by three occupying tenants, the final 
dwelling on site was demolished.
255
 However, yet another wave of resistance 
was about to be presented.  
Although Auckland City Council did not consider it a priority to acquire the 
surplus land to include into its adjoining beach reserve, several motivated local 
residents thought otherwise. They lobbied their local Member of Parliament, 
the Hon Murray McCully, who gave his support to their views. The situation 
took on a whole new level of significance in 1995 when Mr McCully was 
appointed Minister of Housing. In his ministerial capacity, he requested that 
the Corporation defer their efforts to sell the land so he could hold further 
discussions with Auckland City Council.
256
  
A sale to Auckland City Council never eventuated. The Corporation therefore 
proceeded with its objective to sell the surplus land on the open market. It 
consulted Land Information New Zealand (“LINZ”), the government agency 
responsible for administration of the Public Works Act, about the disposal. It 
informed LINZ about a Cabinet directive of 16 June 1993 that land of this kind 
should be sold under the Housing Act 1955 rather than as surplus state housing 
land. The response from LINZ by letter of 25 March 1999 lifted the veil of 
confusion regarding the Corporation’s offer back obligations to the former 
land owners. A Cabinet directive could not override the Corporation’s 
obligations under s40 of the Public Works Act.
257
  
On 23 April 1999 the Corporation instructed a consultant to attend to the 
statutory offer back on its behalf. Seven grandchildren of the original owner 
were entitled under their grandfather’s will to have the land offered to them. 
Two from those seven grandchildren accepted the offer to purchase the land 
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What the Courts said 
 
The parties each had a view regarding the date they considered the subject land 
should have been offered back. Successors of Mr Morrison contended that the 
relevant date was 1 July 1988 when the Branch Manager of Housing 
Corporation offered to sell the land to Takapuna City Council.
259
The Crown’s 
position was that the relevant date was 21 April 1999 when the Minister 
approved the disposal.
260
 There is a gap of almost eleven years between these 
dates.  
Fisher J at the High Court concluded that the land should have been offered 
back on 5 February 1988.
261
 This was the date of a memorandum by the 
Branch Manager at Housing Corporation which directed that the land should 
be sold. However, it was the Court of Appeal judgment that settled the matter 
once and for all. All sections except one were vacated with the houses 
demolished by 31 December 1991. The final section was vacated and the 
house demolished by 9 December 1992. The Court of Appeal held these dates 
were the dates upon which the values in the sale contracts would be set.
262
  
Neither the successors of Mr Morrison, the Crown, Fisher J at the High Court 
or the presiding Court of Appeal judges could agree upon a date. They all had 
their own well-reasoned positions. However, by constitutional prerogative, the 
Court of Appeal had the final say. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is in 
keeping with the fundamental offer back scheme prescribed by Parliament. Its 
decision is sound.  
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The difference between the High Court and Court of Appeal dates rests upon 
the question of required timing for the offer back. The High Court adopted a 
strict approach. The immediate date of the Branch manager’s decision was 
Fisher J’s choice. The Court of Appeal was prepared to be more practical. It 
made allowance for time needed to identify descendants of the former owner, 
saying that a delay of 12 months could be appropriate.
263
 It also distinguished 
between the facts of Horton
264
 and the facts before them. Unlike Horton, the 
former Morrison land was still being used for housing purposes, the public 
work for which it was held, until the tenants vacated the properties and the 
houses were demolished. The Court of Appeal decision reads:  
Where land is still being used for the authorised public work, even if the decision has 
been taken that it is no longer required for that purpose, it will normally necessarily 
take longer to ready for disposal than vacant land. How long depends on the 
particular circumstances of each case.
265
 
The fundamental purpose and provisions of the statutory offer back scheme 
may be understood and acknowledged by all stakeholders. However, it is the 





The offer back cases contribute to the law in a manner which the statute 
cannot. It is the application of statute law to a set of facts which brings true 
meaning to the offer back scheme. This is ultimately the role of the judiciary. 
Government agencies may interpret their own obligations, but Morrison 
illustrates this is not always reliable. Housing Corporation incorrectly believed 
for some time it was not subject to statutory offer back obligations.
266
 When it 
realised that it owed a duty to offer the land back to successors of the former 
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owner, the date it believed its obligation was triggered was over six years 
different from the date finally determined by the Court of Appeal.
267
 The 
experience of Mr Morrison’s successors is not an unfamiliar one for Maori. 
Sometimes it is necessary to engage in legal proceedings to ensure statutory 
schemes are upheld and the duties conferred upon responsible Government 
agencies are properly exercised.  
The Court of Appeal decision in Morrison
268
 illustrates that actual use of land 
for the designated public work, and the cessation of such use, is a more 
significant indicator regarding the trigger of s40 obligations than any recorded 
decision alone may indicate. This approach makes sense as it looks beyond the 
paperwork into the substance of circumstances.  
It is the broader Morrison story that serves an important reminder to former 
Maori owners of public works land. The Crown’s special duty to Maori is not 
the only responsibility that faces the Crown when it wishes to dispose of its 
surplus public works land. The offer back scheme, notwithstanding its 
legislative status, is challenged by competing interests. Responsible land 
holding agencies must get the best return from their assets for the taxpayer. In 
the interests of economic efficiency, Government agencies should not be 
burdened by land which no longer serves a purpose. Then there are the 
interests of other public bodies, Treaty considerations and demands from 
public interest groups. Morrison appears to have them all, including political 
influence. Morrison is a reminder of the importance of a statutory scheme to 
protect the interests of former owners of surplus public works land. Law of 
Parliament is supreme over other demands, obligations and pressures of the 
day. Statute law is enforceable through the Courts when competing 
circumstances unjustifiably seek to take priority.  
For Maori, loss of considerable tracts of land to public works is deeply felt.
269
 
The offer back of surplus public works land to those former owners is a 
fundamental acknowledgement of that loss. It is an opportunity to address a 
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perceived injustice where land compulsorily taken would otherwise be sold 
without giving the former owner an opportunity to buy it back.
270
 The interests 
of former owners will only take priority over competing interests if an 
overriding statutory scheme recognises and protects their rights. A statutory 
scheme ensures there is requisite priority and accountability. Former owners 
must be recognised when public works land is no longer required. They should 
be afforded an opportunity to be reunited with land taken from them. These are 
the sentiments of Morrison which echo the protest voice at Te Kopua, Raglan 
and Bastion Point in the late 1970s.  
 
 




Smiler & Ors v Port Gisborne Ltd HC Gisborne CP 1-98, 12 June 1998 






Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler
271
 at the Court of Appeal is an offer back case that 
should raise significant concern for Maori. The judgment imposes limitations 
to the offer back scheme which arguably do not exist in the statute and are 
prejudicial to Maori interests. Laurenson J at the High Court delivered a well-
reasoned decision in favour of the Maori plaintiffs. However, his decision was 
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Two key questions are brought before the Courts in Smiler
272
.  
The first question is: From whom was the land acquired? Under s40(2), the 
offer back is to be directed to that person or their successor.
273
The distinction 
here is in the difference between land acquired by the Crown from former 
Maori owners and held in the general land bank of the Crown, versus the 
unallocated Crown land which some years after it was acquired from Maori, 
was set apart for a public work.  
The second question is the meaning of the term ‘successors’ as defined under 
s40(5) of the offer back scheme.
274
 It was 119 years from when the land was 
lost from Maori ownership until offer back proceedings were heard at the High 
Court. Generations later, the hapu of Tauwhareparae had not lost their 





Port Gisborne Limited owned and operated the shipping port at Gisborne. The 
company was the successor of the Gisborne Harbour Board which had held the 
subject harbour land since 1884. The land was set apart as an endowment for 
purposes of the Gisborne Harbour Board Empowering Act 1884.
275
 Revenue 
from the lease of endowment lands supported the cost of harbour works.
276
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Over 100 years later, the subject land was vested in Port Gisborne Limited 
under provisions of the Port Companies Act 1988.
277
 The endowment status 
was brought to an end under the 1988 Act, which as a result lifted restrictions 
over the land regarding its sale.
278
 The transfer of land from the Harbour Board 
into the company was exempted from the Public Works Act offer back 
provisions under the 1988 Act. However, the new port companies became 
subject to statutory offer back obligations as if they were a Harbour Board.
 279
  
The land was used by both the Harbour Board and latterly the port company 
for the Port facility.
280
 By 1998 the land was surplus to requirements. The 
Crown did not wish to resume ownership from Port Gisborne Limited so the 
company sought to sell the land by tender on the open market.
281
  
Proceedings were brought before the High Court by descendants of the 
original Maori owners of the land. They claimed that Port Gisborne Limited 
had to offer the land back to them in accordance with the company’s 
obligations under s40 of the Public Works Act. The Crown had purchased the 
land as part of the 40,000 acre (16,000 hectare) purchase of land known as 
Tauwhareparae Block from its Maori owners, the Tauwhareparae hapu, in 
1879.  
The Crown purchase was carried out under authority of the Immigration and 
Public Works Act 1870.
282
 There was no public work purpose designated at 
the time, the land was merely held by the Crown.
283
 The Crown had placed a 
prohibition on the land prior to the sale, which prevented any person other than 
the Crown from acquiring an interest in the Block.
284
 Purchase of 40,000 acres 
(16,000 hectares) amounts to a considerable land holding. The reason behind 
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Within the Tauwhareparae Block there were areas given to activities for public 
use. Some of the land had been a port for well over 200 years. Captain Cook 
anchored his ship the Endeavour and made his first landing in Aotearoa New 
Zealand near the site in 1769.
286
 Flax trading was established in the area by 
1831 with trade conducted from ships.
287
 Although 40,000 acres of 
Tauwhareparae Block can be described generally as settlement lands, within 
that greater Crown land holding would have been specific areas used but not 
designated for public works at the time of the Crown’s purchase. The obvious 
use is port activities. Although this aspect of history is not mentioned in either 
the High Court of Court of Appeal Court judgments, Laurenson J at the High 






What the Courts said 
 
Two key issues arise. The first is a question: ‘From whom was the land 
acquired?’ The original land owners were Maori. Their land, a considerably 
large holding, was purchased by the Crown for settlement although it was not 
designated as such. Soon after the acquisition, arrangements were put in place 
for various areas to be set apart for public purposes. The public work over the 
relevant part of the block was formalised in 1884, three years after it was 
purchased from its former Maori owners. The land was endowed on the 
Gisborne Harbour Board and set apart as an endowment.
289
 On the question 
‘from whom was the land acquired?’ Laurenson J said it was acquired from the 
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former Maori owners. The Court of Appeal, with the final say, said the land 
was acquired from the Crown. The land was therefore not offered back. The 
Court of Appeal concluded the port authority was obliged under s40 to offer 
the land back to the Crown, not the former Maori owners.
290
  
Equally troubling for Maori is the Court of Appeal’s obiter views of the 
second key issue: The meaning of the term ‘successors’
291
 to whom s40 offer 
back rights extend. Maori land succession is unique because it takes into 
account Tikanga Maori or Maori customary values and practices.
292
 Parliament 
has recognised this in the offer back scheme under s41 of the Act which relates 
to the disposal of former Maori land.
293
 Where pre-requisite criteria are met, 
s41 enables the chief executive to avoid complying with the requirements of 
s40 altogether. The chief executive may instead apply to the Maori Land Court 
to vest the land into Maori ownership.
294
 This is a remarkable and entirely 
relevant statutory provision of which the Court of Appeal obiter is silent. It is, 
however, a mechanism that Laurenson J observes in his decision as the means 
under which Parliament intends for the more complex Maori ownership 
question to be resolved.
295
 
The approach by Laurenson J at the High Court to whether or not the statutory 
offer back provisions extend to the former Maori owners of Tauwhareparae 
Block is based upon the underlying purpose of the Crown when it acquired the 
land.
296
 He concluded:  
“…from a date which almost certainly preceded the vesting of the land in the 
Crown, the land was contemplated as being required for a public work, namely the 
endowment of a harbour. The exigencies of the time meant that a firm decision was 
not made until 1884.”
297
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Laurenson J considered as ‘a neutral factor’ that the land was held generally as 
unallocated Crown land for three years after it was acquired before being 
allocated for a public work purpose.
298
 The land was first secured by the 
Crown to protect it from acquisition by private interests. That involved a two-
step process. The first step was that the Crown prohibited alienation to private 
buyers.
299
 The threat or contemplation of compulsion is inferred from such 
action. It is a step akin to negotiations with an acquiring authority which holds 
powers to compulsorily acquire land under public works legislation. The 
prohibition on the sale of land was imposed by the Crown as prospective 
purchaser for its exclusive and unfair advantage. Although Tauwhareparae 
Block was sold by its former owners to the Crown, the prohibition of 
alienation to private buyers confirms an element of compulsion in the sale. 
This principle is recognised in the 2015 decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Williams & ors v Auckland Council.
300
 The second step was that the Crown 
purchased the land and held it in its general land bank pending allocation of 
various parts for the intended purpose.
301
Laurenson J concluded that the land 
was held for a public work by the Crown before it was formally designated as 
such upon vesting as endowment.
302
 
The High Court decision was overturned on appeal in favour of the port 
authority. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal is difficult to reconcile with 





 A critique of the decision is perhaps best supported by a 
quote from leading text about statutory interpretation in New Zealand:  
In the enthusiasm engendered by the purposive and contextual approaches it must 
never be forgotten that the task of the interpreter is to interpret the text of the statute: 
to say what the text means.
305
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The Court of Appeal in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler deviated from this 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation.
306
 With Parliament as the 
supreme lawmaker in New Zealand, it is essential that statute law is observed 
‘from its text and in light of its purpose’.
307
 It would not be justifiable to level 
criticism at a judgment if only because the outcome is not suitable to a 
particular position or view. The adversarial court system in New Zealand 
means there are winners and losers in most civil cases. Disappointment is 
inevitable for at least some people. However, criticism rests where a Court 
deviates from well-established canons of interpretation.  
Laurenson J at the High Court makes an important observation regarding the 
triggering requirement of s40.
308
 Section 40(1) refers to land that is ‘held’ 
under the Act or in any manner for a public work. The scheme does not require 
subject land to have been ‘acquired’ from the former owners, merely ‘held’. 
The Court of Appeal judgment in Horton,
309
 upheld by the Privy Council,
310
 
identifies two features of the statutory offer back scheme that must each be 
observed separately. The first feature is whether s40(1) is satisfied, where land 
‘held’ for a public work and is no longer required for a public work or 
exchange. The Court in Horton observes this subsection is expressed in the 
present tense.
311
 The Court of Appeal in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler 
approaches s40(1) from both the present tense and past tense, therefore 
extending to the time to when the subject land was acquired.
312
 However, from 
the words of the statute itself, there is no linking of this first feature to the 
circumstances of the acquisition itself. The Courts have been clear on this 
point.
313
 Once the first feature or s40(1) is satisfied, then the second feature of 
the scheme under s40(2) which refers to ‘acquisition’ is to be addressed. The 
second feature under s40(2) expresses this mandatory language:  
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“…[T]he chief executive … shall offer to sell the land …to the person from whom it 
was acquired or to the successor of that person …” (emphasis added)
314
 
The statute simply refers: ‘from whom it was acquired’. As observed 
positively by the Privy Council, the legislative policy is to preserve the rights 
of the former owner subject only to the continuing needs of the state.
315
 
Because of the statute wording and the Privy Council observation, it is difficult 
to justify the reasoning of the Court of Appeal where it concludes an offer 
back of surplus public works land should be made to the Crown.
316
 
It is notable that in its written judgment the Court refers to submissions by 
counsel for the appellant which are not in keeping with the words of s40. 
These submissions appear to have swayed the Court. The commentary reads:  
[Counsel for the appellant] submitted that the Crown did not acquire the land for a 
public work; it cannot therefore be said that the respondents are the successors of 




There is no rebuttal in the judgment of the inaccuracy of this statement. The 
words quoted from s40(2) ‘from whom it was acquired’ are blended with 
additional foreign words: ‘for a public work’. Subsection (2) does not include 
these latter words, nor can they be imported from subsection (1) if, as the 
Courts in other cases contend, the first feature under subsection (1) is to be 
satisfied independently from the second feature under subsection (2).  
The Court of Appeal judgment continues with the prerequisite ‘public work 
acquisition’ theme: 
“In light of that background it would be contrary to the statutory intention to apply 
s40 to land which has been acquired for other than public work purposes. What 
justification could there be for requiring an offer back to be made where land has 
been acquired for a commercial purpose on an arm’s length transaction, but years 
later used for a short term for some form of public work but is no longer required for 
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The Court became lost ‘in the enthusiasm engendered by the purposive and 
contextual approaches’.
319
 Parliament expressly provides a solution for the 
situation observed by the Court, should that ever arise. Section 40(2) of the 
offer back scheme confers power upon the chief executive to grant an 
exception to offer back where a requirement to offer land back would be 
impracticable, unreasonable, or unfair to do so.
320
 The statutory intention is to 
preserve the rights of the former owner subject only to the continuing needs of 
the state.
321
 The chief executive has discretion to exempt land from offer back. 
The Court of Appeal assumed responsibility for a mischief that Parliament 
expressly places under the care of the chief executive.  
Section 40(2)(b) provides an exception to offer back where there has been 
significant change in the character of the land due to the public work.
322
 This 
subsection refers to such change that occurred: 
‘…for the purposes of, or in connection with, the public work for which it was 
acquired or is held.’[emphasis added]323 
The provision was included to the offer back scheme as an amendment in 
November 1982.
324
 Williams J at the High Court in Bennett & Ors v Waitakere 
City Council & Anor observes that the terms ‘acquired or held’ merely reflects 
there is a possibility of significant change on public work sites and this may be 
a factor to exempt offer back.
 325
 It is not an opportunity to import the term 
‘acquired’ into other parts of the statute which trigger s40 offer back 
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 Public Works Amendment Act 1982, s2 – deemed to have come into force on 1 November 1982 
325
 Bennett & Ors v Waitakere City Council & Anor HC Auckland CIV-2005-404-007348, 14 May 2007 at [85] – 




consideration where the qualifying requirement is merely that subject land is 
‘held’ for a public work.
326
  
The Court of Appeal explored repealed public works legislation of 1876 and 
1928 together with amendments of 1878 and 1935 to compare the disposal 
mechanisms under those statutes with the offer back scheme of the 1981 
Act.
327
 It intended to assist ‘in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of 
s40’.
328
 It was a mistake for the Court to refer to the mechanism under those 
repealed statutes as offer back schemes.
329
 These mechanisms were little more 
than provisions to facilitate the disposal of surplus public works land.
330
 Their 
purpose was for rationalisation of land tenure and repatriation of surplus public 
works land with adjoining land parcels. The Court of Appeal was in error to 
treat the land disposal mechanism under the repealed statutes as a scheme in 
the nature of s40 offer back. The statutory purpose of s40 offer back is 
remedial. It is to address perceived injustice where land is compulsorily taken 
from its owners.
 331
 Parliament passed the offer back legislation in 1981 
following an awakening about the rights of former land owners. It was not the 
continuation of the tenure rationalisation mechanism under former public 
works legislation. If the statutory offer back scheme is to be compared with 
any other legislation, the comparison should more appropriately be made with 
the discretionary offer back provisions of the now repealed s436 of the Maori 
Affairs Act 1953.
332
 The Court of Appeal did not mention this legislation in its 
quest to understand the ‘true intent and meaning’ of s40 despite the strikingly 
similar objectives and wording between the two schemes. The conclusion 
reached by the Court of Appeal following its perusal of surplus public works 
land disposal provisions since 1876 is:  
                                                          
326
 Public Works Act 1981, s40(1) 
327
 Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler & Ors CA 182-98, 26 April 1999, [1999] 2 NZLR 695 at [31] 
328
 Ibid at [29] 
329
 Ibid at [30] and [31] 
330
 Public Works Act 1928, s35 (Repealed) 
331
 Rowan v Attorney-General [1997] 2 NZLR 559 at 568 
332
 Maori Affairs Act 1953, s436 (Repealed) 
98 
 
“The consistent intention which comes through is that the offer back concept is 




The Court fails in its reasoning to recognise two things. First, Parliament had a 
change of focus following events in 1978 at Te Kopua, Raglan and Bastion 
Point. A new scheme was introduced under the 1981 Act. Section 40 offer 
back is not a repeal and re-enactment of a previous statutory provision. The 
new scheme extends well beyond a mere amendment of the former statutory 
land disposal mechanism. The nature and purpose of the new scheme is 
different, being remedial as opposed to a mere land disposal and tenure 
rationalisation mechanism. Any obligations or rights of either public work land 
holders or former owners are to be assessed under the 1981 Act, not its 
repealed predecessors.
334
 Second, the literal words of the statute passed by 
Parliament in 1981 do not support the Court’s interpretation. There is no need 
to explore repealed statutes dating back over 100 years before the 1981 Act to 
understand the true intent and meaning of s40. The repeal of previous public 
works legislation should not revive any former land disposal scheme
335
 or 
carry repealed provisions over on grounds of broadening Parliament’s intent. 
To do so is implied statutory amendment.
336
 The Court would have done better 
to apply conventional rules of statutory interpretation and apply s40 from its 
own text and in light of its own purpose.
337
 If it did so, the end decision is 
likely to have been the same as that of the lower Court even if the path to get 
there was different.  
 
 
                                                          
333
 Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler & Ors CA 182-98, 26 April 1999, [1999] 2 NZLR 695 at [31] 
334
 Waitakere City Council & Anor v Bennett & Ors [2008] NZCA 428, [2009] NZRMA 76 at [63] – Also see JF 
Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (5
th
 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2009) at 648: “There is also 
some authority [Beaumont v Yeomans (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 562 (CCA) at 570 per Jordan CJ] for the view that if a 
provision is repealed and re-enacted in a form that enlarges its scope, this is amendment rather than true 
repeal.” “In so far as the new provision is merely repetition it may operate retrospectively: R v Worsley (1994) 
77 A Crim R 241 (Tas SC) at 246 per Zeeman J” 
335
 Interpretation Act 1999, s17(2) 
336
 JF Burrows and RI Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (5
th
 ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2009) at 648 
337









 litigation is 
that the offer back provisions of the Public Works Act mean what they say, 
Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler
340
 is an exception to that message. It is not for the 
judiciary to import meaning into a statute beyond that which can reasonably be 
sustained by those words passed by Parliament. Legislative reform in New 
Zealand is in the exclusive domain of Parliament.  
The Court of Appeal had the final say on the matter and its reasoning sets a 
precedent. However, the Court of Appeal’s approach should not be immune 
from constructive and qualified criticism which should enquire whether 
Parliament’s objective regarding its offer back scheme has been correctly 
applied. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered in 1999. Since 
that time, the case has become recognised as a leading authority in offer back 
law. The Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler
341
 deviation is at the expense of Maori. It 
will take an intervention by Parliament to restore the true intent of the offer 
back scheme. That will only happen if there is the political will to do so.  
 
 
TE ATATU LANDS LITIGATION (WILLIAMS): Real Personal 




Williams v Auckland Council [2016] NZSC 20 (SC) – Leave to appeal Court 
of Appeal decision denied.  
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Williams v Auckland Council [2015] NZCA 479 (CA) – Unsuccessful appeal 
of High Court decision.  
Robertson & Ors v Auckland Council [2014] NZHC 765 (HC) – Unsuccessful 
application for declaration  
Robertson & Ors v Auckland Council [2014] NZHC 422 (HC) – Question of 
law regarding legal privilege 
Bennett & Ors v Waitakere City Council & Anor [2013] NZHC 1357 (HC)  – 
Application for order directing plaintiffs to provide further and better 
discovery and to answer interrogatories. 
Waitakere City Council & Anor v Bennett & Ors [2008] NZCA 428 (CA)  – 
Confirming decision of High Court not to strike out.  
Bennett & Ors v Waitakere City Council & Anor HC Auckland CIV-2005-
404-007348, 12 December 2007 – Reasons for granting leave to appeal High 
Court’s refusal to strike out claim.  
Bennett & Ors v Waitakere City Council & Anor HC Auckland CIV-2005-
404-007348, 14 May 2007  – Unsuccessful application for review of High 
Court dismissal of strike out proceedings.  
Bennett & Ors v Waitakere City Council & Anor HC Auckland CIV-2005-






The Te Atatu Lands litigation is a legal battle initiated by litigation funders. 
They struck a deal with the successors of former owners of seven separate 
properties in Te Atatu at the upper Waitemata Harbour. The successors were 
funded to take up the case. If successful, the funders stood to reap the benefit 
101 
 
of a substantial increase in land value. The successors themselves would 






The successors claimed that the local Council owed a duty to them under s40 
of the Public Works Act 1981 to offer the surplus public works land back. 
They contended the subject land was no longer required for a public work 
when the 1981 Act came into force on 1 February 1982. If this was the case 
the market value of the land at 1 February 1982 would be the price Council 
must offer the land for sale to them. Proceedings were first lodged in 2005, so 
the significant increase in land value since 1982 was a problem for the 
Council.
342
 The case was hard fought with the Council denying liability 
throughout.  
The concept of a ‘real personal interest in the land’ is something familiar to 
Maori. The connectivity principle was brought up by the Court of Appeal in 
the Te Atatu lands case when the successors had satisfied all the express 
technical requirements of s40. The Court had to come up with a good reason 
why it would not require the Council to offer the land back in circumstances it 
deemed inappropriate and outside of the remedial nature of the offer back 
scheme. In the Te Atatu lands litigation, the successors were motivated by 




In 1949 rural land in the upper Waitemata Harbour at Te Atatu was required 
for construction and development of port facilities. The Auckland Harbour 
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Board notified land owners of seven separate properties of the proposed public 
work. Acting under statutory powers, it then over several years acquired 75 
hectares of land from those owners.
343
  
The port facilities were never constructed. It became evident by the late 1970s 
that the port development would not go ahead.
344
 The land was instead used 
for other purposes including residential housing. However, most of the land 




The land passed through a succession of public owners over the years. Under 
the Auckland Harbour Board and Waitemata City Council (Te Atatu) 
Empowering Act 1983, Waitemata City Council had powers to promote the 
subdivision and development while the land was still held by the Auckland 
Harbour Board.
346
 Importantly, this subdivision and development contradicts 
the fact that Auckland Harbour Board held the land for a public work.
347
  
Subdivision and development of the Te Atatu lands, promoted by Council to 
provide for the needs of a growing city, did not fall under a public work. In 
1988 when the Auckland Harbour board was to be disestablished in favour of a 
new Port Company,
348
 a dispute developed as to whether the land should 
transfer to a Port Company or instead be transferred to a newly established 
Waitakere City Council.
349
 The land was in 1989 vested in Waitakere City 
Council with no regard to a public work purpose, other than acknowledging 
the public work ‘port purposes’ designation had long since ceased to be 
applicable.
350
 The land was eventually held by Auckland Council following 
the amalgamation of Auckland councils in 2010.
351
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Statutory offer back provisions under the Public Works Act 1981 introduced a 
new direction in public policy regarding surplus public works land. Public 
bodies were subject to greater accountability for their lands which no longer 
qualified for the public work for which they had been taken and held. The 
former owners of the Te Atatu lands commenced proceedings in 2005 for 
declaratory relief. They sought to require the then holder of the lands to follow 
through on the offer back provisions of s40, with market values to be derived 





What the Courts said 
 
The litigation covers a range of issues under s40 and provides useful insight 
into interpretation and application of the statutory offer back provisions. The 
claim by the successors of former owners was not motivated by their desire to 
be restored to their lands. The litigation was conducted and financed by a third 
party litigation funder who would take the majority of proceeds from the 
benefit of a win against the Council.
353
  
The successors of the former owners said that due to the significant costs of 
litigation the only way they could pursue their claim was through a litigation 
funder. Such a move was not prohibitive in the eyes of the Courts; however, it 
didn’t win them any favour. Counsel for the successors of the former owners 
sought to address difficulties Council would inevitably face if it had to transfer 
the subject lands to private interests. The Court of Appeal observed:  
“… this submission serves to highlight an inequity which undermines the [successors 
of the former] owners’ claims. S 40 Ltd, the [successors of the former] owners’ 
litigation funder, would be the principal beneficiary of success. The company would 
acquire the Te Atatu land at 1983 prices, without any adjustment for the time value of 
money in the intervening 22 years. Inflation over this period, and the rapidly 
increased demand for land for residential purposes, means its 1983 value is a fraction 
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of its current market worth. On one estimate, the value of the Te Atatu land as a 
whole is about $50 million to $70 million. To allow the [successors of the former] 
owners, or more particularly S 40 Ltd, to take at the Council’s expense the benefit of 
windfall profits attributable solely to extraneous factors would be contrary to the 
policy underlying s40.”
354
   
The proposition was simply untenable to the Court. The successors of four out 
of seven former owners had established that the Council breached its duty to 
offer the land back. The Council was in trouble at this point. However, the 
Court of Appeal took the matter further by drawing upon the purpose of the 
statutory offer back scheme:  
“We accept, of course, that the owners have established the Council’s breaches of 
their rights; and that in the normal course they should be vindicated by declaratory 
relief. But, where the owners’ delay has been prolonged and where the effect of 
allowing them to assert their rights now would be adverse to the Council and its 
ratepayers, the interests must be balanced.  
In undertaking this balancing exercise we repeat that the purpose of s40 is remedial, 




For a person to be eligible under s40, they need more than to just meet the 
technical criteria prescribed. Their cause must satisfy the remedial purpose of 
s40.  
The unsuccessful parties sought leave of the Supreme Court to appeal the 
Court of Appeal decision.
356
 The application was refused:  
“We do not read the Court of Appeal’s judgment as being critical of the use of a 
litigation funder, but rather as emphasising that the purpose of the Public Works Act 
is to restore to someone whose land has been compulsorily taken land with which 
that person has a personal or familial connection. That is in keeping with the fact that 
the offer back right applies only to the original owner and the original owner’s 
successor, as that term is restrictively defined in s40(5). In the present case the land 
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was taken in the 1950s and the present named applicants did not have any real 
personal interest in the land.”
357
  
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal’s purposive approach. It 
also noted that the Court of Appeal’s restrictive interpretation of the term 
‘successor’ supported the lack of ‘personal or familial connection’ the 





The concept of a ‘real personal interest in the land’ is something that Maori 
retain through Tikanga Maori, or Maori customary values and practices.
358
 
Whether the land was taken for a public work in 1950 or before, former Maori 
owners and their descendants retain strong ties with land as part of their 
cultural identity as tangata whenua or people of the land. Unlike the Te Atatu 
lands litigants, the connection with formerly held land will not be reduced to 
merely an economic interest. However, if a proposition of a litigant is deemed 
untenable to a Court, even a litigant with an interest in former Maori freehold 
land, the chance of their success will be greatly reduced. The Te Atatu Lands 
litigation illustrates that the Courts are not only concerned about meeting the 
technical requirements of the statutory offer back scheme, they are also 
concerned about meeting its purpose.  
The Supreme Court touched on the Court of Appeal’s narrow approach to 
interpretation of the term ‘successor’
359
 compared with the wider interpretation 
of Fogarty J at the High Court.
360
 The Court of Appeal observes:  
“ – it is whether a person would have been entitled to the land under the will or 
intestacy of the person who owned the land at the time of acquisition had that person 
owned it at the date of his or her death. There is an assumption that ownership of the 
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land has not changed between the dates of acquisition and the owner’s death, 
meaning …that Parliament intended only one level of succession.”
361
  
Maori should be alarmed at this interpretation which fails to account for the 
traditional succession of Maori freehold land interests by lines of natural 
descent. However, between the drafting of the s40(5)
362
 ‘succession’ definition 
and the Court of Appeal interpretation in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler
363
, there 
is difficulty with the offer back scheme. The Supreme Court conceded there is 
an arguable point on the interpretation of s40(5).
364
 Statutory reform is likely 
to be the only way to adequately accommodate Maori land succession 
practices under the offer back scheme.  
 
 










The Crown’s role is not simple when multiple parties hold legitimate rights in 
public works land. Rights held by one party confer duties upon another. 
Difficulties arise where rights compete with one another. Kane v Attorney-
General
365
 is a case that deals with such an issue. The Crown’s intention to 
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enter a settlement with Kurahaupo and other iwi was in keeping with a duty it 
owed as part of its Treaty of Waitangi partnership responsibilities. However, 
there was a question as to the Crown’s duty to former owners and their 
successors regarding the offer back of some of the land that happened to be 
tagged for the Treaty settlement. The broader interests of Treaty of Waitangi 
claimants competed with those interests conferred upon former owners or their 







The public works land was about to be transferred from Crown ownership as 
part of a Treaty of Waitangi settlement with iwi.
 367
 The applicants were not 
party to the pending Treaty settlement. They alleged that the Crown failed to 
observe their rights under s40 and unjustifiably denied them from an 
opportunity to buy back public works land. The Crown contended that it had 
considered its s40 offer back obligations, but there were no eligible living 
successors of the deceased former owner.
368
 It further contended that the 
public works land was not surplus to requirements because it would continue 
to use the land for the public work purpose under a lease back arrangement; 
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George Fairhall lived at Woodbourne in Marlborough until he died intestate 
and without issue in 1941.
370
 His farm had been in family ownership ship since 
1885. He was the descendant of settlers who had arrived in Nelson in 1842.
371
 
Mr Fairhall held an early interest in aviation. His Woodbourne farm was used 
as a private airfield in the 1920s.
372
In 1939, a major part of the farm was taken 
for defence purposes under the Public Works Act 1928.
373
Following Mr 
Fairhall’s death, the Crown in 1947 compulsorily acquired a further 111 acres 
(45 hectares) from the administrators of his estate.
374
 It was this land that later 
became the subject of proceedings.  
Letters of administration were granted by the Supreme Court in Nelson in 
1941 to the late Mr Fairhall’s four surviving siblings, as his next of kin.
375
 By 
the time proceedings were lodged in 2013, those four siblings and all their 
children had died. The applicants in the proceedings are grandchildren of two 




In 2010 land at the Woodbourne air force base was offered to Kurahaupo and 
other iwi as part settlement of their Treaty of Waitangi claims. The Crown’s 
offer by way of Deeds of Settlement comprised land which fell under three 
categories. First, ‘current surplus land’ which was defence land declared 
surplus to requirements on 1 March 2010. Statutory obligations, such as s40 
offer backs, were being addressed. Second, ‘non-operational land’ which was 
land that the New Zealand Defence Force would notify iwi by a specified date 
was no longer required for operational purposes or any other public work. The 
availability of this land was also subject to the Crown’s statutory clearance 
obligations. Third, ‘leaseback land’ which was land at Woodbourne still 
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required for either defence purposes or another public work. This land would 
be leased back by the Crown for operational purposes.
377
 Transfer of land to 
iwi was conditional on Treaty of Waitangi settlement legislation being passed 
to give effect to contemplated arrangements.
378
  
The former 1947 Fairhall land fell under the leaseback category. The 
applicants sought a declaration from the Court. They wanted the Court to 
declare that before the land was provided for Treaty settlement purposes the 
Crown should have first obtained their consent, or procured their 
acknowledgement, for their contended surrender of statutory offer back 
rights.
379
 The applicants claimed a legitimate expectation that the Crown 
would first address its offer back obligations to them.
380
 They further claimed 
that the Crown was under an obligation while negotiating the Treaty of 




A small part of the former 1947 Fairhall land had become surplus to 
requirements some years beforehand. In 2011 it was offered back to the 
applicants as part of the Crown’s statutory clearance procedure. The offer 
occurred because the applicants were the immediate surviving descendants to 
eligible beneficiaries of the late Mr Fairhall’s estate.
382
 The applicants declined 
the Crown’s offer. However, the Crown’s offer apparently gave rise to their 
expectation that the balance land taken from the estate in 1947 would in future 
be offered to them.  
The Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and officials from the Office 
of Treaty Settlements had set out in correspondence the Crown’s position 
regarding offer back obligations to former owners of the former 1947 Fairhall 
land.
383
 Surplus public works land would be processed subject to standard 
offer back obligations where such obligations exist. However, land still 
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required for a public work and subject to transfer to iwi with a lease back to 
the Crown was not surplus to requirements. The Crown considered that it did 





What the Courts said 
 
There were three aspects to the applicants’ claim. First, do the applicants 
themselves qualify within the meaning of ‘successors’ as referred in s40(5) of 
the Public Works Act 1981? Second, is the applicants’ claim justiciable? 
Would it be possible to bind the Crown to an unknown future contingency if 
the land was not surplus to requirements?
385
 Third, does the Court have 





Are the Applicants Eligible “Successors”?  
Government officials had in 2011 offered 2.66 hectares of surplus land to the 
applicants. That land was part of the former 1947 Fairhall property. However, 
three years later the Crown held a different view concerning its offer back 
obligations. Its revised position was that the estate of Mr Fairhall was the 
owner from whom the land was taken for a public work. The beneficiaries of 
his estate were therefore the ‘successors’ for s40 offer back. Given that all 
these beneficiaries had died before the Crown’s offer back duty had 
materialised, and it still had not materialised by the date of proceedings, there 
was no living person to whom the statutory offer back obligation applied.
387
 
The applicants were one and two generations too far removed from eligibility.  
                                                          
384
 Kane v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 251 at [35] 
385
 Ibid at [26] 
386
 Ibid at [20] 
387
 Ibid at [22] 
111 
 
The Court applied the obiter observation of the Court of Appeal in Port of 
Gisborne v Smiler 
388
and held that Mr Fairhall and his siblings as his 
successors in intestacy were the only people to fall into the eligible class of 
offerees under s40 of the Act. The Crown’s submissions were accepted. The 
applicants failed to qualify as successors so at this point their cause was lost.
389
  
Although Kane v Attorney-General
390
 does not serve as a leading s40 






, it is a 
relatively clean illustration of Smiler obiter cutting short succession at one step 
removed from the original owner. If the Crown holds a property for a public 
work long enough, it will inevitably outlive former owners and their 
successors. Over time statutory offer back obligations will be defeated.  
 
Is the applicants’ claim justiciable? 
Despite the claimants failing to qualify under the Smiler
394
 observation of 
‘successor’, the Court continued to consider other aspects of their claim. The 
next problem for the applicants was that the land was still required for the 
public work purpose for which it was taken. Inclusion of the land as part of a 
Treaty of Waitangi settlement with iwi did not change the defence purpose for 
which it would continue be utilised under the terms of the leaseback 
arrangement.  
The Court rejected the applicants’ claim that the Crown should have 
considered the rights of eligible s40 offerees before such time as the actual 
obligation to offer land back to them had arisen. The applicants could have no 
legitimate expectation of the Crown within this context.
395
 The Crown may 
enter into arrangements to vest or transfer the land into a third party if the 
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public work purpose for which the land is utilised prevails. Under these 
circumstances the s40 offer back provisions are not be triggered.  
 
Does the Court have Jurisdiction to Review Parliamentary Driven and 
Sanctioned Arrangements? 
The Te Tau Ihu Claims Settlement Bill was before Parliament during the Kane 
v Attorney-General
396
 proceedings. The Bill, if passed, would authorise the 
Crown to give effect to its settlement with iwi which included the transfer or 
vesting of the former 1947 Fairhall land into an iwi settlement trust.
397
 
Evidence was presented to the Court showing that the responsible Minister and 
officials had not overlooked s40 offer back considerations during negotiations 
with iwi and during the parliamentary process.
398
 The Crown had taken care to 
point out that any contemplated transfer of surplus public works land under the 
Treaty of Waitangi settlement would be conditional upon clearance through 
the statutory offer back procedure. It also clarified that land still utilised for a 
public work would not trigger statutory offer back obligations and therefore 
would not be offered back to former owners or their successors.
399
 Regarding 
the contemplated transfers of land to iwi, clause 148 of the Bill provided: 
“…the Crown is not required to comply with any other enactment that would 
otherwise regulate or apply to the transfer of a commercial property, a deferred 
selection property, or any Woodbourne land.”
400
  
The wide sweeping provision removed any doubt that s40 offer back 
obligations could not be triggered by transferring operational defence land into 
third party iwi hands. The parliamentary process was underway to address this 
point.  
The Court would not intervene in the parliamentary process nor would it 
review the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process.
401
 The facts were not 
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complicated and the constitutional separation of powers between Parliament 






The applicants’ claim was directed at the Crown’s failure to observe the 
statutory offer back scheme before committing itself to a Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement. The settlement had been presented as a Bill before Parliament.
402
 
The Crown had taken steps to deal with matters arising under s40 as part of its 
Treaty settlement procedure. Its position was that since the land was still 
required for a public work, notwithstanding a contemplated transfer of the 
subject land from Crown ownership as part of a Treaty of Waitangi settlement, 
the offer back provisions of s40 were not triggered. Had the Crown failed to 
consider its obligations under s40 the Court may have taken a different 
approach, perhaps similar to that of Hammond J at the High Court in Deane v 
Attorney-General when an issue of the Crown owing dual obligations to 
multiple parties arose:  
“In my view, if the Crown was in breach of its Treaty of Waitangi obligations and 
had to be reminded of them by New Zealand Courts, then the consequences for 
transactions caught midstream should fall on the Crown, and not on the innocent 
[third party] plaintiffs. Hence, in my view the fact that the Crown had to reconsider 
its overall position as a result of a decision of our Court of Appeal in no way affects 
the underlying substantive liability [under the s40 offer back scheme] between the 
plaintiff and the Crown.” 
403
 
The Crown had sufficiently covered off this issue in Kane which made the 
Court’s task easier. But Hammond J’s observation in contrast serves as an 
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example that the Crown cannot avoid a statutory obligation under s40 merely 
because it owes a conflicting obligation to another party.  
Another feature of Kane v Attorney-General is the use of the Smiler
404
 
‘successor’ interpretation which limits eligibility regarding offer back rights. 
The plaintiffs’ claim was knocked out on this point. The message to Maori is 
that if the Crown utilises public work land for long enough, s40 offer back 
rights will eventually be lost, even if a ‘real personal interest’
405
 in the land is 
retained by descendants of former owners.  
Where a former owner or their successors would otherwise be entitled to an 
offer back except for the land being required for Treaty of Waitangi settlement 
purposes, a solatium payment may be made by the Crown to that otherwise 
eligible person.
 406
 The solatium payment scheme is set out under s42A and 
was introduced by way of an amendment to the Public Works Act in 1995 
under the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995.
407
 However, the 
scheme is little more than a token. Solatium payments cannot exceed the 
relatively small sum of $20,000.
408
 A token solatium payment is unlikely to 
adequately compensate former owners or their successors for the lost 








Ngahina Trust & Ors v Kapiti Coast District Council HC Wellington CIV-
2008-485-1657, 31 May 2010 
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The acquisition, holding and disposal of public works land will inevitably 
involve a story. Circumstances of former land owners will vary as too will 
reasons for land being required for the public good. The story of Ngahina 
Trust’s dealings with the local Council at Kapiti Coast is a good example, 
from acquisition through to disposal, of interactions between a Maori land 
owner and a public works acquiring authority. As is often the case in s40 
litigation, the plaintiffs were forced to take legal action to remind the public 
body of its obligations to them under the statutory offer back scheme. Council 




Ngahina Trust land was acquired by the Council in two stages. The first stage 
was a sale transacted under provisions of the Public Works Act. The second 
stage was also a sale but the land transaction was instead implemented by way 
of conventional transfer. Council did not exercise its public works powers of 
acquisition for the second stage.
409
  
Prior to enactment in 1993 of restrictions upon the alienation of Maori 
freehold land,
410
 it was common place for Maori freehold land to be sold on a 
willing seller basis.
411
 The Ngahina trustees were proactive in land 
development of which land sales were part. Although there appears to be a 
willing buyer willing seller basis to the Trust’s land transactions with the 
Council, district planning rules restricted the prospective purchasers to one 
party, the Council. Those planning rules had been created by the purchaser.  
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An issue before the Court was whether or not the statutory offer back scheme 
was relevant in light of the circumstances. If the scheme was relevant, 
exceptions to offer back could apply. A similar problem was raised in 
Smiler.
412
 Was land held for a public work or was it held generally by the 
acquiring authority? Representatives of the former Maori owners showed a 
willingness to sell to the Council. The sale of the majority area was initiated by 
the trustees. The second stage transaction wasn’t even transacted under Public 





Ngahina Trust was created by order of the Maori Land Court in 1981. Its 
purpose was to administer several consolidated Maori land blocks in the 
Paraparaumu area on behalf of beneficial Maori owners. Trust lands were 




District Plan restrictions over subject Ngahina Trust lands restricted sale to any 
party other than the local Council. The Trust was actively subdividing other 
lands in its holding for commercial development. However, Council was the 
only prospective purchaser of lands they had designated themselves for road, 
park, recreation reserve and civic purposes.
414
 
During 1981 in an attempt to address their financial problems, previous 
administrators of the trust land had agreed with Kapiti Borough Council to sell 
an area comprising 3.755 hectares. The agreement recorded a term whereby 
the land would be designated for road extension and civic centre. A 
compensation figure of $108,900 was agreed upon and the land was 
accordingly taken under s32 of the Public Works Act 1928 which was the Act 
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in force at that time. All of the trust’s debts were paid from the compensation 
received, and a balance of $60,000 was retained.
415
  
Following the 1981 sale of land to the Council, the Trustees approached 
Council with a proposal to sell more land. The trustees intended to utilise sale 
proceeds for the further development of the Trust’s commercial land 
development.
416
 The land offered to Council was designated under the 
operative District Plan for public purposes. It could not be developed by 
anyone other than Council.
417
 Following interaction between the parties which 
stretched over several years, 12.8 hectares of Trust land was sold to the 
Council in 1989 for $84,800.
418
  
The Council’s intended development of Paraparaumu town centre never went 
ahead. Council had entered into an arrangement with Kapiti Coast Enterprise 
Trust, a charitable trust charged with the responsibility of managing the 
development at arm’s length from Council.
419
 Under the arrangement, Kapiti 
Coast Enterprise Trust was granted an option to purchase the town centre land 
to carry out the contemplated comprehensive development.
420
 However, the 
agreement expired in 1997 following a change in planning direction from the 
Council and a lack of consensus between the parties.
421
Despite several 
attempts, Council could not revive the development and, except for 
constructing three buildings, the land remained undeveloped.
422
 
In 2008, Ngahina Trust and other plaintiffs filed proceedings seeking a High 
Court declaration requiring Council to offer the 1981 and 1987 land back 
under obligations arising under s40 of the Public Works Act 1981.
423
The 
plaintiffs contended that both the 1981 and 1987 land were held for public 
works and were no longer required for public works. The Council disputed that 
it had an obligation to offer the land back. It contended that the 1987 land, 
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having been purchased following a sale offer initiated by the Trust, was not 





What the Courts said 
 
The Ngahina Trust case illustrates the ‘purpose of acquisition’ test laid down 
by the Court of Appeal in in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler.
425
The test enquires 
whether the subject land was held for a public work immediately after it was 
acquired from former owners. MacKenzie J adopted a similar approach 
although the end result for Ngahina Trust was different to the result delivered 
to the hapu of Tauwhareparae in Smiler
426
. MacKenzie J’s approach reads: 
The question whether land is held for a public work must in this case be determined 
by a consideration of the purpose for which the land was acquired. That requires a 




The conclusion to be reached following application of the ‘purpose of 
acquisition’ test will swing entirely upon the facts of each case and the Court’s 
interpretation of those facts.  
We see in Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler the Court of Appeal concluding that 
land was acquired for the general land bank of the Crown, not for a public 
work. The ‘purpose of acquisition’ test in that case led to a finding that the 
former Maori owners were not entitled to a statutory offer to purchase surplus 
land although the land had been designated for a public work several years 
after it was acquired.  
Kapiti Coast District Council eventually conceded that public work purposes 
were behind its acquisition of the 1981 land. These purposes included 
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 Ngahina Trust & Ors v Kapiti Coast District Council HC Wellington CIV-2008-485-1657, 31 May 2010 at [67] 
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extension of a public road, setting apart a segregation strip preventing access 
to a specific portion of public road, and plans for a civic centre. MacKenzie J 
reiterated the public work intention was further evidenced by the acquisition 
having been concluded by way of powers prescribed under public works 
legislation: 
Compensation was paid under the [Public Works Act] and a compensation certificate 




Land acquired for a public work purpose, and by way of public work powers, 
will give rise to s40 offer back provisions.  
The 1987 land had a different acquisition history. It was willingly sold by 
Ngahina Trust. Unlike the 1981 land, the 1987 land was conveyed to Council 
under a conventional sale agreement and the land title was accordingly 
transferred. The Council did not exercise statutory public work powers or 
utilise public work provisions. However, there was more to the circumstances 
of this acquisition. The apparent willingness of the seller was offset by 
Council’s requirement for the land in its district plan. MacKenzie J recognised 
the predicament of the landowners leading up to their sale. District Plan 
designations confined the land use to such degree that only Council could 
utilise it for its designated purpose. MacKenzie J cites Bowler Investments v 
Attorney-General
429
 in comparing the inevitability of the Trust’s sale to the 
Council:  
“…where an owner sells to the Crown because the prospect of a public work has 
denied him a market he is, in a sense, compelled to sell to the Crown.  
While I do not overlook the fact there was no formal [public work] designation, it 
seems to me that in substance, if the market is anticipating the designation and the 
property is thus unsaleable, no material distinction should be drawn on the basis that 
a formal designation has not yet been imposed.  
[It was] emphasised that at the time the Crown did not have to buy, but even if such 
were strictly the case, the simple fact is that the Crown did buy and the obvious 
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reason why it bought was that it must have been satisfied that Bowler Investments 
could not sell elsewhere because of the plans for the northern motorway.”
430 
Circumstances surrounding the sale of Maori freehold land by Ngahina Trust 
to the Council were relevant. Kapiti Coast District Council was found to have 
acquired the 1987 land for a public work.
431
 The ‘purpose of acquisition’ test 
revealed the true nature of the acquisition. Designations under the local 
authority’s District Plan forced the hand of Ngahina Trust. The mechanism 
under which the land was transferred was deemed irrelevant.  
The absence of compulsion in an acquisition of land for a public work may 
qualify an exemption to offer land back if such circumstances amount to an 
offer being unreasonable.
432
 If it wasn’t for the District Plan designation 
limiting the practical utilisation of the 1987 Ngahina Trust land, Council may 
have been justified to exempt the land from offer back.
433
  
A relatively small area of the former Ngahina Trust land, comprising 7400m², 
was in 1987 vested in Kapiti Coast District Council as reserve contribution 
upon subdivision. 
434
The plaintiffs did not seek a declaration for this area to be 
offered back to them. It had already been ruled in Dunbar v Hurinui District 
Council that land taken for reserve contribution upon subdivision is not subject 
to s40 offer back provisions.
435
  
The Court considered whether or not the 1981 land and 1987 land were no 
longer required for a public work. Kapiti Coast District Council contended that 
the 1981 land and the 1987 land was not surplus to requirements. MacKenzie J 





and found otherwise. Hull emphasises the critical 
role of the facts when determining whether public works land is surplus to 
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An affirmative decision by the land holding agency or conduct 
to the same effect can lead to an inference that public works land is no longer 
required.
 439
 If the land holding agency is in a genuine state of indecision over 
whether it still requires a public work property, it is likely to have difficulty to 
justify its indecision: 
“… if any reasonable person would undoubtedly have concluded that in all the 
circumstances the land was no longer required for the relevant public work …”
440
  
The Horton principle is that once land is no longer required for a public work, 
or any other public work or exchange, the land holding agency cannot retract 
its decision or reinstate a defunct public work status. When a public work 
purpose or exchange is no longer valid, the right to an offer back immediately 
vests in the former owners or their successors subject only to those exceptions 
prescribed under s40(2) of the Act.
441
  
Kapiti Coast District Council’s attempt to distance itself from developing 
Paraparaumu town centre by passing responsibility to Kapiti Coast Enterprise 
Trust introduced a possibility that the public work nature of the development 
was no longer applicable. If this was the case the land would be deemed 
surplus to requirements and Council’s offer back obligations would be 
triggered. In relinquishing its control, the project would not qualify as a local 
work authorised under public works legislation. The term ‘local work’ under 
the Public Works Act 1981 means:  
“… a work constructed or intended to be constructed by or under the control of a 
local authority, or for the time being under the control of a local authority.”
442
 
The Council could not maintain enough control of the project under the terms 
of its arrangement with Kapiti Coast Enterprise Trust. The multiple purpose 
nature of the contemplated development into public and commercial facilities 
was enough to conclude that none of the subject land was required for public 
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Council acquired the land for designated public purposes, but its 
plans proceeded beyond those purposes and beyond what could be justified as 
public or local works.
444
 
The Court referred to a leading Court of Appeal decision which addressed 
mixed public work and commercial uses over land designated for public 
works. McElroy v Auckland International Airport
445
concerns land taken for 
aerodrome and utilised for Auckland International Airport. Not only does the 
airport serve its core function, there is also significant retail and commercial 
activity on site which extends well beyond core airport operations.  The Court 
of Appeal held that a modern international airport would be unworkable 
without a mixed commercial purpose. It would be unworkable and unrealistic 
in such case to fragment airport land ownership solely to cater for a purest 
application and strict enforcement of public work purpose.
446
  
MacKenzie J decided that the contemplated mixed public work and 
commercial purpose for Paraparaumu town centre was not justified in the same 
manner as a modern international airport. Commercial and civic purposes for 
the town centre were not so intertwined that Council must retain ownership 
and control of the land.
447
 It could divest itself of ownership and control of 
commercial land without undue interruption to civic activity on civic land.  
It was concluded that not all of the 1981 land and 1987 land was still required 
for a public work.
448
The Court directed Council to ascertain which part of the 
subject land was no longer required for a public work, in practical terms 
meaning Council needed to clearly distinguish between its commercial 
purpose and civic purpose. Once this was done, Council would then be in a 
position to determine whether it would be impractical, unreasonable or unfair 
to offer the land back to Ngahina Trust, or whether significant change in the 
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character of the land would exempt Council from its offer back obligations.
449
 
If subdivision of land was required to effect an offer back to former owners or 
their successors, this could be reason under s40(2)(a) of the Act to justify an 
exemption from offer back on grounds it would be impractical to do so.
450
 The 
judgment of MacKenzie J was not appealed.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
Maori are not unfamiliar with taking Court action against public bodies. More 
often than not this will concern exercise of statutory powers. The words of a 
statute are merely one part of the equation, albeit a fundamental part. The 
blurring of statutory rights, powers and obligations happens when background 
facts are applied and each party seeks to preserve their own position.  
There was more to the nature of the Ngahina Trust land transactions than the 
method of conveyance. The district plan was construed in such a way that the 
Ngahina Trust land would inevitably be acquired and held for various public 
purposes. The story behind the relationship and dealings between Ngahina 
Trust and the Council was essential to understanding the true nature of the land 
and its status as a public work. Clarity regarding statutory offer back rights and 
obligations could be ascertained from that point on.  
The statutory offer back scheme under s40 is not limited to circumstances 
where land was compulsorily taken.
451
 Trustees of Ngahina Trust initiated land 
sales to the Council. However, Council had shut down any possibility of the 
land being sold to any other party or developed other than according to 
Council’s plan. This may not have amounted to a compulsory acquisition, but 
it removed all possibility that the sales were conducted openly.  
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NGATI WHATUA O ORAKEI MAORI TRUST BOARD: Justified in 




Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General & Ors HC 





Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General
452
 concerns an 
application for judicial review of a decision by the Department of Survey and 
Land Information
453
 to sell land without the plaintiff having an opportunity to 
tender its purchase offer. It does not concern the land clearance provisions of 
ss40 and 41 of the Act which presumably had been addressed before the 
subject land was offered for tender on the open market. The case is an example 
of Maori engaging in the Crown’s land disposal process and raising concerns 
essentially at odds with that process. A problem for Maori arises when genuine 
concerns have no legal standing.  
Events in Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General took 
place during an era which predated Treaty of Waitangi settlements and the 
formal protection mechanism to hold surplus Crown land for Treaty settlement 
purposes. A protection mechanism process was later sanctioned by Cabinet for 
Government agencies to consult with Maori before selling surplus land. If 
Maori express an interest in such land, the Office of Treaty Settlements will 
now purchase it from the vendor Government agency and hold the land in a 
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regional landbank pending claim settlement. If called upon by a successful 
claimant, the land-banked property can be used as part settlement of their 








Although the Crown’s protection mechanism is now in place to protect 
claimants’ interests in surplus Crown land from sale to third party purchasers, 
such a mechanism is unlikely to exist without pressure brought upon the 
Crown by litigants such as Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board. The 
Trust Board’s claim before the High Court was unsuccessful with the right of 
the Crown to sell to a third party purchaser upheld. Regardless of the outcome 
under black letter law, the decision by Cabinet to introduce the Crown land 
protection mechanism shows that the Trust Board’s cause was valid and well 
placed, if not before its time. The wheels of Government move slowly and, 
unfortunately for Ngati Whatua, too slow to prevent the subject surplus land at 
Auckland from being lost into private hands. Ministerial responses to 
questions raised by the Trust Board prior to the Crown’s sale were too slow, 
vague or non-existent for a change of policy to help in the situation.
455
Valid 
and well placed principles may not be recognised under black letter law. 
However, claims on these grounds will sometimes indicate a need for law 
change or policy change. The practical requirements of Maori seeking to 
engage with the Crown as their Treaty partner are not always supported in law.  
 
                                                          
454
 Office of Treaty Settlements Protection of Maori Interests in Surplus Crown-Owned Land: Information for 
Crown Agencies (June 2006) at 2 – see www.linz.govt.nz/.../cp_protection-mechanism-information-for-crown-
agencies.pdf 
455
 Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General & Ors HC Auckland M.1501/92, 18 November 
1992 at 5 – 8 and 14 – The Court refers to correspondence from Mr Te Aho, solicitor for the Trust Board to the 
Prime Minister, Minister of Lands, Minister of State Owned Enterprises, Minister of Education and Minister of 
Maori Affairs with replies from private secretaries to the Minister of Lands and Minister of Maori Affairs and a 






The Tamaki Girls College some years beforehand was located in a suburb of 
Auckland on 4.7150 hectares of Crown owned land administered by the 
Ministry of Education. The college was amalgamated with Tamaki Boys 
College and relocated to another site. The Tamaki Girls College land was 
therefore no longer required by the Ministry of Education. Buildings on the 
land were leased and utilised for some years by community groups with an 
emphasis upon Maori education. Activities on site included pre-school and 
primary school Maori language education under Kohanga Reo and Kura 
Kaupapa Maori schemes. Skills and technical training to young Maori were 
also taught under a Maccess scheme.
456
  
The Ministry of Education decided in 1991 that the land should be sold. Early 
in 1992 it was decided that the sale process would be promoted by public 
tender. Terms of tender included a tender closing time and date of 4.00pm 10 
June 1992. The sale process was facilitated by Mr MacLean who was then the 
Auckland office manager at Landcorp Reality Limited.
457
 
Mr MacLean met with representatives of Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust 
Board. The Trust Board representatives expressed their concern for the land. 
They considered that the land was Maori land and should be dealt with in a 
manner which recognises their Treaty of Waitangi claim.
458
 Only a matter of 
days after the meeting, the Waitangi Tribunal on 22 April 1992 delivered an 
interim decision about other land in Auckland, known as Sylvia Park, which 
had been sold by the Crown but was the subject of claims by Ngati Whatua 
and other iwi.
459
 The Waitangi Tribunal recommended that the proceeds of 
sale should be held on trust in an interest bearing account until the claims are 
settled. It also recommended that the Crown should negotiate with Ngati 
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 Ngati Whatua, Ngati Paoa and Ngaitai WAI 276, 72 and 121 
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Whatua and the other iwi claimants for a suitable land disposal mechanism 




The Trust Board instructed its solicitor, Mr Te Aho, to act. On 28 April 1992, 
Mr Te Aho wrote to the Prime Minister asking if the government would be 
adopting the Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendation regarding Crown land in 
Auckland. His letter was copied to the Minister of Lands and Landcorp. Other 
than a written acknowledgement from the Prime Minister’s private secretary 
promising a reply “as soon as possible”, there was no reply.
461
Mr Te Aho 
wrote several more letters on behalf of the Trust Board in light of the Waitangi 
Tribunal’s recommendation seeking to progress an arrangement to purchase or 
acquire the former Tamaki Girl’s College land. These letters were addressed to 
the Minister of Lands, the Minister of State Owned Enterprises, the Minister of 
Education and the Minister of Maori Affairs. The letters were acknowledged 
again with promises to reply “as soon as possible”. The correspondence all 
took place within a six week time frame. The only response beyond a basic 
acknowledgement was from the Minister of Lands, dated almost two weeks 
after the subject property was unconditionally sold to a third party purchaser. 
The Minister explained that the property was sold and that negotiations with 
the Trust Board had “fallen through”. Mr Te Aho replied to the Minister’s 
letter disputing that negotiations had ceased.
462
 
The Trust Board relied upon the advertised tender closing date of 10 June 1992 
as the date upon which they had to lodge their own tender to have any chance 
of acquiring the surplus Crown property. The tender conditions recorded that 
the property could be sold beforehand by private treaty, outside from the 
tender process, should an early offer be acceptable to the vendor.
463
 On 29 
May 1992 a third party purchaser presented an unconditional offer on the basis 
that such offer was only open for that day. The proposed purchase price was 
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within the Crown’s expectations. Mr MacLean phoned Mr Te Aho and 
explained that the offer had been received although Mr MacLean had not yet 
seen it. Mr Te Aho told Mr MacLean that the Trust Board was due to meet 
before the tender closing date to discuss its offer if there was a 
quorum.
464
Following consultation between officials, the Crown accepted the 





What the Courts said 
 
The Trust Board presented three arguments in its proceedings:  
The first argument was based upon the statutory provision for general disposal 
of land not required for a public work, s42 of the Public Works Act 1981. 
Where surplus public works land has been cleared from ss40 and 41 offer back 
obligations, s42(1)(d) provides that the chief executive of Land Information 
New Zealand
466
 may:  
“Cause the land to be offered for sale by public auction, public tender, private treaty, 
or by public application at a specified price…”
467
  
Section 42(2) then requires the chief executive to give public notice of public 
tenders to certain people, including former owners and owners of adjoining 
land, no later than 20 working days before the tender closing date.
468
  
The Trust Board argued that the Crown was statute bound to the tender process 
and unlawfully withdrew from that process by unconditionally selling the 
property before the tender closing date. The Court rejected this argument. The 
ability of a vendor to accept, before a tender closing date, an offer lodged 
outside of the tender process is “…just a matter of commercial decision-
                                                          
464
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making in the market place.”
469
The Court’s interpretation of the sale methods 
prescribed under s42(1)(d) did not lock the chief executive into a mandatory 
tender process once sale by tender was decided.
470
  
The Trust Board failed in its argument alleging the Crown behaved 
unlawfully. There was no improper or underhanded behaviour exercised by the 
third party purchaser, nor was there any improper or unscrupulous behaviour 
or dealings by the officials when attending to the surplus land disposal. The 
sale transaction was conducted within the law and in keeping with typical 
commercial practice regarding sale and purchase of land.
471
 The needs and 
interests of Ngati Whatua fell outside of black letter law and those commercial 
norms.  
Fairness  
The Court also considered the Trust Board’s two arguments based on fairness. 
The first fairness argument was the Crown deprived the Trust Board the 
opportunity of buying the land when it accepted the third party offer 
notwithstanding expressions of interest and communications regarding the 
Trust Board’s intention to present an offer to buy the land. The second fairness 
argument was based upon the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Trust 
Board contended that it was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to present its 
offer and negotiate in good faith and there was no proper reason for the Crown 
to withdraw the tender deadline to accommodate the third party purchaser.
472
  
Both fairness arguments were rejected by the Court. The judgment records: 
“It is not unfair to observe that it is really a case of “first come first served” …”
473
 
Market place principles prevailed in absence of express statutory policy or 
Crown policy to the contrary. Treaty of Waitangi obligations were irrelevant in 
the judicial context. There was no legislative authority to justify such 
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 If there was an abuse of process or ““trickery” when dealing 
with Maori rights”
475
, the Court would intervene. But neither the Crown nor 
its servants exercised any such behaviour in their dealings with the Trust 
Board or in the sale to the third party purchaser.  
 
Legitimate Expectation 
There were no evidential grounds to support the Trust Board’s contention it 
held a legitimate expectation that its offer would be received and considered. 
The property was offered for sale on an open market basis. The Crown’s 
consultation and communications with the Trust Board did not amount to a 
promise for special consideration, or any consideration, of an offer from the 
Trust Board should it be forthcoming.
476
 The Trust Board held no special 
status in the open market environment. A reasonable expectation was 
acknowledged by the Court, but the standard for legitimate expectation which 





The Court rejected a further claim by the Trust Board that the Crown had acted 
unreasonably by abandoning the tender process to consider and accept a third 
party offer. The third party offer was within the price range the Crown 
expected for the property. In light of the open market nature of the surplus land 
sale, the Court held that the Crown’s early acceptance of the third party offer 
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Ngati Whatua O Orakei Maori Trust Board v Attorney-General is an example 
that well principled arguments will not be upheld by the Courts unless those 
arguments are supported by law.  
Statutory schemes are important because the rights conferred are binding and 
enforceable through the Courts. With disposal of surplus public works land, 
the s40 offer back scheme offers some protection. It recognises circumstances 
under which land has been taken from private owners for the public good. The 
remedial nature of s40 can be at odds with the government policy agenda and 
priorities of the day. For this reason, Government cannot always be relied 
upon to voluntarily protect the interests of former owners. The protection must 
be sanctioned by Parliament and available for the Courts to uphold.  
Well principled claims on grounds not supported in law will sometimes 
indicate a need for law change or policy change. It may be just as important 
for law makers and policy makers to note the legal cases lost by Maori as well 
as those where Maori have succeeded. The practical requirements of Maori are 
not always recognised in law. If the Crown is genuine with its engagement of 
Maori as its Treaty partner, gaps in the law must be reviewed and addressed. 
To its credit, the Crown implemented the Crown land protection mechanism to 
avoid a repeat of circumstances that gave rise to the Ngati Whatua O Orakei 













The objective of statutory offer back must be revised. The existing scheme is 
essentially a first option in favour of former owners or their successors to 
purchase surplus public works land at market value. The objective under 
revised legislation should more appropriately be for the Crown to offer back 
and also return to Maori surplus public works land where that is at all possible.  
The offer back scheme was at its introduction in 1981 the realisation of a 
significant shift in policy regarding surplus public works land. Instead of a 
mechanism purely to assist the Crown and local authorities dispose of 
unwanted public works land, the interests of former owners and their 
successors is now recognised.  
For Maori, the offer back of surplus public works land to them will only be 
meaningful if there is a reasonable chance of the land being returned to their 
hands. The ability to overcome barriers to follow through on land purchases at 
market value is a very real problem.  
 
Need for Reform 
 
Several decades have now passed since statutory offer back obligations were 
introduced. The offer back provisions under the Public Works Act 1981 have 
remained substantially unchanged since the law was first enacted. A lot has 
happened since that time in the arena of Crown land and Maori issues. 
Corporatisation and privatisation of government owned assets, modification of 
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surplus Crown land disposal mechanisms, express statutory acknowledgement 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori land legislative reform, Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements and greater public awareness and empathy for Maori land related 
issues are some legal, political and social developments which have taken 
place in Aotearoa New Zealand since 1981. These factors together with the 
judicial narrative from decades of offer back cases serve as a firm basis upon 
which to review the statutory offer back regime and assess how it could more 
appropriately reflect the Crown’s special duty to Maori in a modern context.  
The existing requirement for the Crown to offer surplus public works land 
back to former owners or their successors is futile unless there is a real 
possibility that the surplus land may in fact be returned to those entitled people 
should they wish to exercise their right. Maori in particular will face 
significant difficulty to follow through on land purchase arrangements under 
the existing offer back regime.  
Maori interests in land typically involve multiple parties, in keeping with the 
notion of communal ownership and compounded by traditional land 
succession arrangements enshrined in legislation.
479
 The ability of Maori to 
accept an offer within the prescribed 40 working day time period
480
 is 
encumbered with several logistical constraints. These include the need for all 
prospective purchasers to understand the full implications of the offer and 
reach a consensus amongst their own group as to whether or not the terms 
prescribed by the Crown can be met.  
The task for multiple people to raise funds to purchase land at market 
valuation is complex. Where it is intended for surplus public works land to be 
vested in the purchasers as Maori freehold land,
481
 Maori are likely to struggle 
to raise finance from mainstream lenders who are reluctant to accept mortgage 
security over Maori freehold land.  
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2009 - Public Works (Offer Back of and Compensation for Acquired 
Land) Amendment Bill 
 
During 2007, the Public Works (Offer Back of and Compensation for 
Acquired Land) Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament. The Bill 
sought to ensure former owners of surplus public works land are given the first 
right of refusal to purchase land no longer required for the original public work 
for which it was taken.
482
 A proposal was made for solatium payments, being 
payments compensatory or consolatory in nature, to former owners where land 
taken was not actually used.
483
 Another purpose of the Bill was to:  
“…provide for the descendants of the former owners to exercise [offer back rights], 
where the former owners are deceased.” [emphasis added]
484
 
It is not clear whether use of the term ‘descendants’ was intentional. There is 
no express provision proposing to replace the term ‘successor’ as it appears in 
s40(2) and defined in s40(5) of the Act. However, the term ‘descendants’ does 
imply an intention for the offer back right to extend beyond the ‘one step’ 
obiter succession limit observed by the Court of Appeal in Port of Gisborne v 
Smiler 
485
and adopted by the High Court in Kane v Attorney-General.
486
  
The Bill was not passed. A Select Committee report noted: 
“…the intent of the bill is addressed by current mechanisms for redress for 
compensation and offer back, available through the Court system and Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlement processes. …Nevertheless, it is apparent to us in the bill’s 
motivation, and comments made in submissions to the bill, that significant concern 
remains about the effects of activities conducted under the various forms of the 
[Public Works] Act in New Zealand’s history.” 
487
 
                                                          
482
 Public Works (Offer Back and Compensation for Acquired Land) Amendment Bill 2007 (139-1) 
483
 Ibid cl 6 
484
 Ibid cl 4 Purposes 
485
 Port Gisborne Ltd v Smiler & Ors CA 182-98, 26 April 1999, [1999] 2 NZLR 695 at [44] – [45] 
486
 Kane v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 251 at [23] 
487
 Local Government and Environment Committee Recommendation on Public Works (Offer Back of and 
Compensation for Acquired Land) Amendment Bill (21 June 2010) at 4 
135 
 
Instead of the compensatory nature reflected under the Bill, the attempt for 
reform may have been better placed with a scheme or mechanism to enable 
former Maori owners or their descendants to overcome barriers that would 
otherwise prevent surplus public works land from being returned to them 
under the existing statutory offer back scheme. Land owners are eligible for 
compensation when their land is taken for a public work.
488
 The adequacy or 
fairness of compensation is an issue better considered under provisions of the 
Act which address compensation. If taking land for a public work purpose, 
with or without compensation, has in the past given rise to a breach of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, this issue is best considered in the Treaty 
settlement forum. The offer back of surplus public works land to former 
owners or their successors is a different issue.  
The select committee report records that the Member or Parliament who 
sponsored the Bill, Te Ururoa Flavell, acknowledged the difficulty of 
amending the Act as proposed in his bill. However, it also noted Mr Flavell’s 
submission that a comprehensive review of the offer back provisions should be 
conducted by Land Information New Zealand as the government agency 
responsible for administration of the Act. The report records his view that a 
review of the Act should include a Treaty of Waitangi clause and amendments 
to s40 that acknowledge and address historical injustices committed under the 
Act.
489
 Any advancement of these ideals appears to have been lost in the 
compensatory or consolatory proposals under the Bill.  
Parliament is the supreme law maker in New Zealand. Change to the existing 
statutory offer back regime must be carefully designed as any such change will 
have significant implications for Maori and all New Zealand. On one hand, 
reform ought to meet desired objectives for change. On the other hand, reform 
must be workable alongside other statutory regimes and administrative 
systems.  
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Early 2000s - Legislative Review of the Public Works Act  
 
The Government carried out an extensive review of the entire Public Works 
Act during the early 2000s. The review included strong themes articulating the 
Crown’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. Excerpts from a public 
discussion paper of December 2000 released by Land Information New 
Zealand records:  
“The Government has decided to undertake a review of the 1981 Act to:   
… 
- ensure that exercise of the 1981 Act powers, functions and duties is within a 
statutory framework that accords with Treaty of Waitangi principles;  
… 
The Government has decided that certain principles will apply to the new Act. These 
include:  
… 
- That the Act’s acquisition and disposal procedures are just and transparent for all 
parties; and 
- Crown obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi 
… 
The review objective is to provide legislation that is clear, workable, sufficiently 
flexible to be able to meet current and future requirements for public works, and 
gives effect to Crown obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.  
… 
The approach taken is a rigorous consultative process that identifies and addresses 
broad key issues, including:  
… 
- Disposal of land no longer required for a public work;  
- Matters raised by the Waitangi Tribunal;  
… 
- Whether Treaty of Waitangi provisions should be included in any new legislation.490  
 
‘The new Act’ never eventuated. It was not even presented as a bill before 
Parliament. Striking the perfect balance between the Crown serving the greater 
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public interest and observing its obligations under the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi is perhaps an impossible task regarding public works legislation. 
As the Waitangi Tribunal observed, Crown powers of compulsory acquisition 
of land cuts right across the guarantee of Maori rangatiratanga it promised 
under Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi.
491
 Rather than seeking the perfect 
unattainable balance, new public works legislation should instead seek to 
capture the intent of the Government articulated in the Discussion Paper 
regarding its Treaty obligations and resulting special relationship it considers 
to hold with Maori. Until such arrangement is enshrined in law as a standard 
which would give rise to accountability, these words are vulnerable to being 
described as aspirational at best or contradictory at worst.  
The Discussion Paper asks whether or not an offer back scheme is needed in 
new public works legislation.
492
The argument for repealing offer back rights is 
based upon land owners having already received monetary compensation for 
losing their land. From a Maori viewpoint, monetary compensation for losing 
fee simple title and possession is unlikely to adequately compensate for the 
land loss. Customary ties to land will remain. Wahi tapu sacred sites are not 
erased when fee simple title passes from Maori. The status of those sites 
remains significant to Maori in a cultural sense. There may even be a valid 
question whether or not a form of customary title may exist over such land, a 
title which recognises customary status not severed by exercise of compulsory 
powers of acquisition under the Act.  
The review of the Act was an opportunity to consider how well the existing 
offer back regime works in practice and whether it is appropriate to introduce 
changes to cater for the requirements, objectives and values of the current day. 
The only reliable way to test the suitability of offer back legislation is to apply 
it to a set of facts.
 493
 Despite the offer back regime being in place for almost 
20 years at the time of the review, and the Government expressing the 
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importance of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in its public works role, 
it is surprising that modifications to the law were never advanced.  
Submissions to the review of the Act were summarised by Land Information 
New Zealand and released in a report of August 2001. On the disposal of 
surplus public works land, offer back of surplus land to former owners 
generated the most responses. Approximately two thirds of submitters were 
either users of the Act, such as government agencies and local authorities, or 
Maori. The number of submissions from these two groups was more or less 
equal at approximately 65 each.
494
 The users of the Act supported streamlining 
the offer back process as much as possible. They considered the existing 
regime was too costly and time consuming to implement so therefore needed 
to be revised.
 
On the other hand, Maori submitters had strong views that 
surplus public works land should be offered back in all cases, and such offers 
should be conducted at either no cost or less than market value.
495
  
Some Maori submitted that additional compensation should be paid to former 
owners in recognition of the benefit received from the land while it was held 
for a public work. This view was later captured in the defeated Public Works 
(Offer Back and Compensation for Acquired Land) Amendment Bill 2007. 
496
 
It illustrates that Maori remain connected to land notwithstanding the loss of 
ownership of fee simple title. A cultural or customary connection prevails.  
The connection former Maori owners hold to public works land could be 
easily overlooked if the context of discussion is limited to legal ownership of 
the fee simple. An argument that connection to land will be severed upon 
transfer of the fee simple is foreign under Maori custom.  
Maori custom regarding natural and physical resources is supported under 
legislation as a ‘matter of national importance’. Section 6 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 reads:  
                                                          
494





 Public Works (Offer Back and Compensation for Acquired Land) Amendment Bill 2007 (139-1) 
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In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers 
under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and 
physical resources, shall recognise and provide for the following matters of national 
importance:  
… 
(e) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral 
lands, water, sites, wahi tapu, and other taonga. 
(g) the protection of protected customary rights. 
497
 
Section 7 of the Resource Management Act continues with this theme:  
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers 
under it, in relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and 
physical resources, shall have particular regard to –  
(a) Kaitiakitanga [which means the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an 
area in accordance with Tikanga Maori in relation to natural and physical resources; 
and includes the ethic of stewardship].  ….
498
 
The role and status of Maori as prevailing ‘kaitiaki’ or guardian over natural 
and physical resources is not lost over public works land. The role and status 
of Maori former owners will in fact be strengthened regarding public works 
land if the Crown’s acknowledgement of its Treaty of Waitangi obligations 




Submissions regarding to whom the offer back should be made were received 
during the review of the Act. Section 40(2) requires that the offer be presented 
to the person from whom the land was acquired or the successor of that 
person.
500
According to the summary of submissions, users of the legislation 
preferred measures which would reduce the administrative burden on them. 
Discussion whether the offer back obligation should be limited to only the 
former owner, not the successor of that former owner, was “…seen to balance 
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the interests of both the former owner and the acquirer.”
501
Some submitters 
proposed a time limit after which the obligation to offer land back would 
lapse. It must be accepted that the offer back regime, whether the existing 
regime or a regime under revised legislation, must not be disproportionately 
burdensome to administer. However, any perceived difficulty with the unique 
Maori land system and succession arrangements under relevant legislation 
should not be grounds to promote a ‘simplified’ offer back process to merely 
avoid such system and arrangements. To do so would be prejudicial against 
Maori. Extending an opportunity to a person to buy back land previously taken 
from them for a public work is not an exercise of convenience. It is a remedial 
exercise designed to confer a personal benefit on those with an attachment to 
the land.
502
It is for that reason a ‘simplification’ of the existing offer back 
regime should be treated with caution. Reform should not erode the rights of 
the class of person entitled to offer back under the existing Act.  
 
 
Enduring Connection between Maori and Public Works Land 
 
The compulsory loss of land to a public work will for Maori typically result in 
consequences which cannot be addressed by fiscal compensation at market 
land value. Ngati Turangitukua was deeply affected by the loss of its land and 
subsequent development when in 1964 the Ministry of Works moved under 
public works powers to establish a township at Turangi.
503
 The Waitangi 
Tribunal observed the far reaching consequences of the public work:  
The Tribunal found that as a result of inadequate consultation with the Ngati 
Turangitukua people, the Crown failed to mitigate the trauma and adverse social 
repercussions from their activities at Turangi. As the Tribunal noted, this has resulted 
in the dislocation of households, the loss of lifestyle and livelihood, and the loss of 
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the guarantee of a place on ancestral lands for their children. The pain of this loss is 
long term and is being passed on to the next generation. 
504 
These implications for all former Maori owners should be considered against 
the offer back scheme under existing public works legislation. The purpose of 
offer back legislation is remedial in nature. Restoration of former owners to 
their traditional land is an important part of their social, cultural and economic 
wellbeing.  
Ngati Turangitukua’s experience shows that aspects of customary authority 
over public works land will prevail over physical and natural resources. 
However, this prevailing interest is not recognised under the Public Works 
Act. Absence of any such statutory provision may have been a factor why the 
acquiring authority behaved in such an authoritative manner in complete 
disregard to the values and concerns of former Maori owners.  
Customary authority exercised by an iwi or hapu in relation to a particular area 
is the basis for holding ‘mana whenua’ status.
505
 That customary authority is 
not revoked when land is taken for a public work. Parliament recognises the 
relevance of ‘tangata whenua’ for purposes under the Resource Management 
Act 1991.
506
 The iwi or hapu holding mana whenua over a particular area have 
rights conferred under that statutory scheme. This recognition is based upon 
customary authority over a particular area. It is not based upon the formal 
notion of land ownership from which an owner will be alienated upon sale or 
confiscation.  
Ngati Turangitukua’s affiliation with its land continued after the public work 
taking by the Ministry of Works. Several wahi tapu sacred sites remained in 
the area. Crown officials gave undertakings to Ngati Turangitukua that wahi 
tapu would not be interfered with. A senior Ministry of Works official gave 
assurances that wahi tapu would be respected and protected.
507
Unfortunately, 
several sites were not respected or protected. One such site was an old urupa 
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called Te Puke a Ria. It was a small hill within an area that the Ministry of 
Works designated for industrial purposes. At the summit lay the remains of 
Ria. For years, she mourned the loss of her husband from the summit which 
looked out to Motiti where he had died. The Tribunal heard evidence that Te 
Puke a Ria was sacred and had been cared for by Ngati Turangitukua.
508
 The 
site was desecrated when the public works were carried out. The Tribunal 
report reads:  
We were told by Ranginui Biddle of Ngati Hine, a hapu of Ngati Tuwharetoa, what 
happened. He was employed by a contractor who specialised in moving land with 
heavy machinery. He was working in the areas close to the hill known as Te Puke a 
Ria. He approached the hill in his big D8 bulldozer. He then realised this was the 
place where our ‘old kuia was buried’. Ranginui knew this place was ‘very special’. 
He stopped his bulldozer and told his boss they should not be digging there because 
the hill was an urupa. His boss told him the work had to go on. Everything had to be 
done quickly and on time. Ranginui refused to carry on with the destruction of the 
hill. He was instantly dismissed. Te Puke a Ria was flattened and the bones left 
somewhere on the industrial block. They have never been recovered.
509
  
This evidence is a compelling example of former Maori owners retaining 
strong ties to land notwithstanding its acquisition for a public work. In 1998 
Ngati Turangitukua agreed with the Crown to settle its grievances regarding 
the Turangi township development.
510
 The settlement includes a consultation 
protocol for the offer back of surplus public works land.
511
  
The Crown’s failure to protect Ngati Turangitukua wahi tapu was considered 
by the Waitangi Tribunal as one of the most serious of the Crown’s omissions 
to fulfil its Treaty of Waitangi obligations.
512
Acquisition of the fee simple 
estate in land for a public work did not sever the connection retained by the 
former Maori owners. This prevailing connection gave rise to an obligation 
upon the Crown to act reasonably and in good faith towards Ngati 
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Adequacy of compensation for land compulsorily taken from Maori for a 
public work cannot be measured merely by the sum of money paid to former 
owners. Value from a Maori perspective is derived over many generations of 
association and activity with land. Land confers identity while ancestry is 
associated with occupation. These values cannot be translated into monetary 
terms.
514
 This is a position is supported in the landmark 1987 Court of Appeal 
case New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General where Richardson J 
observes:  
“As expressed in the English text [of the Treaty of Waitangi], the guarantee to the 
Maori collectively and individually was of "the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and other properties" as long 
as they wished to retain them. In the Maori text it is the rangatiratanga, the 
chieftainship of those lands, which is protected. … 
There are difficulties in ascribing either perspective as having the full understanding 
of the Treaty partners at the time. However, read in conjunction with article 2, two 
points at least are clear. One is that the protection accorded to land rights is a positive 
"guarantee" on the part of the Crown. This means that, where grievances are 
established, the State for its part is required to take positive steps in reparation. The 
other is that possession of land and the rights to land are not measured simply in 
terms of economic utility and immediately realisable commercial values.”
515
 
Fee simple title to land confers upon the holder various rights and privileges. 
One of the most significant of these is the right of exclusive possession. 
Taking land from Maori owners not only alienates them physically from the 
land, it also interrupts the ancestral association which is part of their cultural 
identity. Return of surplus public works land to former Maori owners is a 
means by which the inadequacy of monetary compensation at the time of 
taking could be addressed. The return of land is remedial in its full sense.  
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The Waitangi Tribunal in its Turangi observations recognises the prevailing 
connection Ngati Turangitukua has with its traditional lands. The connection 
prevails notwithstanding confiscation of the fee simple estate and the denial of 
land possession in favour of the Crown for public works. The basis of this 
traditional connection is Ngati Turangitukua’s affinity to specific significant 
sites together with their responsibility for such land which has been exercised 
and passed down for generations.  
Former Maori owners do not lay claim to responsibility for carrying out public 
works over such lands. That responsibility rests with the Crown in its domain. 
Responsibility for the bones of ancestors and other culturally significant issues 
which lay upon public works land rests with former Maori owners as tangata 
whenua. The Crown, in its role as facilitator of public works, has an overriding 
duty to respect and protect the enduring role and responsibilities of former 
Maori owners. Former Maori owners remain as tangata whenua over public 
works land.  
Alienation of the fee simple estate from Maori does not equate to the 
alienation of Maori from their role and responsibility as tangata whenua of 
public works land. The Treaty partnership between the Crown and Maori is 
further justification for the Crown to preserve and protect the role and 
responsibility of tangata whenua over public works land. To do so would be an 




Uncontested evidence was presented before the Court of Appeal in the 1987 
New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General lands case to support the 
significance of land in Maori culture. Richardson J quoted with approval from 
a New Zealand Maori Council paper Kaupapa – Te Wahanga Tuatahi which 
reads:  
“It [Maori Land] provides us with a sense of identity, belonging and continuity. It is 
proof of our continued existence not only as a people, but as the tangata whenua of 
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this country. It is proof of our tribal and kin group ties, Maori land represents 
turangawaewae [a place to stand]. 
It is proof of our link with the ancestors of our past, and with the generations yet to 




The return of surplus public works land to former Maori owners will restore 
continuity between past and future generations. In keeping with the 
observation of Richardson J, where grievances are established, such as where 
the connection to land is lost to a public work, the State for its part is required 
to take positive steps in reparation.
518
Reparation solely in monetary terms will 
not restore to Maori a sense of identity, belonging and continuity.
519
 
Reparation for the loss of these values can only be satisfied when subject land 
is returned to the people from whom it was taken. The State is therefore 
obliged to take all reasonable steps to ensure, wherever possible, that surplus 
public works land is not only offered to former Maori owners but also that 





Reform of Public Works Act offer back provisions is well overdue. The 
suitability of the offer back scheme as an effective remedial instrument for 
Maori must be seriously reconsidered by Parliament.  
Maori have strong ties to land, including land for which they no longer hold 
fee simple title. Public works land taken for the greater public good should be 
offered back to the former owners and their successors when it is no longer 
required. However, the offer back should be more than a token procedure with 
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little chance of land return. Surplus public works land should be returned to 
former Maori owners and their descendants where that is at all possible. The 
return of land is remedial in its full sense.  
There has been no material change in the Public Works Act following the 
extensive review carried out in the early 2000s. The offer back scheme is 
essentially the same as when it was first passed into law in 1981, well over 
three decades ago. A revised offer back scheme is now required to better 
address the remedial purpose of the scheme when public works land formerly 
owned by Maori is no longer required for a public work.  
Maori hold an ancestral connection to land. This is interrupted when land is 
taken away from them for the greater public good. The blanket policy for 
succession of Maori and non-Maori interests under the existing offer back 
scheme fails to adequately cater for the ancestral association specific to Maori. 
Their connection extends well beyond the one step succession limit imposed in 
existing offer back law. This is compelling reason alone for Parliament to 






SURPLUS PUBLIC WORKS LAND: THE 




The Crown owes a special duty to Maori regarding the offer back of surplus 
public works land. The Crown’s responsibility to Maori as its Treaty partner is 
inherent to constitutional arrangements in place since 1840 and which endures 
to the present day. The duty not only extends to responsibility for the statutory 
offer back scheme itself, but also to ongoing issues arising between the Crown 
and Maori which indicate the need for statutory revision and reform. There is 
little point in having a remedial offer back scheme unless it is effective in 
achieving the purpose for which it was enacted.  
The statutory offer back scheme has been in operation for well over three 
decades. The judicial narrative illustrates the importance of a statutory scheme 
for offer back. Statutory schemes are enforceable. History shows that the 
triggering of offer back obligations has not always been understood or 
observed by responsible land holding agencies. Government institutions face 
pressures which compete for attention and priority. Good policy in principle is 
not as powerful as good policy in law. Remedial policy directed toward former 
owners of public works land will not be granted priority by public 
administrative authorities if it was not for Parliament sanctioned offer back 
provisions.  
A reform of the offer back legislation would be an opportunity to consider 
improving the scheme for Maori and keep pace with developments since 1981. 
Such improvement could include a statutory mandate for the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi to be observed, similar to Treaty provisions under other 
legislation.
520
 The remedial nature and purpose of the offer back scheme is 
likely to be better served with measures that would ensure surplus public 
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works land is returned to former Maori owners and their descendants where 
that is at all possible. 
Maori continue to hold a real personal interest in land notwithstanding the loss 
of such sites for public works and notwithstanding the passing of time and 
generations. Customary authority known as ‘mana whenua’ is still relevant and 
exercised by an iwi or hapu over public works land.
521
 Just as the ‘mana 
whenua’ status of Maori endures and is recognised under statute, so too must 
offer back rights endure for all descendants of original Maori owners who 
have lost or surrendered lands for public works. The one step succession limit 
imposed upon Maori under existing offer back law is entirely inappropriate 
and is in need of reform.  
Long overdue reform of the offer back scheme will only be realised if 
Parliament makes it a priority to do so. The Crown’s special duty to Maori 
regarding the offer back of surplus public works land is governed by statute 
law which has not kept pace with developments since 1981. The Crown’s 
special Treaty relationship with Maori has come a long way since then.  
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